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Summary  
This thesis investigates ways in which the Fast & Frugal Heuristics (F&FH) programme in 
the field of Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) theory can be brought to bear on the 
phenomenon of disinformation.  The study applies existing theory to develop an argument 
around the capacity of the F&FH framework to respond in a normative, descriptive and 
prescriptive fashion specifically to implicature-type disinformation. This leads to conclusions 
about the usefulness of the programme for a specific field that is supposed to be within the 
ambit of the programme. 
The study attempts to answer the research question by examining the philosophical and 
developmental history of JDM and of disinformation as a theme of inquiry.  With the 
necessary background as context, the phenomenon of disinformation is investigated, 
specifically in the case of advertisements.  Specific focus is given to pictorial metaphor that 
may lead to disinformation. 
The study concludes that F&FH only succeeds to some extent in its descriptive capacity, 
whilst it fails to provide normative or prescriptive insights when faced with implicature-type 
disinformation in the following ways: firstly, proponents of the F&FH programme seem self-
contradictory about the value of F&FH as a decision making theory – on the one hand they 
are generally positive about the its descriptive, normative and prescriptive abilities, whilst 
fully admitting to fundamental problems in every aspect of the theory and its applications.  
Secondly, even though there is a general admission of the importance of social and cultural 
elements in decision making, F&FH still remains intrinsically individualistic.  As such it will 
fail to recognise deception and disinformation as those form part of a language act that is 
specifically designed around hidden motives and specialised persuasion techniques.  Thirdly, 
F&FH will not be able to break free from the underlying issues it faces without breaking free 
from its philosophical underpinnings. F&FH still remains primarily empiricist through its 
behaviourist/positivist assumptions and application and as such fails to recognise the validity 
of concepts such as meaning, belief and attitude. 
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Opsomming  
Die tesis ondersoek die wyses waarop die Fast & Frugal Heuristics (F&FH) program in die 
veld van besluitnemingsteorie van toepassing gemaak kan word op die verskynsel van 
disinformasie. Die studie gebruik bestaande teorie in terme van normatiewe, voorskrywende 
en beskrywende toepassings om argument te ontwikkel rondom die kapasiteit van die F&FH 
raamwerk om te reageer op spesifiek implikatuur-tipe disinformasie. Dit lei tot 
gevolgtrekkings oor die bruikbaarheid van die program vir ‘n spesifieke veld wat 
veronderstel is om binne die bestek van die program te val. 
Die studie poog om die navorsingsvraag te antwoord deur die filosofiese en 
ontwikkelingsgeskiedenis van besluitnemingsteorie asook disinformasie te ondersoek.  Met 
die nodige agtergrond as konteks word die verskynsel van disinformasie deur implikasie 
ondersoek, spesifiek in die geval van die advertensies.  Daar word spesifiek gefokus op 
advertensies waar metafore wat ontwikkel word deur visuele beelde waardeur disinformasie 
geïmpliseer kan word. 
Die studie maak die gevolgtrekking dat F&FH slegs tot ’n mate sukses behaal as 
beskrywende teorie terwyl dit nie suksesvol toegepas kan word as normatiewe en 
voorskrywende teorie nie. Die volgende probleme word uitgelig: eerstens, voorstaanders van 
die F&FH program hou teenstrydige perspektiewe voor – aan die een kant is hulle oor die 
algemeen positief oor die teorie se beskrywende, normatiewe en voorskrywende kapasiteite 
terwyl hulle openlik getuig van die grondliggende probleme in bykans elke faset van die 
teorie en sy toepassings.  Tweedens, ten spyte daarvan dat daar erkenning gegee word aan die 
sosiale en kulturele aspekte van besluitneming bly F&FH primêr individualisties.  As sulks 
sal dit faal om valshede en disinformasie te herken aangesien beide elemente is van ’n 
taalaksie wat spesifiek ontwerp is rondom versteekte motiewe en gespesialiseerde 
oorredingstegnieke.  Derdens, F&FH kan nie afstand doen van die onderliggende probleme 
sonder om weg te breek van die onderliggende filosofiese grondslag nie.  F&FH bly 
hoofsaaklik empiristies deur die behavioristiese/positiwistiese eienskappe in die 
onderliggende aannames en toepassings – as sulks gee dit nie erkenning aan die geldigheid 
van konsepte soos betekenis, oortuiging en houding nie. 
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Chapter  1  
Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
“One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit.  Everyone 
knows this.  Each of us contributes his share.  But we tend to take the situation for granted.  
Most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken 
in by it.  So the phenomenon has not aroused much deliberate concern, nor attracted much 
sustained inquiry.”2  In this manner Harry G. Frankfurt introduces his take on a society rife 
with all manner of deceit.  Even though he takes a somewhat whimsical slant on the subject, 
the underlying idea is relevant, especially in a world filled with unverified (and often 
unverifiable) information.  The same idea is confirmed by Carl Hausman who states: “We 
live in a media-driven society fuelled by 
consumption which, in turn, is fuelled by 
advertising.  Our decisions – about what to 
buy, whom to vote for – are shaped, in large 
part, by an ecological system of persuasion. 
Persuasion has grown into a serious and 
sophisticated business and has interwoven 
itself into the fabric of society – so much so 
that we’re sometimes not quite sure what’s 
‘real’ and what’s ‘made up’.”3 
Figure 1 – “This is not a plastic bag” – an example 
of information that is deceptive, even though it is 
technically true or accurate 
One can easily find evidence of the issue 
                                                
2 Frankfurt, H.G. 2005. On bullshit:  1 
3 Hausman, C. 2000. The lies we live by: Defeating double-talk and deception in advertising and politics: 5 
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raised by both Frankfurt and Hausman.  Every day we read words and see pictures that have a 
single purpose – to lead our decisions to a brand, product or vote.  As an example, in Figure 1 
we see the cover of a well-known magazine, wrapped in a paper envelope with bold printing 
on the top that states: “This is not a plastic bag”.  The theme for this particular edition of the 
magazine is “Earth Issue” and discusses subjects related to saving the scarce resources of the 
earth. 
At the time of writing, the magazine had a total paid circulation of 33 9664.  It consists of 
more than 141 pages5 contained in a large paper envelope.  Using these figures, the magazine 
used at least 4 789 206 sheets of paper.  Including the envelopes (which is roughly equal to 
two sheets of paper) this particular edition used an estimated total of 4 857 138 sheets of 
paper.  A study conducted by Berkley University in 2003 estimates that a single tree produces 
about 8 500 sheets of 80gsm A4 paper6.   If we do the simple calculation of sheets used 
divided by sheets per tree, we find that Marie Claire destroyed a little more than 571 trees this 
month alone. By using the envelopes instead of plastic wrappers, they used almost eight trees 
worth of paper.  Even more interesting, this edition has a special supplement of 24 pages for 
the “Earth Issue” theme (as seen in Figure 1) which implies that 815 184 pages were printed 
that would normally not be included in the magazine.  Nearly 96 trees were used in the 
making of this supplement alone. 
Taking the example of the magazine, two sets of questions arise – a set relating to the intent 
of the publisher of the magazine, and a set relating to the way in which the message of the 
magazine influence the decisions made by readers to buy a copy.  For example, related to the 
intent of the publisher, one could ask the following rhetorical questions: 
1. If their true intent was to be more environmentally friendly, why not change the 
format of the magazine to use less paper or use a higher percentage of recycled paper?   
                                                
4 Associated Magazines. 2011. Marie Claire: http://www.assocmags.co.za/brands/2/marie-claire. Accessed 4 
June 2011. 
5 On the Marie Claire web site there is a reference made to an article on page 141 about paper versus digital 
products: http://marieclairvoyant.com/in-this-months-issue/the-art-of-paper-by-flux-trends. Accessed 4 June 
2011 
6 University of California. 2003. How Much Information? 2003: 
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/print.htm#wpaper. Accessed 4 June 
2011  
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2. Why seal the magazine in the first place and not just eliminate the wrapper altogether 
and use an alternative way (e.g. A sticker seal) to achieve the same goal?   
3. Why did they find it necessary to advertise a very obvious fact (that the wrapper is not 
plastic) in bright colours and big letters? 
 
When we think about the consumer who finds the magazine in the shop we could ask: 
1. How does the message of environmental friendliness affect their attitude towards the 
magazine? 
2. Are they aware of the true environmental impact of the magazine? 
3. If they would be made aware of the magazine’s impact on the environment, how 
would it change their decision making behaviour? 
4. Is there any way for the consumer to differentiate messages that are misleading, even 
when those messages are facts (e.g. “This is not a plastic bag” is a fact, but the 
underlying implication of the message is misleading) 
As Frankfurt stated – we seem to believe that we are well equipped to manage the 
disinformation we face every day.  This study asks the question whether current perspectives 
on decision making, specifically the programme of F&FH, have the potential to engage 
fruitfully with the phenomenon of disinformation when modelling decision making 
behaviour.  The study will attempt to answer the question by discussing accepted definitions 
of disinformation, placing a selected definition in the context of the selected decision making 
theory and applying the combination to examples from the advertising industry. 
1.2 Background and motivation 
The study is the result of questions raised about the effect that messages related to the H1N1 
virus during 2009 had on the use of antiviral medicines and flu vaccines by the public.  After 
some research on the subject it became clear that the underlying question of how people 
make decisions in the face of disinformation seems unanswered specifically within the 
context of currently accepted decision making theory.  This realisation served as the primary 
motivation to take a deeper look into decision making theory and the role of disinformation. 
The field of Judgment and Decision Making is very active with numerous researchers 
contributing to the field.  The field is also highly influential with a number of Nobel Prizes in 
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Economics awarded to researchers who have had an explicit connection to the field.7 
Exploratory research into the subject clarified the need to focus on a single prominent meta-
theory, rather than attempting a critique of the entire discipline.  For this purpose the 
programme of F&FH was chosen as it presented a perspective that attempts to move away 
from the classically defined concept of rationality and seems to have a certain attractiveness 
in popular intellectual discourse. 
1.3 Research problem 
As seen in the introductory section of this chapter, it seems to be a commonly accepted fact 
that people lie, and that they do so as a natural part of daily life.  When decision making is 
studied however, it seems as if the information used during the decision making process can 
be called “truth neutral” – none of the intent to deceive, the nature and qualities of deceptive 
information nor the effects thereof on the decision maker seems to be fully explored.   
The problem that follows from this is that current decision making theory doesn’t seem to 
fully recognise the effects of the intent to deceive on the ability of the decision maker to 
make a “good” decision.  As is shown throughout the study, this intent to deceive is not only 
an everyday occurrence, it is a strategy applied in various types of marketing and sales 
activities that directly affect the quality of life for people who are exposed to it.  If decision 
making theories cannot provide norms and rules for how everyday people can make better 
decisions, especially in a world where the intent to deceive dictates the available information 
upon which decisions are made, then these theories are of merely academic value. This is 
particularly true for the programme of F&FH where proponents of this theory claim that it 
has normative, descriptive and prescriptive value. 
Of specific interest is deceptive information that can be defined as disinformation.  As the 
study will show, disinformation typically presents information that at face value seems true, 
but in actual fact contains untruths.  More specifically, as was seen with the Marie Claire 
example, these untruths may in fact be in an implied form.  Implied information that is 
untrue, or implicature-type disinformation, provides a particular challenge for decision 
makers as they may not have the required skills or knowledge to identify this type of 
disinformation. 
                                                
7 For example, Daniel Kahneman who received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2002. Nobel Prizes 2002: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/year/?year=2002. Accessed 27 February 2012 
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This study takes a deeper look into the truth of this problem and investigates the extent to 
which the specific theory of F&FH deals with deceptive information. 
The following question provides the foundation for this study and acts as the primary 
reference point for research conducted: Does the programme of F&FH provide adequate and 
useful norms, descriptions and prescriptions for decision making when the decision maker is 
faced with implicature-type disinformation? 
1.4 Research objectives 
The research question requires a three-pronged approach namely 1) developing a clear 
understanding of the character of F&FH through in-depth analysis of the philosophical and 
theoretical underpinnings, 2) defining disinformation as a strategic language act through a 
discussion of the nature of language use as a means to deceive, and 3) applying the concepts 
of F&FH and disinformation to selected examples of disinformation used in advertising as a 
thought experiment.  The study answers the research question as stated above by reaching the 
following objectives: 
1. To discover the origins and underlying suppositions of the discipline of Judgement 
and Decision Making (JDM). 
2. To discover the origins and nature of F&FH as a research programme within JDM. 
3. To understand the use of language as a joint social action with the aim to reach private 
and public goals. 
4. To examine different perspectives on the concept of “disinformation” in terms of its 
origins and characteristics with the aim to select an appropriate definition for use in 
the study. 
5. To apply the concept of disinformation to implicatures (implied information) as a 
thought experiment. 
6. To examine the extent to which F&FH can address implicature-type disinformation 
by discussing cases of disinformation and decision making in the context of 
advertising. 
7. To identify opportunities for future research 
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1.5 Research methodology 
1.5.1 Strategies and techniques 
The study is primarily argumentative, conceptual and qualitative and uses a number of 
primary and secondary sources as a means to explore and understand various related 
concepts.  Using the information presented by a broad range of researchers, the study 
proceeds to develop a logical argument towards an answer to the research question.  Primary 
sources rely on philosophy, established theories in Judgment and Decision Making and 
linguistics whereas secondary sources will provide additional insight through economics, 
psychology, management sciences, advertising and marketing, as well as history of religion. 
The study will utilise the following approach: 
1. A literature study with relevant examples will be used to discuss current approaches 
to decision making and decision making models, which will lead to an overview of 
the F&FH meta-theory 
2. A literature study with relevant examples will be used to identify the origins and 
nature of disinformation with the aim to select a definition of disinformation 
3. Two examples of implicature-type disinformation in advertising will be discussed 
and evaluated in terms of the theory of F&FH (specifically ecological rationality and 
the adaptive toolbox).  These examples will be selected to indicate advertising that 
informs a) immediate and b) future decisions.   
1.5.2 Key theoretical frameworks 
1.5.2.1 Frameworks related to judgment and decision making 
The study firstly seeks to gain an understanding of the origins and current debates within the 
field of Judgement and Decision Making. The following frameworks are used for this 
purpose: 
1. Rationalism and empiricism as philosophical theories underlying to the two meta-
theories discussed.  These theories are selected as it is assumed to be the most 
prominent philosophical perspectives that inform the majority of disciplines within 
the Western-philosophical academic paradigm and that underlie the kind of 
behaviourist research undertaken often in the JDM field. 
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2. Correspondence and coherence as theories of truth.  There are numerous theories on 
truth that may have been used; however the theories of correspondence and coherence 
reflect the core arguments of the two key decision making frameworks mentioned 
below as well as the arguments of rationalism and empiricism. 
3. Herbert Simon’s conceptualisation of bounded rationality.  Bounded rationality is a 
key concept in the understanding of the decision making frameworks below. 
4. The Heuristics & Biases (H&B) programme of Kahneman & Tversky.  This 
framework is selected as a breakthrough perspective on decision making as opposed 
to perspectives developed in neoclassical economics. 
5. The F&FH programme of Gerd Gigerenzer and the ABC Research Group. This 
framework provides part of the focus for this thesis – it was selected because of its 
claims as a programme that can provide descriptive, prescriptive and normative 
outputs.  
1.5.2.2 Frameworks related to language use and disinformation 
The origins and characteristics of disinformation is found via the perspective of language use 
as a joint activity.  The following theoretical frameworks apply: 
1. Language use as a joint action as proposed by Herbert H. Clark.  The concept of 
language use as an activity performed jointly provides the foundation for 
understanding disinformation as a joint activity. 
2. The so-called Gricean Maxims, developed by Paul Grice that provides an “ideal” 
model of communication.  This serves as a foundation for discussion of deviations 
from the ideal that could be construed as misinformation or disinformation. 
3. For a comprehensive overview of medieval rhetoric, the work of J.J. Murphy will be 
used.  This historical perspective provides some insight into the development of 
disinformation from rhetoric via advertising. 
4. The work of Dariusz Galasinski takes an in-depth look at deception and specifically 
the language used during the process of deception.  His work will provide 
confirmation of how deceptive language deviates from the Gricean Maxims, but more 
importantly the character and role of intent during deception. 
5. Finally Don Fallis provides a fully argued process for “disinforming”, which provides 
the definition of disinformation in conjunction with other frameworks. 
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1.5.3 Delimitation 
This study consists of an argumentative analysis of F&FH and its descriptive, normative and 
prescriptive capacities.  As such the study will not present empirical data, but rather construct 
an argument using primary and secondary sources to investigate the research question as a 
thought experiment. As such, this study is specifically limited to the meta-theory of F&FH.  It 
will not attempt to provide a complete overview of all the available theories within the 
discipline of Judgment and Decision Making, nor will it attempt to provide a complete 
overview of the H&B programme of inquiry.  Furthermore, the study only makes use of 
examples drawn from the field of marketing and advertising.  Other areas such as medical 
information or politics might have been used, but advertising provided ample opportunity to 
investigate the issue at hand. 
Historical overviews are provided for the purpose of creating context and background and are 
not intended to reflect historical figures or concepts in its entirety.  This information has been 
selectively discussed as support to the main arguments proposed. 
1.6 Research outline 
Chapter 1, titled “Introduction”, introduces the study by providing an example of a situation 
where strategic disinformation affects an audience.  The chapter then proceeds to provide the 
background and motivation for the study.  It discusses the research problem, objectives and 
key assumptions.  Finally it provides an outline of the thesis. 
Chapter 2, titled “Overview of the discipline of Judgement and Decision Making (JDM)”, 
provides a broad overview of the field of decision making from its origins in Ancient Greek 
philosophy.  It discusses the philosophical theories of rationalism and empiricism as well as 
the related truth theories of coherence and correspondence.  Three key assumptions of JDM 
are examined in the context of two main perspectives on rationality.   
Chapter 3, titled “Information and truth in Gigerenzer’s Fast & Frugal Heuristics”, provides 
an overview of the F&FH programme as a response to the H&B programme. The F&FH 
programme will be discussed in terms of the three underlying questions posed by the 
founding researchers that relates to the nature of the adaptive toolbox, the character and 
function of ecological rationality, and the practical application of the theory. 
Chapter 4, titled “Disinformation: A language use strategy”, investigates different 
perspectives on the use of language, information quality and the use of information in the 
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process of deception.  The perspectives are developed through a historical overview on 
rhetoric, which leads to the development of the advertising industry.  Concepts such as motive 
and goals are discussed.  A definition for disinformation is sought after which the concept of 
implicature is applied to said definition.  In order to arrive at a deeper understanding of the 
concept, disinformation will be discussed by comparing it to accepted definitions of 
misinformation, persuasion and deception. 
Chapter 5, titled “Disinformation and Fast & Frugal Heuristics”, takes the discussion of 
deceptive techniques in advertising further and identifies ways in which advertisers generate 
strong and weak implicatures to elicit inferences that may possibly be false.  Two examples 
are used to test the principles of F&FH to implicature-type disinformation.  Various 
shortcomings are discussed. 
Chapter 6, titled “Conclusion”, summarises the key findings of the study, proposes a number 
of conclusions and provides recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter  2  
Overview  of  the  discipline  of  
Judgement  and  Decision  Making  
(JDM)  
2.1 Introduction 
The ideas used by different programmes in the discipline of Judgment and Decision Making 
(JDM) share common origins.  More than that, these origins shape the arguments used to this 
day to try and unravel the mysteries of the human decision making process.  This chapter will 
attempt to answer the following question: What are the underpinnings of JDM? In this 
chapter an overview is provided of JDM to establish a clear context for the chapters to 
follow.   
The chapter is divided into two parts.  The first part takes a deeper look into the historical 
origins of the underlying philosophical theories of JDM.  The traditions of Rationalism and 
Empiricism are then extended towards two specific approaches to truth namely 
Correspondence and Coherence.  The second part discusses three main assumptions of JDM 
namely that man is rational, decisions follow norms and decisions have a utility fulfilment 
function.  Throughout the study, lines will be drawn between the philosophical theories, their 
related truth theories and the two main approaches of rationality in JDM namely pure 
rationality and bounded rationality. 
2.2 The philosophical foundations of JDM 
In an effort to clarify the effect of disinformation on the most pertinent programmes of 
decision making, a deeper understanding of the origins and character of Judgment and 
Decision Making (JDM) theory is required.  In this section the roots of the field of JDM are 
discussed and developed towards currently accepted models. 
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2.2.1 Philosophical approaches 
Baron explains the cross-disciplinary nature of JDM by discussing how different models 
belong to different disciplines – he points out that “[d]escriptive models are clearly the task 
of psychology” and that “[n]ormative models are properly the task of philosophy.”8 
Gigerenzer & Selten argues for interdisciplinarity when they state: “Visions of rationality do 
not respect disciplinary boundaries.  Economics, psychology, animal biology, artificial 
intelligence, anthropology, and philosophy struggle with models of sound judgment, 
inference and decision making.”9 As much as both the programmes have been developed by 
psychologists10 both programmes discussed in this study have foundations in philosophy.  
Two main philosophical theories, along with their different iterations over the centuries, are 
proposed as the foundations for JDM namely rationalism and empiricism. 
2.2.1.1 Rationalism  
Peter Markie provides the following insight into rationalism: “Rationalists generally develop 
their view in two ways. First, they argue that there are cases where the content of our 
concepts or knowledge outstrips the information that sense experience can provide. Second, 
they construct accounts of how reason in some form or other provides that additional 
information about the world.” Markie then proceeds to provide three approaches or theses 
within the rationalist paradigm namely 1) “The Intuition/Deduction Thesis: Some 
propositions in a particular subject area, S, are knowable by us by intuition alone; still others 
are knowable by being deduced from intuited propositions” 2) The Intuition/Deduction 
Thesis: Some propositions in a particular subject area, S, are knowable by us by intuition 
alone; still others are knowable by being deduced from intuited propositions” and 3) “The 
                                                
8 Baron, J. 2007. Normative Models of Judgment and Decision Making in: Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & 
Decision Making: 20 
9 Gigerenzer, G. and Selten. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox:  1 
10 Amos Tversky was a cognitive psychologist from Stanford University in: “Amos Tversky, leading decision 
researcher, dies at 59” in Standford University News Service: 
http://news.stanford.edu/pr/96/960605tversky.html. Accessed 12 September 2011 
Daniel Kahneman received his PhD. In Psychology in 1961 from the University of California, Berkeley in: 
Princeton Unversity. 2011. Curriculum Vitae, Daniel Kahneman: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/DKahnemanCV.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2011 
Gerd Gigerenzer was awarded his PhD in Psychology from Munchen Univesity in 1977 in: Max Planck 
Institute.2011. Gerd Gigirenzer: http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/staff/gerd-gigerenzer#CV. Accessed 12 
September 2011 
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Innate Concept Thesis: We have some of the concepts we employ in a particular subject area, 
S, as part of our rational nature.” In all three approaches the underlying idea remains that 
knowledge as a whole or in part is somehow intuitive rather than the result of experience.11 
The idea that man is rational, and possibly purely rational, is very much the original butterfly 
that caused the proverbial hurricane of philosophical discussions throughout history.  
Christopher J. Rowe tells us that Socrates, as seen through the eyes of Plato in his Apology, 
proposes that man wants to be happy, and that happiness is doing what we know to be good.  
However, we cannot know what is good if we haven’t reasoned about it.  He notes the 
following: “What is most peculiar about this position…is that it allows no room for the 
notion of an irrational self.”12 From this point of view we will always make a rational choice 
if we know which choice will allow us to live happy lives. 
Plato contributed to Socrates’ original thoughts with the addition of the Theory of Forms 
(also Ideas or Types). The underlying concept Plato proposed was that everything in 
existence is an expression of an ideal form.13  The form is something of a blueprint for that 
which we perceive, for example, a bulldog and a Labrador are both expressions of the form 
“dog”.  The Ideal Form “dog” contains all of the attributes that will give its expressions the 
characteristics that we need in order to identify it.  All of the possible expressions of dog are 
therefore contained in the single form of “dog”. As David E. Cooper puts it: “This emphasis 
on unity [of all things into a single form] culminates in Plato’s claim that the enlightened 
philosopher attains knowledge of the supreme Form, that of the Good, which is the source of 
the intelligibility, nature and very being of everything else…”14  Later philosophers built on 
this concept of knowledge through rationality.  Descartes for example is famous for his 
supposition “cogito ergo sum” – I think, therefore I am – which points directly at a rationalist 
                                                
11 Markie, P. 2008. “Rationalism vs. Empiricism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Fall 2008 
Edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/. Accessed 17 October 2011 
12 Rowe, C.J. 2005. “Socrates” in Fifty Major Thinkers on Education - From Confucius to Dewey: 6 – 7. 
13 Silverman, A. 2008.  “Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology”  in: The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/plato-metaphysics/. 
Accessed 12 September 2011. 
14 Cooper, D.E. 2005. “Plato” in Fifty Major Thinkers on Education - From Confucius to Dewey: 10 – 12 
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perspective on knowledge.15  With this single statement he effectively connected the 
existence of man to his capacity for rational thought upon which he developed an entire 
philosophy around the rational process for scientific reasoning. 
Other well-known rationalists are Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz.  Spinoza reiterated 
a revised version of Plato’s forms by positing that everything in existence is an expression of 
a single substance which he called God.  God, in Spinoza’s view is a “thinking thing” and 
everything else, which he viewed as expressions of this single form, are “extended things.”16 
Leibniz provided a similar point of view by stating: “What is not truly one entity is not truly 
one entity either”17 through which he developed a theory of so-called “monads” or supreme 
entities that holds the core nature of everything that is.18 
The rationalist perspective can therefore be summed up by saying that people make choices 
in order to live happy lives, that their choices are rational and that this rationality is born from 
a supreme singular knowledge that exists separately from the world we experience.  
Knowledge is acquired a priori or independently from experience. 
2.2.1.2 Empiricism 
Empiricists claim that one can have no knowledge of something without prior experience 
through the senses: “Insofar as we have knowledge in the subject, our knowledge is a 
posteriori, dependent upon sense experience… Sense experience is our only source of 
ideas.”19 The origins of the rivalry between the empiricist theory and that of rationalism are 
the arguments proposed by Aristotle as a response to the philosophy of Socrates and Plato.  
Aristotle rejected the concept of a dualistic world (Plato’s Ideal Forms and expressions 
                                                
15 Descartes, R. 1637. Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason, and seeking truth in the 
sciences. Section IV. Accessed via the Gutenberg Project: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-
h.htm#part4. Accessed 17 October 2011. 
16 Spinoza, B. 1677. The Ethics. Part I. Accessed via the Gutenberg Project: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm. Accessed 17 October 2011. 
17 Quoted in Phemister, P. 2006. The Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz: 61 
18 Phemister, P. 2006. The Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz: 61 - 62 
19 Markie, P. 2008. “Rationalism vs. Empiricism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/. Accessed 14 October 2011 
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thereof) and opted rather for a view that whatever exists, exists as it is and that we perceive 
this singular existence through our senses.20 
The most famous of empiricist philosophers were John Locke, George Berkeley and David 
Hume.  Locke rejected the idea that knowledge can be a priori but that individuals should 
rather be regarded as tabula rasa or a blank slate.  Upon this blank slate impressions form 
and as impressions form so does the ability of the individual to make good decisions.21  
Berkeley took the concepts proposed by Locke a step further.  He argued that the idea of 
matter, as something that exists in the actual, is nonsensical since there is only that which we 
perceive.  He explained objects as “collections of ideas” that are generated as artefacts of 
sensations.22  Morris discusses how Hume proposed that all of science (and therefore in 
effect, the way in which we attain knowledge) is subject to the limits of our understanding of 
human nature: “For Hume, all the materials of thinking — perceptions — are derived either 
from sensation (‘outward sentiment’) or from reflection (‘inward sentiment’).”23  Hume 
developed a philosophy rooted in the human experience with an acknowledgement of the 
limits of our own capacity for understanding as well as the limits of metaphysical language as 
is confirmed by this quote from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: “Nothing, at 
first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all 
human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. 
To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no 
more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is 
confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an 
instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, 
into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was 
seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except 
what implies an absolute contradiction. 
                                                
20 Hobson, P. 2005. “Aristotle” in Fifty Major Thinkers on Education - From Confucius to Dewey: 15.  
21 Smith, R. 2005. “John Locke” in Fifty Major Thinkers on Education - From Confucius to Dewey: 46.  
22 Berkeley, G. 1709. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Section I. Accessed via The 
Gutenberg Project: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4723/4723-h/4723-h.htm.  Accessed 17 October 2011. 
23 Morris, W. E. "David Hume" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition): 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/hume/. Accessed 17 October 2011 
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But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer 
examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative 
power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, 
augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.”24 
Empiricism therefore has the following characteristics: humans gain knowledge through 
experience, these experiences form our moral senses (included in which is our notion of what 
a “happy” life consists of) and these moral senses provide us with the framework we use to 
make decisions.  Knowledge, from the empiricist point of view, is gained a posteriori, or as a 
result of experience. 
2.2.1.3 Criticisms of the division of Rationalism and Empiricism 
The division of philosophical schools of thought between Rationalism and Empiricism is 
often criticised as misleading and even incorrect.  George Ladd puts the blame for what was a 
growing trend during the early 20th century to create this division on the shoulders of the so-
called Pragmatists: “There is probably no other subject of controversy about which, and no 
other word under the cover of which, there has been more of this deplorable confusion and 
consequent inner bitterness and outward contempt than the subjects covered by the word 
‘rationalism’.  So worn-out and antiquated does all this seem to the student of history, as it 
was illustrated and indeed made lurid by the theological writings of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, that it could scarcely make valid claim to occupy our attention at the 
present time, were it not for the fact that Pragmatism has just recently renewed the 
confusion… the now current attacks on so-called rationalism seem, too often, to take the form 
of an unrationalised and emotional and rather dogmatic empiricism… But rationalism is no 
more antithetic to empiricism than it is to idealism, or to realism, or to supernaturalism, or 
even to pragmatism.”25 
Hidé Ishiguro takes a similar point of view on the issue: “The grouping of European 
philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into rationalists and empiricists 
seems to me to be unfortunate and unhelpful.  It suggests that there are two self-contained 
                                                
24Hume, D. 1748. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Accessed via The Gutenberg Project: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext06/8echu10h.htm#section2. Accessed 17 October 2011. 
25 Ladd, G.T. 1913. “Rationalism and Empiricism” in Mind, 22(85): 2 – 3.  Ladd’s argument centres around the 
definition of rationalism as a method of inquiry rather than a school of thought.  
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mutually incompatible sets of views, which are clearly demarcated and based on opposing 
principles: one claiming that the source of all substantial truths about reality is reason; the 
other claiming that all knowledge derives from experience…Not only did thinkers like 
Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz take great interest in the experimental sciences of their day, 
they also thought that the data we obtain from our senses played an important role in the 
formation of our knowledge of the world… Berkeley went so far as to write that intellect and 
reason are alone the sure guides of truth, and even Locke, who proclaimed that all our 
knowledge comes ultimately from our senses, defended a theory of knowledge in which an 
indispensable role is played by elements which, as many have pointed out, cannot be derived 
from sense-experiences.”26   
Ladd provides a compelling argument against the division when he says: “… But the depths 
of misapprehension would seem to be reached when we begin to decry Rationalism in 
systematic philosophy as the antithesis of a reasonable Empiricism.  Empiricism that has not 
been subjected to the testing and elaborating activity of reason furnishes no truth at all.  An 
unrationalised empiricism is not philosophy, is not science, is not ordinary knowledge… All 
claims to the content of truth – call this content realism or idealism, scepticism or dogmatism, 
orthodoxy or infidelity, empiricism, rationalism or even pragmatism – all must appear before 
the same court27, all must abide by the verdict of this same court.”28 
Anthony Kenny explains that this distinction is often used for textbook and examination 
purposes.29  This fact implies that the distinction of Rationalism and Empiricism as opposing 
schools of thought formed part of the experience many students have of philosophy – an 
experience that influenced their perspectives as they took this knowledge further in their 
academic endeavours. 
The divide between Rationalism and Empiricism seems to be an artefact of an approach to 
teaching philosophy which makes it artificial.  The points made above tell us that this divide 
                                                
26 Ishiguro, H. 1986. “Pre-established harmony versus constant conjunction: a reconsideration of the distinction 
between rationalism and empiricism” in Rationalism, Empiricism and Idealism: 61 – 62 
27 The “court” Ladd refers to is the process of rational enquiry into the truth of a matter. 
28 Ladd, G.T. 1913. “Rationalism and Empiricism” in: Mind, 22(85): 7 - 8 
29 Kenny, A. 1986. “Introduction” in Rationalism, Empiricism and Idealism: 1  
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is not only misleading, but can be detrimental to academic progress the two approaches are 
seen as opposites rather than complimentary. 
2.2.2 Philosophies of truth 
In the previous section an overview of the main philosophical theories underlying JDM was 
provided.  An attempt was made to point out the way in which knowledge is acquired from 
each perspective.  An additional issue that is critical to our understanding of how 
disinformation affects the meta-theories of JDM is how truth is determined.  For the purpose 
of this study it is important firstly to establish the concept of truth as it relates to the 
philosophical underpinnings of JDM, and secondly as it relates to how it is understood in the 
normal, day-to-day sense.  As much as the risk in juxtaposing Rationalism with Empiricism is 
taken into account, it can be argued that the effects of this artificial division are strengthened 
in the continued opposition of the rational and empirical approaches to seeking truth.  The 
purpose of this section is not to maintain the division between the philosophical traditions but 
rather to establish how, in the field of JDM, the choice of one over the other has led to the 
programmes discussed in this study. 
There are various theories of truth that can be discussed, however, in this section it is shown 
how the traditions of Rationalism and Empiricism formed into two specific approaches to 
conceptualising a definition for truth. An argument is developed whereby Rationalism leads 
to a concept of truth based on coherence of arguments or beliefs within a given system 
whereas Empiricism, from its earliest days, formed into a concept of truth that is based on 
correspondence with observable facts.  The section ends with an overview of truth as an 
everyday concept as it is understood in common use language.  This approach is taken firstly 
to establish a firm link between the underlying philosophical traditions of Rationalism and 
Empiricism with the programmes of H&B and F&FH.  Secondly, it establishes how people 
understand truth in their daily lives to establish a link with the practical application of the 
principles of said programmes to decision making as it relates to advertising.  
2.2.2.1 The difficulty of defining truth 
In his discussion of the correspondence theory of truth, D.J. O’Connor warns the reader that 
an effort to define truth is fraught with philosophical conundrums that have not yet been 
clarified in a manner that is generally accepted: “A ‘theory’ about truth is an attempt to give 
satisfactory answers to questions such as the following: what are the marks that distinguish a 
true statement from a false one? How can we establish that a particular statement is true or 
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false? What is an acceptable definition of the word ‘true’? Or, more simply, what is truth?  
Such questions do not look on the surface very difficult.  But an attempt to answer them leads 
us quickly into deep philosophical issues which have not so far met with any solutions that 
have been generally accepted.”30  Leslie Armour takes a similar point of view in the opening 
paragraph of his book: “It is scarcely possible to imagine a man who has no views about what 
separates truth from falsehood – or any doubt more tragic than the doubt that truth and 
falsehood can be separated effectively.  Yet there is no agreement – at least amongst 
philosophers – about how the concept of truth is to be construed.”31  Finally Richard L. 
Kirkham confirms that the problem of agreement persists: “Even the briefest writings about 
truth… reveals that there is little agreement about what the philosophical problem of truth 
is.”32  Clearly, a difficulty in defining truth is that theorists cannot agree on a definition of the 
concept, and from Kirkham’s perspective, nor do they agree on the question they are trying to 
answer when attempting to develop a theory of truth.  
A second issue, namely that of the cultural tradition that formed the perspectives on truth 
discussed in this section, is introduced by Renato Rosaldo in discussing the difficulties faced 
by anthropologists in understanding other cultures: “We cannot… simply use our minds to 
invent other cultural worlds.  Even those so-called realms of pure freedom, our fantasy and 
our ‘innermost thoughts,’ are produced and limited by our own local culture.  Human 
imaginations are as culturally formed as distinctive ways of weaving, performing a ritual, 
raising children, grieving, or healing; they are specific to certain forms of life, whether these 
be Balinese, Anglo-American, Nyakyusa, or Basque.”33  When we investigate any concept, 
the cultural context and tradition of that concept plays a significant role in its validity and 
use.  As an example of how truth can differ between cultures, David Hall & Roger Ames 
provide this insight about the differences between the Western concept of truth as compared 
to the Chinese notion of the same concept: “In the West, truth is a knowledge of what is real 
and what represents that reality.  For the Chinese, knowledge is not abstract, but concrete; it 
                                                
30 O’Connor, D.J. 1975. The Correspondence Theory Of Truth: 12 
31 Armour, L. 1969 . The Concept of Truth: 1 
32 Kirkham, R.L. 1992. Theories of truth: 1 
33 Rosaldo, R. 1993. Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis: 25 
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is not representational, but performative and participatory; it is not discursive, but is, as a 
knowledge of the way, a kind of know-how.”34 
The definition of truth is a question for the ages – the primary problem in an endeavour of 
this kind is the fact that there seems to be no agreement amongst academics as to what truth 
may constitute, or in fact, what the underlying question to the definition of truth is.  
Furthermore, any conceptualisation of truth is subject to the cultural context from within 
which it comes and will reflect the dominant world view of the given culture. 
2.2.2.2 Coherence 
A rationalist will say that we learn about the world by thinking it through.  Knowledge pre-
exists and through careful reasoning is revealed to us.  Knowledge exists a priori or removed 
from experiences.  Our moral sense is innate which means that the truly rational man will live 
a good life because his choices are built upon sufficient reasoning.  Truth in the rationalist 
sense is conceived as existing independently and being available to us through the process of 
deductive reasoning.  René Descartes was perhaps one of the most influential of rationalists35 
in the philosophical tradition of the West.  He had the following to say about finding the truth 
in science: “The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are 
accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, had led me to 
imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected 
in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, 
or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for 
the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one 
truth from another.”36 Descartes made several points here – firstly he suggests that knowledge 
consists of a set of interlinked units of truth and that one truth can be deduced from a 
preceding truth within this system.  He believes that all of knowledge is attainable in this 
                                                
34 Hall, D.L. & Ames, R.T. 1998. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and 
Western Culture: 104 
35 Markie warns however that the labels of “rationalist” and “empiricist” requires that one places more attention 
on the nuances of the individual philosophers.  This perspective resonates with the points raised in Section 
2.2.1.4 in: Markie, P. 2008. “Rationalism vs. Empiricism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2008 Edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/. Accessed 17 October 
2011.  
36 Descartes, R. 1637. Discourse on method. Accessed via The Gutenberg Project: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm  Accessed October 2011. 
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manner of rational enquiry.  He confirms the process of discovering truth when he says: “…I 
commenced with the simplest and most general truths, and that thus each truth discovered 
was a rule available in the discovery of subsequent ones. Nor in this perhaps shall I appear 
too vain, if it be considered that, as the truth on any particular point is one whoever 
apprehends the truth, knows all that on that point can be known.”37  In other words, starting 
with truths that he already had all the available knowledge on, he was able to use those truths 
as the basis for discovery of subsequent truths. 
Harold H. Joachim is one of the earliest proponents of what he calls the coherence-notion of 
truth.  He builds an argument for it by starting with the proposition that, in criticising other 
truth theories, a person starts out with a notion of what truth is, and even though Joachim 
does not explicitly state it as such, comes across as a notion that exists a priori – one always 
has some conception of what truth is and can therefore determine when something isn’t 
true.38  Building on the concept of an interlinked system as proposed by Descartes, Joachim 
develops an argument for a systematic coherence that results from conceivability as “the 
essential nature of truth”39: “Thus ‘conceivability’ means for us systematic coherence, and is 
the determining characteristic of a ‘significant whole’. The systematic coherence of such a 
whole is expressed most adequately and explicitly in the system of reasoned knowledge 
which we call a science or a branch of philosophy.”40  As such the process of building this 
system of truth relies on rational enquiry in almost Platonic form.  This is confirmed when 
Joachim expresses the view that, in order for something to be true, the system of which it 
forms a part of, is subject to an ideal form – different to Plato however, for Joachim there 
exists only one such form: “For, if there are certain judgements indubitably true, then these 
are the materials of knowledge.  And, in the progress of thought, a form is imposed upon 
these materials which arranges without altering them.  Truth is linked to truth until the 
arrangement constitutes that network of chains of truths which is the system of ideally 
                                                
37 Descartes, R. 1637. Discourse on method. Accessed via The Gutenberg Project: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm  Accessed October 2011. 
38 Joachim, H.H. 1906. The Nature of Truth: 65 
39 In starting out his argument Joachim provides a preliminary definition of the coherence notion when he says: 
“Anything is true which can be conceived.  It is true because, and in so far as, it can be conceived. 
Conceivability is the essential nature of truth.” in: Joachim, H.H. 1906. The Nature of Truth:  66 
40 Joachim, H.H. 1906. The Nature of Truth:: 67 - 68 
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complete knowledge.  The form under which the infinitely various materials are ordered, is 
the universal form of all thinking.”41 
In the approaches taken by Descartes and Joachim it becomes clear that the elements found in 
the philosophical tradition of Rationalism is evident in coherence theories of truth.  The 
concept of an ideal, reasoned system that is a requirement for truth, and that this system 
consists of interlinked truths, all starting from an a priori notion of what truth is, provides 
ample evidence of the relationship between Rationalism and coherence. 
2.2.2.3 Correspondence 
An empiricist will say that we learn about the world through experience.  We start out tabula 
rasa (with a blank slate) and, as we gain experiences, our understanding of the world is 
formed.  These experiences establish our moral framework – our ability to judge whether 
something will contribute to a happy life. As such, truth must also be deduced from our 
experiences.  In a very literal sense then, the empiricist approach holds the tenet that seeing 
(or experiencing) is believing. 
Joachim provides the following perspective into truth as correspondence “In most everyday 
judgments of common sense, and in many philosophical theories, a certain conception of 
truth is implied or expressed, which I shall call the ‘correspondence-notion’ of truth.  Thus 
e.g. to ‘speak the truth’ is to speak ‘in accordance with’ or ‘in conformity to’ the facts.  A 
‘true’ man, or a ‘true’ friend, is a person whose outward acts ‘correspond to’ – faithfully 
reflect – his inner feelings.  A narrative is ‘true’ if it ‘re-presents’, in essentials and within its 
own sphere, the real order of events.  So again, according to Aristotle, the synthesis or 
analysis of the thoughts expressed in true judgement must exactly re-present, or correspond 
to, the way in which the real things are conjoined or divided; and a ‘scientific truth’ is the 
conclusion of a deductive inference, which exactly repeats in its structure the necessary 
coherence of a substance with its propium through the proximate cause of that connexion.”42  
Kirkham provides a similar definition, although he distinguishes between two different kinds 
of correspondence: “We come now to the most venerable of all kinds of theories of truth: 
correspondence theories, of which there are two types: correspondence as correlation and 
                                                
41 Joachim, H.H. 1906. The Nature of Truth:: 73 
42 Joachim, H.H. 1906. The Nature of Truth:: 7 
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correspondence as congruence.  The first of these, put very simply, says that every truth 
bearer is correlated to a state of affairs.  If the state of affairs to which a given truth bearer is 
correlated actually obtains, then the truth bearer is true; otherwise it is false.”43  Kirkham also 
confirms that correspondence-as-correlation can be taken back to Aristotle: “Aristotle offered 
the first correspondence-as-correlation theory with his famous remark ‘To say that [either] 
that which is is not or that which is not is, is a falsehood; and to say that that which is is and 
that which is not is not, is true’ (Metaphysics 1011b26)”44 
Correspondence as correlation is clearly an Empiricist approach to truth inasmuch as it was 
born from Aristotle’s work.  Correspondence reflects the notion that knowledge, and 
specifically true knowledge, can be acquired through observations of fact. 
2.2.2.4 Truth in everyday language 
It is critical to investigate how the concept of truth is understood in everyday language.  It is 
assumed that the definition of truth as it is reflected in this understanding will also reflect 
how it is used in the day-to-day decisions undertaken by people in normal circumstance.  This 
investigation will assist in confirming the extent to which specifically the F&FH programme 
lives up to certain claims of practical applicability of the theory. 
The best source for finding ordinary use definitions of any word in common language is 
almost certainly a dictionary.  The following definitions of truth were found in various 
dictionaries: 
The Chambers 21st Century Dictionary:45  
1. the quality or state of being true, genuine or factual. 
2. the state of being truthful; sincerity; honesty. 
3. that which is true. 
4. that which is established or generally accepted as true scientific truths. 
                                                
43 Kirkham, R.L. 1992. Theories of truth: 119 
44 Kirkham, R.L. 1992. Theories of truth: 119 - 120 
45 Chambers 21st Century Dictionary.  2001. truth: 
http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/chambdict/truth. Accessed 14 October 2011 
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5. strict adherence to an original or standard. 
The Collins English Dictionary46: 
1. the quality of being true, genuine, actual, or factual: the truth of his statement was 
attested. 
2. something that is true as opposed to false: you did not tell me the truth. 
3. a proven or verified principle or statement; fact: the truths of astronomy. 
4. (usually plural) a system of concepts purporting to represent some aspect of the 
world: the truths of ancient religions. 
5. fidelity to a required standard or law. 
6. faithful reproduction or portrayal: the truth of a portrait. 
7. an obvious fact; truism; platitude. 
8. honesty, reliability, or veracity: the truth of her nature. 
9. accuracy, as in the setting, adjustment, or position of something, such as a 
mechanical instrument. 
10. the state or quality of being faithful; allegiance. Related adjs veritable, veracious. 
The Macquarie Dictionary47: 
1. that which is true; the true or actual facts of a case; to tell the truth. 
2. conformity with fact or reality; verity; the truth of a statement. 
3. a verified or indisputable fact, proposition, principle, or the like; mathematical truths. 
4. the state or character of being true. 
5. genuineness, reality, or actual existence. 
                                                
46 Collins English Dictionary. 2000. truth : http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/hcengdict/truth. 
Accessed 14 October 2011 
47 The Macquarie Dictionary. 2005. truth: http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/macqdict/truth. 
Accessed 14 October 2011 
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6. agreement with a standard, rule, or the like. 
7. honesty, uprightness, or integrity. 
8. accuracy, as of position or adjustment. 
9. Archaic fidelity or constancy. 
The multitude of definitions for the concept of truth provides more evidence of the 
difficulties of definition as noted above – even in ordinary language use.  However a general 
theme comes to the fore namely that of correlation between a statement or proposition with 
an established fact.  When we speak the truth, what we say is understood to correlate with 
some established fact.  For the purpose of this study the truthfulness of information in 
commonly used language may be understood as something that corresponds with a proven or 
accepted fact.  Taking the issue of the Western cultural tradition into account, this common 
use understanding of truth reflects the scientific approach of correspondence. 
2.3 The core assumptions of JDM 
Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) seems to be governed by three underlying 
assumptions namely that human beings are rational, that the process of making decisions 
follows norms and that the outcomes of decisions achieve some degree of utility.  Gigerenzer 
says: “If you open a book on judgment and decision making theory, chances are you’ll 
stumble over the following moral: Good reasoning must adhere to the laws of logic, the 
calculus of probability, or the maximization of expected utility…”48  This point of view is 
echoed by David Over (in talking about what constitutes rationality) when he includes formal 
logic and probability theory as two of the main underlying normative theories in the field of 
decision making.49  Finally Jonathan Baron confirms the notion when he says: “The study of 
judgement and decision making (JDM) is traditionally concerned with the comparison of 
judgments to standards…The major standards come from probability theory, utility theory 
and statistics.”50  This section will firstly investigate the idea that humans are rational, 
presenting different viewpoints on the subject and introducing the concept of bounded 
                                                
48 Gigerenzer, G. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 63. 
49 Over, D. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making:  3. 
50 Baron, J. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 19.  
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rationality.  Secondly the issue of norms will be clarified where Gerd Gigerenzer’s concept of 
ecological rationality will be juxtaposed with the normative framework of unbounded 
rationality.  Finally the idea of utility will be discussed in terms of the distinction between the 
utility of unbounded rationality versus that of bounded rationality. 
2.3.1 Humans are rational 
Rationality as a concept differs from that of rationalism.  Whereas the latter refers to the 
philosophical theory discussed above the former is a somewhat problematic concept that can 
refer either to “the ability to think logically” or to “be reasonable”.51  Within the discipline of 
JDM we find various perspectives on rationality. In fact, it is precisely these differences that 
clearly delineate the two programmes52 of H&B on the one hand and F&FH on the other. 
That said, Over provides us with a good starting point when he describes the most widely 
accepted definition of rationality (which he calls instrumental rationality) within JDM as 
follows: “According to this definition, our mental states or processes are rational when they 
help us to achieve our goals.”53  In other words, when we found the most effective way to 
solve a problem or fulfil a need, we acted rationally. 
Baron explains that, within the context of normative models (discussed in Section 2.3.2), this 
definition of instrumental rationality provides a common key, namely the idea that the best 
option, when faced with a decision, is the one that results in the most good and that “good”, 
or utility, is that which allows us to achieve our goals.54  Ideas underpinning Decision Theory, 
also known as Rational Choice Theory, has a long history – as early as 1662 Atoine Arnauld 
published this statement in his work called Port Royal Logic: “To judge what one must do to 
obtain a good or avoid an evil one must consider not only the good and the evil in itself but 
also the probability of its happening or not happening, and view geometrically the proportion 
that all these things have together.”55  In this statement we can see the same principles at 
work that underlies current theories around decision making – when referring to the 
                                                
51 Manktelow, K.I. & Over, D.E.  1993. “Introduction: The study of rationality” in Rationality: Psychological 
and Philosophical Perspectives: 2  
52 In Chapter 3 it will be discussed in detail how Fast & Frugal Heuristics became a programme 
53 Over, D. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 3 
54 Baron, J. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox : 23 
55 Arnauld, A. 1850. Logic, or, The art of thinking : being the Port-Royal logic: 359 – 360.  
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consideration that must be given and the way in which things must be considered, we can 
clearly see the foundations of rationality.  Furthermore, Arnauld refers to the application of 
probability and mathematics to predict the outcome of the rational choice – tools often used 
in JDM.   
In an attempt to solve the St. Petersburg Paradox56 in 1738, Daniel Bernoulli took the concept 
of rational choice into the realm of economics by applying it to the monetary benefits that 
could possibly be gained in this famous problem.57  Jeremy Bentham (1738) provided 
possibly one the earliest examples of an explicitly economic utilitarian stance in his 
Economic Writings by developing the concept of utility as the maximum enjoyment a person 
can achieve through economic consumption.58 Traction for this concept grew in the form of 
utilitarianism during the Neoclassical age and was eventually adopted by economists through 
the works of individuals such as John Stuart Mill (1863) and Henry Sedgwick (1907).59 
Herbert Simon provides us with clear insight into the assumptions of Neoclassic economic 
theory: “First, human goals and motivations are assumed to be given a priori in the form of a 
utility function which allows an individual to make consistent choices among all the possible 
bundles of goods and services.  Second, economic actors are assumed always to choose, 
among the alternatives open to them, that one of the alternatives that yields the greatest 
utility.”  Following this he refers to the latter assumption, namely the maximization of utility, 
as rationality, thereby confirming the original thoughts of Bentham and his followers.60  This 
form of rationality is regarded as unbounded, meaning that the rational agent (the individual 
making the decision) has no limits in terms of their cognitive abilities, availability of 
information or constraints of time.61  The neoclassical assumption that motivations and goals 
                                                
56 Refers to the discrepancies between choices made and the mathematical outcomes of a  gamble. Gigerenzer, 
G. and Selten, R. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 2 
57 Martin, R. 2008. “The St. Petersburg Paradox” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/paradox-stpetersburg/. Accessed 17 October 2011. 
58 Driver, J. 2009. “The History of Utilitarianism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 
Edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/utilitarianism-history/.  Accessed 17 October 2011 
Stark, W. 1954. Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings: 421 - 450  
59 Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2011. “Consequentialism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 
Edition): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/consequentialism/.  Accessed 17 October 2011 
60 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 277 
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are given a priori and can be maximised through rational decision making closely reflects its 
classical roots of rationalism. 
Simon developed an alternative concept, namely that of bounded rationality, that opposed the 
traditional approaches to decision making.  He explains the following: “The theory of 
subjective utility (SEU theory) underlying neo-classical economics postulates that choices are 
made: (1) among a given, fixed set of alternatives; (2) with (subjectively) known probability 
distributions of outcomes for each; and (3) in such a way as to maximize the expected value 
of a given utility function.” He then introduces the concept of bounded rationality as follows: 
“Theories of bounded rationality can be generated by relaxing one or more of the 
assumptions of SEU theory.”62  In other words, choices are made within certain boundaries, 
such as limited time or limited knowledge.63  These two perspectives on rationality – that of 
unbounded and that of bounded rationality – form the first cornerstone of the current 
discussions within the study of decision making.   
2.3.2 Decisions follow norms 
If humans are rational (be it bounded or unbounded), and rationality refers to the human 
capacity for logical reasoning, it follows that rational humans reason logically when making 
decisions.  When faced with the two alternative views on rationality, however, the question as 
to what constitutes logic must be addressed.  
It is at this juncture that a better understanding of the classification of different theories or 
models within Judgment and Decision Making theory is done.  In broad terms, JDM theories 
are normative, descriptive or prescriptive.  Normative models describe the ideal way in which 
we should make rational decisions, descriptive theories attempt to provide a description of 
                                                                                                                                                  
61 Encyclopedia of the Human Brain. 2002. II. Unbounded Rationality Versus the Bounded Reality of Human 
Decision Making: 
http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/esthumanbrain/ii_unbounded_rationality_versus_the_bounde
d_reality_of_human_decision_making. Accessed 16 August 2011 
62 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 291 
63  Encyclopedia of the Human Brain. 2002. II. Unbounded Rationality Versus the Bounded Reality of Human 
Decision Making: 
http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/esthumanbrain/ii_unbounded_rationality_versus_the_bounde
d_reality_of_human_decision_making. Accessed 16 August 2011 
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how decision making actually happens whereas prescriptive models provide rules by which 
better decision making happens.64  
David Over explains that normative theories include formal logic, probability theory and 
decision theory (or utility theory).65  James Baron confirms Over’s explanation by stating 
that: “The major standards [in JDM] come from probability theory, utility theory and 
statistics.”66  As such, normative theories provide norms by which “good decision making 
behaviour” can be measured. 
Gerd Gigerenzer (in describing what a heuristic is) provides a clever thought experiment to 
explain the differences between unbounded rationality and bounded rationality in which he 
posits a robot that has the same characteristics as the traditional economically rational man.  
He poses that, if one builds a robot that can catch balls (specifically fly balls in baseball or 
cricket) that this robot can be built using one of two approaches.  The first is that of 
omniscience, where the robot would require a complete representation of its environment 
alongside a very powerful capacity to calculate all of the parabolas and trajectories a ball 
might travel.  Furthermore, this robot will require instruments that can measure the 
information (e.g. the initial distance, initial velocity and projection angle) required to 
calculate the ball’s final landing point.  The robot must then be capable of making all of the 
measures and calculations within a few seconds (whilst the ball is in the air) in order to catch 
it.  Gigerenzer follows this up with a second perspective namely the development of a robot 
that makes use of simple rules that mimic human decision making behaviour.  He points out 
that humans are too limited in their calculating abilities to use all of the environmental inputs 
and variables to catch the ball.  However, as is proven by baseball and cricket players, people 
still succeed in doing so with the application of simple rules (called heuristics).  He highlights 
one such rule called the “gaze heuristic” where players fixate on the ball in the air and adjust 
their running speed so that the angle of the gaze remains constant. Unbounded rationality 
assumes that all information and capacities are available to the decision maker (a concept 
closely resembling the perspectives of coherence in that an answer is true on the basis of a 
                                                
64 Over, D. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 3 
Baron, J. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 24 
65 Over, D. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 3 
66 Baron, J. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 23 
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logical argument) and that any deviation from the strict logical and mathematical models that 
underlie this perspective implies, as Gigerenzer puts it, “some form of cognitive or 
motivational flaw”.67  
On the other side of the spectrum, Simon provides us with a metaphor that consists of two 
interlocking principles that work like the blades of a scissor to shape human behaviour – the 
first blade is that of the computational capabilities of the actor and the second is the structure 
of task environments.68 In other words the bounds of our rationality, from Simon’s point of 
view, consists of the limitations in our context or environment and the limitations in our 
capacity to derive and process relevant information gained from the environment – 
Gigerenzer refers to the latter as ecological rationality.69   Instead of the logical and 
mathematical norms underlying unbounded rationality, bounded rationality implies that 
rational decisions are therefore subjective to the cognitive abilities and environmental 
structure of the decision maker.  As such the decision maker uses simple rules to achieve 
their outcome.  Where unbounded rationality has complex norms, bounded rationality makes 
use of simple rules.  
2.3.3 Outcomes achieve utility 
In the previous sections it was found that the unbounded rational man has as his ultimate goal 
the maximisation of utility.  In this fundamental assumption of unbounded rationality one 
finds a definition of what the ideal outcome of a decision is: the neoclassical economic man 
will always make his decisions in order to get the maximum benefits from the options 
available to him.  This process of seeking maximum utility is also called optimisation.70  
What has not yet been clarified is what utility looks like from the perspective of bounded 
rationality. 
Gigerenzer & Selten proposes three classes of process models namely simple search rules, 
simple stopping rules and simple decision rules.  All of these rules apply to the overall 
process of search (the process of finding information that will help an individual make a 
                                                
67 Gigerenzer, G. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 63 – 64 
Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 6 - 7 
68 Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 6 
69 Gigerenzer, G. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 66 - 68 
70 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 295 
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decision).  The authors explain that the process of search further distinguishes between 
models of bounded rationality namely those that search for alternatives (for example 
satisficing) and those that search for cues (for example fast and frugal heuristics).71 
Gigerenzer explains the difference as follows: satisficing applies to a context where options 
are unknown72 which implies that alternatives need to be sought out whereas fast and frugal 
heuristics proposes a search for cues in the environment to guide a decision where options are 
already known (e.g. job candidates).73 
Simon discusses the search for or generation of alternatives and states the following: 
“because of limits on complexity, human alternative-generating behaviour observed in the 
laboratory is usually best described as a heuristic search aimed at finding satisfactory 
alternatives, or alternatives that represent an improvement over those previously available”.74  
The limitations on our capacity to find all possible alternatives has an effect on the outcomes 
of our decisions – in the statement above Simon proposes that the consequence is, contrary to 
the idea of maximum utility, to find alternatives that satisfy our goals according to a set of 
requirements.  Selten, borrowing the term from Simon75, calls these requirements aspiration 
levels.76 
In discussing the problem of optimization, Simon reiterates the problem that most optimal 
solutions within a real-world context can simply not be computed due computational 
complexity.  He proposes an alternative which he calls satisficing. In principle satisficing 
implies that utility is not necessarily the maximum benefit that can be derived from a 
limitless supply of options, but rather that a decision maker searches for an alternative that 
satisfies their aspirations.77  As discussed above, where the options are known, the decision 
maker faces a somewhat different challenge – instead of searches for alternatives (as a limited 
                                                
71 Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 8 
72 This point is confirmed by Simon where he specifically discusses the problem of limitations of time and 
information during the search for alternatives in: Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 292  
73 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 44 
74Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 292 
75 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 296 - 297 
76 Selten, R. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 14 
77 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 295 - 296 
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set of alternatives are already available), the decision maker searches for cues from their 
environment to guide them towards an alternative. According to Gigerenzer “…search is 
stopped as soon as the first cue that favors one alternative is found.”78  Both satisficing and 
search for cues as a process closely reflect the empiricist approach to knowledge acquisition 
(assuming that we build our knowledge through experience) and it may be argued that it 
therefore relates to the correspondence theory of truth.   
Whether search is focused on satisficing or discovering cues, from the above it follows that, 
where rationality is bounded, utility is not maximised, but rather that aspiration levels are 
satisfied. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Figure 2 - From philosophical roots to the assumptions of JDM 
Figure 2 provides a summary of the chapter in graphical form.  Chapter 2 aimed to answer the 
question: “What are the underpinnings of Judgment and Decision Making theory?”  The 
approach was firstly to provide a brief historical overview on the philosophical foundations 
of JDM and secondly to understand the core assumptions of JDM.  An attempt was made to 
create a simplified version of the underpinnings of JDM without the loss of critical concepts.  
The discipline of JDM is however very active and as much as one may be tempted to rigidly 
classify one theory as rationalist and another as empiricist, it must be noted that ideas are 
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often cross-pollinated, shared or otherwise accepted across the boundaries of different 
perspectives.79  Figure 2 above provides a graphical representation of the findings. 
The brief historical overview provided two overarching traditions namely that of Rationalism 
and Empiricism.  It was shown that rationalism espouses the use of reason to acquire and 
verify knowledge.  Truth is an external, objective form or idea that can be understood through 
reasoning using knowledge that is available a priori.  In contrast, empiricism advocates the 
belief that knowledge can only be attained through experience (a posteriori) and that truth is 
established in the same manner.  The discussion on rationalism and empiricism was followed 
with a short description of the two major approaches to truth namely correspondence and 
coherence.  It was shown that the correspondence theory of truth is reflects the same 
principles of empiricism whereas the coherence theory of truth reflects those of rationalism. 
The section following this discussed the core assumptions of JDM namely that humans are 
rational, that decisions follow norms and that outcomes achieve utility.  It was shown that the 
concept of rationality can be divided into the unbounded rationality of neoclassical 
economics and the bounded rationality proposed by Herbert Simon.  It was further shown that 
norms for unbounded rationality are typically strict logical and mathematical whereas 
bounded rationality relies on simple rules.  Finally it was shown that, within the context of 
unbounded rationality, utility is maximised in contrast to bounded rationality where utility is 
the satisficing of aspiration levels through the use of search. 
 
                                                
79 For example Herbert Simon notes that bounded rationality appears in neoclassical economics in: Simon, H.A. 
1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 294 
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Chapter  3  
Information  and  truth  in  
Gigerenzer’s  Fast  &  Frugal  
Heuristics  
3.1 Introduction 
The F&FH programme developed by Gerd Gigerenzer offers an alternative perspective on the 
function of heuristics within the decision making process.  This chapter will provide an 
overview of the programme with the goal of establishing key questions on the issue of truth 
within the Fast & Frugal context.  The chapter will introduce the programme of H&B and 
proposes that F&FH is a response to two key issues found in the former approach namely 1) 
norms, in terms of the way in which they are used to define rationality as well as which 
norms have been chosen for this purpose and, 2) the role of heuristics in study of decision 
making.    
Once the differences between H&B and F&FH has been established, the F&FH programme 
will be discussed in terms of the three underlying questions posed by the founding 
researchers that relate to the nature of the adaptive toolbox, the character and function of 
ecological rationality, and the practical application of the theory.  Following this, the search 
function will be introduced as it is first described by Herbert Simon and now by Gerd 
Gigerenzer specifically.  The similarities and differences between these two approaches to 
search are discussed and graphically represented. 
Finally the problem of information and truth within the Fast & Frugal programme is 
discussed in terms of the nature of information and the underlying truth condition. An 
example of a problem where information is manipulated is presented in order to define 
questions relating to the ability of F&FH to process disinformation. 
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3.2 Challenging the standard of Heuristics & Biases 
3.2.1 Introducing Heuristics & Biases 
It has been established in Chapter 2 that normative theories of judgment are used as a 
standard against which actual decision making can be measured. In recent history it has 
become increasingly obvious that the concept of a fully rational man does not reflect the 
reality of the situation.  People do not seem to make their decisions in accordance with the 
rigours of logic and probability.80  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman pioneered a 
programme that attempted to explain why this is the case.  The programme became known as 
Heuristics &  Biases (H&B).81 
In the preface of the book Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases Kahneman, 
Slovic & Tversky explain the origins of the programme: “The approach to the study of 
judgement that this book represents had origins in three lines of research that developed in 
the 1950s and 1960s: the comparison of clinical and statistical prediction, initiated by Paul 
Meehl; the study of subjective probability in the Bayesian paradigm, introduced to 
psychology by Ward Edwards; and the investigation of heuristics and strategies of reasoning, 
for which Herbert Simon offered a program and Jerome Bruner an example.”82  The origins 
presented by the authors provide a clear indication of the normative approach adopted by the 
authors: the work of Paul Meehl and Ward Edwards provided the normative aspect of the 
H&B programme83, whilst Herbert Simon provided the theory behind heuristics. Jerome 
Bruner applied the concept of heuristics in education as he examined a so-called heuristic of 
discovery.84  Using these influences Tversky & Kahneman states the underlying theme of 
their programme: “…people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations.  In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe 
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and systematic errors.”85  The systematic errors they refer to would then constitute the biases 
mentioned in the title of their article, as well as the name of their programme. 
The H&B programme uses logic and probability theory as standards against which decision 
making is tested – where decision making veers off the norm, one or more biases are 
identified.  These biases are attributed to the use of heuristics. The success of the programme 
attracted both praise and criticism, and created a platform for many studies that wished to 
test, confirm or otherwise critique the H&B approach.86 One such line of study, primarily 
initiated by Gerd Gigerenzer, was to develop into a programme known as Fast & Frugal 
Heuristics.  
3.2.2 Key issues that gave rise to Fast & Frugal Heuristics 
The programmes of F&FH and H&B differ mainly in two aspects namely 1) norms, in terms 
of how they are used to define rationality as well as which norms were chosen by the H&B 
programme for this purpose, and 2) the role of heuristics in the aforementioned process.  
These differences provided the impetus needed for the development of the F&FH 
programme. 
The matter that the F&FH and H&B programmes agree on is the systematic deviation from 
probabilistic norms. Laura Martignon provides the following insight: “Modern experimental 
psychology opened up a front in the war against the view of rational man as probabilist, in a 
flurry of work documenting the ways in which actual human reasoning differs from the 
probabilistic norm.  These deviations were regarded by many as cognitive illusions, as proof 
that unaided human reasoning is riddled with fallacies (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974).”87  
Richard Selten provides more clarity to the critique: “Full rationality requires unlimited 
cognitive capabilities.  Fully rational man is a mythical hero who knows the solutions to all 
mathematical problems and can immediately perform all computations, regardless of how 
difficult they are.  Human beings are in reality very different… [T]here is overwhelming 
evidence for substantial deviations from Bayesian rationality… : people do not obey Bayes’ 
rule, their probability judgments fail to satisfy basic requirements like monotonicity with 
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86 Keren, G. & Teigen K.H. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making:  89 
87 Martignon, L. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 159 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
respect to set inclusion, and they do not have consistent preferences, even in situations 
involving no risk or uncertainty.”88   
Decision theorists seem to agree that people do not make decisions using the norms of 
probability theory.  What they seem to disagree on is whether deviation from these norms in 
fact constitute bad decisions.  On the one hand there is the H&B programme that is quite 
clear about the perspective that heuristics induce biases, which in turn result in non-optimal 
decisions when using logic and probability as standards.  More importantly, these biases are 
often described in a way that implies that normal human decision making is irrational or 
fallacious as Martignon explained above.  This fallacious behaviour is then often attributed to 
the limits of human rational capacity: “Since the 1970s, researchers have documented 
discrepancies between a ‘norm’ (e.g., a law of probability or logic) and human judgment… 
the blame was put on the human mind rather than on the norm.  The discrepancies were 
labelled ‘fallacies,’… and attributed the humans’ ‘bounded rationality,’ in the sense of 
limitations on rationality.”89  This constitutes the first point of difference between the H&B 
programme and that of F&FH: “Bounded rationality is, however, not simply a discrepancy 
between human reasoning and the laws of probability or some form of optimization.  
Bounded rationality dispenses with the notion of optimization and, usually, with probabilities 
and utilities as well.  It provides an alternative to current norms, not an account that accepts 
current norms and studies when humans deviate from these norms.  Bounded rationality 
means rethinking the norms as well as studying the actual behavior of minds and 
institutions.”90 
The two programmes also differ on how they perceive the role of heuristics within rationality.  
H&B sees heuristics as mental shortcuts that lead to fallacious decision making: “The 
meaning of the term heuristics, as first used by Kahneman and Tversky, was highly similar to 
its use in the problem-solving literature, by being considered to be simplified methods 
intended to cope with humans’ limited processing capacity.  They were also error prone, 
leading generally to acceptable (although imprecise) estimates, but under certain 
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circumstances, to systematic biases.”91  However, the F&FH programme is positive about 
heuristics, partly because researchers like Gigerenzer were able to prove that the use of 
heuristics can improve decision making in many situations: “When optimal solutions are out 
of reach, we are not paralyzed to inaction or doomed to failure.  We can use heuristics to 
discover good solutions.”92  Rather than define heuristics as potentially irrational decision 
making shortcuts, F&FH defines heuristics as tools that help us achieve rational decisions: 
“…a heuristic is a rule whose purpose is to describe the actual process – not mere the 
outcome – of problem solving.”93 
3.2.3 Behaviourism and positivism as common origin 
Behaviourism is an approach within psychology that was founded by John B. Watson94 and 
to which its prominence can be attributed in large part to the work of Burrhus F. Skinner who 
maintained an approach known today as Radical Behaviourism.95  The basic tenets of this 
approach hold that 1) the primary determinant of human behaviour is the environment,96 and 
2) that an understanding of human psychology can only come from observing their 
behaviour.97 Behaviourists generally reject the idea that the primary force of behaviour is 
comes from “the mind” with some going so far as to reject the concept of “mind” 
altogether.98 The behaviourist approach can be seen as an expression of the empiricist 
approach.  The behaviourist believes that one gains knowledge through observation, and that 
there is no intangible truth, only knowledge that reflects reality. 
It is generally accepted, in the history of the development of psychology as a science, that 
behaviourism as a so-called school of thought was supplanted by what is often called the 
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cognitive revolution.  Bernard Baars provides an in-depth account of the events and nature of 
the cognitive revolution, and in principle explains that there was a steady move away from 
the behaviourist approach to include what he calls “theoretical imagination” where 
psychologists started to take note of the cognitive aspects that play a role in human 
behaviour: “…the cognitive metatheory [is] the belief that psychology studies behavior in 
order to infer unobservable explanatory constructs, such as ‘memory’, ‘attention’ and 
‘meaning.’”99  The cognitive revolution is often portrayed as a change in approach to the 
study of psychology that was a reaction against behaviourism; George Miller refers to it as a 
counter-revolution that “brought the mind back into experimental psychology.”100  Herbert 
Simon cautions though that one should not see cognitive revolution as opposite to the 
behaviourist approach, as the former relies heavily on the theories and methodologies 
developed by the latter.101 
It cannot be said that either the H&B programme or the F&FH programme is behaviourist in 
their respective approaches, however there are particular similarities and emphases that 
indicate a behaviourist influence.  Within the H&B programme the emphasis on decision 
making behaviour as an indicator of the decision making process relates strongly to the 
behaviouristic approach as was shown in the previous sections.  As will be shown in the 
sections that follow, the F&FH programme not only places a similar emphasis on behaviour 
as an indicator of process, but also places in large part emphasis on the environment as the 
determining factor for the heuristics that are used during the decision making process. This is 
apparent when Gigerenzer states: “What has been called the ‘cognitive revolution’… is more 
than the overthrow of behaviorism by mentalist concepts. These concepts have been 
continuously part of scientific psychology since its emergence in the late 19th century, even 
coexisting with American behaviorism during its heyday (Lovie, 1983). The cognitive 
revolution did more than revive the mental; it has changed what the mental means, often 
dramatically. One source of this change is the tools-to-theories heuristic, with its new analogy 
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of the mind as an intuitive statistician. To show the discontinuity within cognitive theories, I 
briefly discuss two areas will be briefly discussed in which an entire statistical technique, not 
only a few statistical concepts, became a model of mental processes: (a) stimulus detection 
and discrimination and (b) causal attribution.”102  Stimulus detection and discrimination as 
well as causal attribution are methodologies that can be strongly linked to methodologies 
developed in the behaviourist approach – the cognitive revolution might have brought the 
mind back into psychology, but the traditional methods of experimental research reflect the 
positivist notion that observation is the way to gain knowledge. 
3.3 The adaptive toolbox, ecological rationality and practical 
application 
According to Gigerenzer et al.: “The program of fast and frugal heuristics centers on three 
questions. The first concerns the adaptive toolbox: What heuristics do organisms use? 
Answering this involves identifying heuristics, their building blocks, and the evolved 
capacities that these exploit. The second concerns ecological rationality: What are the 
environmental structures in which a given heuristic works well or poorly, and how do people 
adapt heuristics to these structures? The third question concerns applications: How can the 
study of ecological rationality inform the design of heuristics and environments to improve 
decision making?”103  If the programme of F&FH is to be understood, then understanding 
how it defines and uses the three areas of study will provide a foundation. 
3.3.1 The adaptive toolbox 
Gigerenzer introduces the concept of the adaptive toolbox that “promotes a specific vision of 
bounded rationality based on three premises” namely psychological plausibility, which 
implies a more realistic goal of understanding human decision making as it truly happens 
rather than how it theoretically should happen; domain specificity, which describes heuristics 
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as specialised rather than domain general; and ecological rationality, in reference to “the 
study of the match between heuristics and environmental structures”.104  
Gigerenzer notes: “From a functional view…consistency in choice and judgment is not a 
general norm to follow blindly, but rather a tool for achieving certain proximal goals.  For a 
given goal, consistent behavior can be an advantage, a disadvantage, or unimportant.  For 
example, in cooperative relationships within families and businesses, some forms of 
consistent behaviors seem to be indispensable.  They contribute to producing and maintaining 
a social climate of trust, fairness, and commitment.  In competitive relationships, however, 
strategies with built-in inconsistencies can be an advantage.”105  He goes on to clarify what 
the tools within the adaptive toolbox is: “The adaptive toolbox offers a collection of 
heuristics that are specialized rather than domain general as would be the case in subjective 
expected utility (SEU).”106  Heuristics seem to be bound to the environment within which it 
most makes sense and are therefore domain specific.  As such, the F&FH programme holds 
that human decision makers develop a toolbox filled with different domain specific 
heuristics.   
In an in-depth review of advances in the F&FH programme, Todd provides experimental 
developmental and environmental evidence that heuristics are indeed adaptive.  In terms of 
experimentation, Todd provides an example of an experiment conducted by Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer in 1999 that tested participants for the use of the recognition heuristic.  Even 
though Todd notes some possible interpretation challenges, “92% of the inferences made by 
participants still agreed with the recognition heuristic.”107  Todd further provides the example 
of work done by Elman in 1993 who discovered that the often studied “less is more effect” 
was very true for language acquisition experimentation in a neural network.  When Elman 
initially restricted the memory of the neural network, it learned underlying grammatical rules 
from short sentences that allowed it to form more complex relationships as its memory was 
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expanded.108 Finally Todd points out that environmental evidence comes in the form of 
people restructuring their environments for higher degrees of efficiency.109 
An important feature of the adaptive toolbox, and perhaps fast and frugal heuristics in 
general, is that it is conceptualised as something that developed in an evolutionary manner: 
“…everyday decision tasks, such as deciding which of two objects is larger and thereby a 
greater threat or benefit, memory and processing power would not be constrained within 
which evolution had to work – these are the elements that evolution had to work with, to 
shape and extend as necessary to meet the selective demands at hand.”110 Gigerenzer 
confirms the point in discussing the role of the environment in quick estimation: “…the 
ability to estimate the size of social groups accurately might have been of value in a number 
of circumstances encountered by our evolutionary ancestors, for instance, when they had to 
make quick decisions about whether to threaten to fight over resource with other families, 
clans, or tribes.”111 
From the above it follows that heuristics are domain specific and adaptive tools that humans 
(and perhaps other organisms) use to make decisions.  In developing the adaptive toolbox of 
bounded rationality, Gigerenzer challenged the standard of H&B by developing a framework 
for rationality that fundamentally differs from that used by the H&B programme.  
3.3.2 Ecological rationality 
The concept of ecological rationality within the framework of F&FH has been developed as a 
means to posit a theory explaining why and when bounded rationality works112: “The 
‘rationality’ of domain-specific heuristics is not in optimization, omniscience, or consistency.  
Their success (and failure) is in their degree of adaptation to the structure of environments, 
both physical and social. The study of the match between heuristics and environmental 
structures is the study of ecological rationality.”113 Gigerenzer chose this model as it explains 
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how decisions that may seem irrational from the perspective of the neoclassical economic 
man, can be regarded as fully rational as a result of the information found within a particular 
environment.114  The decision maker searches for cues from the environment and selects an 
alternative if cues favour one in particular.  Ecological rationality is therefore a kind of 
bounded rationality that aims to describe the way in which heuristics match the environment 
within which it makes sense. 
Peter Todd provides this insight in discussing the application of fast and frugal heuristics for 
“environmentally bound minds”: “The selective forces impinging on our cognitive evolution 
largely came instead from outside our heads, from our interactions with the world and the 
people and organisms in it.  Thus, the most important bounds that shaped our evolving 
rationality were not internal, mental factors, but rather external, environmental ones.”115  In 
asking “where do new ideas come from?” Gigerenzer notes the following: “New tools can 
suggest new scientific ideas and metaphors about nature, society, and the mind.  When this 
happens, we can trace discoveries back to the changing technological environment in which 
they evolved rather than attributing them to some mystical process inside the scientist’s head.  
In this sense, new insights can come from outside the mind.”116  What is interesting about 
these points is that they strongly reflect an empiricist point of view and as such may suffer 
from the same problems that George Ladd referred to when he talked about empiricism that 
excludes a rational process.  
3.3.3 Practical application 
F&FH is not a fully normative theory in the traditional sense of the word – as a theory built 
on bounded rationality it provides an alternative to the norms found in that of the H&B 
programme.  Gigerenzer provides some clarification as to where the theory fits into the larger 
JDM framework: “The study of smart heuristics is concerned with identifying (1) the 
building blocks of heuristics, and (2) the structures of environments that a given heuristic can 
exploit, that is, the kind of problems it can solve.  In other words, its first objective is the 
study of the adaptive toolbox, and the second that of ecological rationality, with aims that are 
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both descriptive and prescriptive.”117  Gigerenzer explains that studies concerning the 
adaptive toolbox is generally descriptive and makes it possible to make quantitative and 
qualitative predictions.  He further notes that the study of ecological rationality is both 
descriptive and prescriptive: “Its [i.e. the study of ecological rationality] results concerning 
the match between heuristics and structures of the environment can be used to derive 
hypotheses about people’s adaptive use of heuristics.  These results also carry prescriptive 
force.  For instance, when the available information is noncompensatory, we can recommend 
a fast and frugal tree for classification.”118  He finally closes the gap when he states that 
“[t]he systematic study of fast and frugal heuristics can provide normative recommendations 
on an empirical basis, even when we can never know the best solution.”119  Gigerenzer 
effectively argues that the study of F&FH in terms of the adaptive toolbox and ecological 
rationality can deliver normative, descriptive and prescriptive theories and applications. 
Figure 3 provides a graphical overview of Gigerenzer’s argument regarding the practical 
application of the Fast & Frugal programme: 
 
 
Figure 3 - The study of smart heuristics 
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3.3.4 The purpose and assumptions of F&FH 
F&FH was initiated as a response to the issues Gigerenzer found with the H&B programme.  
Specifically, he rejected the notion of an unboundedly rational agent with the unlimited 
capacity to maximise his or her utility through complex algorithmic calculations as regulative 
ideal.  Instead, Gigerenzer proposed that rationality is ecologically bounded and rather than 
maximise utility through complex calculation, decision makers choose to satisfy their goals 
by searching for cues to an alternative that can indeed do so. 
In the first chapter of “Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox” edited by Gigerenzer 
and Selten, the purpose of the book closely reflects the agenda of those who subscribe to the 
Fast & Frugal paradigm: “This book…cannot and will not provide a unified theory of 
bounded rationality.  Rather, its goals are (a) to provide a framework of bounded rationality 
in terms of the metaphor of the adaptive toolbox, (b) to provide an understanding about why 
and when simple heuristics in the adaptive toolbox work, (c) to extend the notion of bounded 
rationality from cognitive tools to emotions, and (d) to extend the notion of bounded 
rationality to include social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools.”120  Admittedly, he 
acknowledge that the theory of bounded rationality is yet to be completed, but as a means to 
promote the concept, Gigerenzer and his fellow researchers followed a path that provided a 
metaphor that describes the way in which human decision making is done in an effort to 
move away from the classical rational man. 
It has been shown that the F&FH programme has the following features: 
1. It subscribes to a particular form of bounded rationality, namely that of ecological 
rationality, that focuses on how cues from the environment allow decision makers to 
choose heuristics and apply them towards a satisfying fulfilment of a goal 
2. Heuristics are seen as adaptive tools that determine how cues are searched, how the 
search is stopped and how decisions are made.  They adapt to an environment, but 
also over time as decision makers learn new things. 
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3.3.5 Summary of claims made by Gigerenzer and other researchers about 
F&FH  
The following claims have been found in literature within the F&FH programme – this is not 
an exhaustive take on all of the claims made by the researchers in question, but rather 
provides a number of repeated claims that are critical to the F&FH argument.  
Gigerenzer claims in various sources that the use of heuristics is how people make decisions 
in real world situations e.g.: 
1. “I will introduce you to the study of cognitive heuristics: how people actually make 
judgments and decisions in everyday life…”121 
2. “This book is about fast and frugal heuristics for making decisions… From a 
descriptive standpoint, they are intended to capture how real minds make decisions 
under constraints of limited time and knowledge.”122 
One of the most obvious claims made by researchers in this programme is that heuristics are 
used by people as effective tools for decision making under the constraints of limited time 
and knowledge and are therefore fast and frugal.  It is important to note that the same 
researchers do not make any claims that heuristics are 100% effective, but rather that in 
specific instances they can be at least as accurate as the normative models used by the H&B 
programme.123 
In section 3.3.3 it was shown how Gigerenzer claims that F&FH can provide descriptive, 
prescriptive and normative insight in the field of JDM.  The descriptive insights come from 
the study of the adaptive toolbox and ecological rationality – in the first instance the use and 
adaptation of heuristics are described whilst in the latter the structures of the environment is 
described.  The prescriptive aspect comes from the study of ecological rationality where so-
called fast and frugal trees can be prescribed based on an analysis of the given environment.  
Finally the overall study of fast and frugal heuristics provides “normative recommendations 
on an empirical basis.”124  Even though an explicit description of the nature of these 
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normative recommendations are difficult to find, Todd & Gigerenzer provides a valuable clue 
as to what it may entail when they say: “Fast and frugal heuristics that are matched to 
particular environmental structures allow organisms to be ecologically rational.”125  A 
rational decision, in the normative sense, is therefore one that consists of a match between a 
heuristic and an appropriate environment.  
In summary then the programme of F&FH makes three major claims namely 1) that the use 
of heuristics reflects the way in which people make decisions in real world situations, 2) that 
these heuristics may be effective tools in making decisions in certain instances and 3) that the 
programme of F&FH provides normative, descriptive and prescriptive insights into the field 
of JDM. 
3.4 The Search Function 
The function of search appears in the work of Simon as well as that of Gigerenzer and has 
similarities as well as a few fundamental differences.   Gigerenzer & Selten provide us with a 
first look into the concept: “A key process in bounded rationality is limited search. Whereas 
in models of unbounded rationality all relevant information is assumed to be available 
already, real humans and animals need to search for information first. Search can be for two 
kinds of information: alternatives (such as for houses and spouses) and cues (that is, for 
reasons and predictors when deciding between given alternatives).  Search can be performed 
inside the human mind (memory) or outside (e.g. library, internet, other minds).”126  
Simon’s approach to search falls into the category of search for alternatives: “Most actual 
human choice begins with the recognition of the need for a decision, then proceeds to 
discover one or more alternatives that would meet this need.  For a very wide range of human 
decision-making activities, the greatest part of the decision maker’s time and effort is devoted 
to generating or identifying alternatives.”127  Selten provides more insight into Simon’s 
approach to bounded rationality: “[Simon] described decision making as a search process 
guided by aspiration levels.  An aspiration level is a value of a goal variable that must be 
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reached or surpassed by a satisfactory decision alternative.”128  One may then deduce that, in 
the decision making process as described by Simon, the following elements are found: a) a 
goal, b) an aspiration level, and c) alternatives.  The process of search implies that a decision 
maker will search for alternatives that can satisfy a given aspiration level for a specific goal.  
When the aspiration level is reached the goal is satisfied.  From there Simon developed the 
concept of satisficing.  Where Simon emphasises the search for alternatives, Gigerenzer 
emphasises the search for cues: “…Simon’s concept of satisficing involves search for 
alternatives, but not for cues (Simon 1955).  Cues can be thought of as implicit in his concept 
of an aspiration level.  On the other hand, the fast and frugal heuristics studied by our 
research group (Gigerenzer et al. 1999) search for cues and are designed for situations in 
which alternatives (such as job candidates or stocks) are already known.”129   
3.4.1 Aspiration levels 
Aspiration levels is a term that can be found in Simon’s description of the search for 
alternatives130 as well as in Selten’s exposition on a theoretical model called aspiration 
adaptation that attempts to “model the nonoptimizing behavior of boundedly rational 
economic agents…” Selten notes that one aspect of the theory is that decision making is 
modelled as a multi-goal problem and that each goal has a number of real-valued goal 
variables.  Selten explains that “[i]n aspiration adaptation theory, an aspiration level is a 
vector of values for the goal variables.”131  What is of interest for this study is how goals 
come about – disinformation, as is shown in Chapter 4, may affect the development of goals 
in different ways.  Selten points out that bounded rationality struggles with a proper 
understanding of motivation: “The human motivational system determines the goal pursued 
by boundedly rational decision making.  Unfortunately we have no clear understanding of the 
interaction of different motivational forces.  This is a serious difficulty for the development 
of a comprehensive theory of bounded rationality.”132  
                                                
128 Selten, R.  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 14 
129 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 43 - 44 
130 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 323 
131 Selten, R.  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 18 
132 Selten, R.  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 32 
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3.4.2 The environment 
In reference to Simon’s second proverbial scissor blade Gigerenzer criticises the neglect of 
analysis of the structure of environments when he says: “On the other hand, the analysis of 
the structure of natural environments has often been paired with a behavioristic anxiety about 
opening the black box of the mind.” For him, studies of the environment rarely meet up with 
studies of the mind.133  He provides a powerful example for this case: “Hundreds of papers 
were written in economics and psychology on the sunk cost fallacy, and hundreds of papers 
were written in evolutionary biology (by some of the most eminent biologists) on the 
Concorde fallacy – which is the same fallacy.  There is not a single cross reference in these 
hundreds of papers, nor any awareness that both fields came to opposite conclusions…”134As 
a result Gigerenzer introduced the concept of ecological rationality: “The question of 
ecological rationality concerns the match between a strategy and an environment… 
Heuristics that are matched to particular environments allow agents to be ecologically 
rational…”135 Instead of trying to define environments, Gigerenzer’s adaptive toolbox places 
focus on the tools (heuristics) that are used to find information within those environments.  
As such the structure of the environment as seen through the lens of F&FH contains 
unknowns that are clarified through the use of fast and frugal heuristics. 
The F&FH programme typically approaches decision making from the point of a single 
rational agent.  However, it does acknowledge the importance of the social aspect of decision 
making – Gigerenzer makes note of a special case of ecological rationality that he calls social 
rationality: “The study of social rationality is a special case of ecological rationality when 
environments consist of other agent with which to interact… the adaptive toolbox contains 
boundedly rational strategies that employ social norms, social imitation and social emotions 
in addition to the cognitive building blocks outlined earlier.”136  In adding the social 
strategies to the adaptive toolbox, Gigerenzer attempts to accommodate the relational aspect 
of decision making.  However, the programme still maintains the perspective of a single 
rational agent that incidentally interacts on a social level. 
                                                
133 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 39 - 40 
134 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 11 
135 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 46 - 47 
136 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 49 
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3.4.3 Heuristics 
It has been shown earlier in the chapter that heuristics are seen in a somewhat negative light 
by researchers in the H&B programme.  In F&FH however, heuristics are seen as the very 
tools used to make decisions.  Heuristics are made up of building blocks which consist of 
search rules, stopping rules and decision rules.  Gigerenzer provides an overview of the 
search rules: “Building blocks for guiding search includes random search, ordered search 
(e.g., looking up cues according to their validities), and search by imitation of conspecifics, 
such as stimulus enhancement, response facilitation, and priming.”137  Stopping rules apply 
when the cue or alternative found satisfies an aspiration level.  Gigerenzer provides a few 
examples of such rules: “Simple rules for stopping search for cues are employed by Take The 
Best, Take The Last, and other heuristics, where search is stopped as soon as the first cue that 
favors one alternative is found (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996).”138  In the same section 
Gigerenzer also notes that stopping rules can be non-cognitive (such as emotions).  Decision 
rules follow search and stop rules.  Gigerenzer points out that decision rules have typically 
been the focus of JDM models.  He further notes that the way in which decisions are actually 
made need not be inferior in terms of accuracy than that of complex probability: “…this is 
not to say that fewer computations and less information imply significantly less accuracy, not 
to mention irrationality.  For example, simple linear models that use only unit weights (+1 or 
-1), and forego the matrix computations linear multiple regression demands, can make 
predictions about as well as regressions.”139 
3.4.4 Cues 
Merriam-Webster defines a cue as “a feature indicating the nature of something 
perceived.”140  Brunswik & Kimiya provide a more relevant definition: “A more broadly 
functionalistic view of perception would suggest an alternative interpretation of the factors of 
perceptual organization which at the same time would be well in keeping with modern 
learning theory. According to this view these factors would be seen as guides to the life-
                                                
137 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 44 
138 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 44 
139 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 45 
140 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Cue: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cue?show=1&t=1313670668. Accessed 18 August 2011 
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relevant physical properties of the remote environmental objects, and thus as playing a part in 
adjustment; in more technical language, they would be conceived of as proximal ‘cues’ to the 
so-called distal bodily reality.”141  According to this definition then, cues are relevant, 
physical properties of remote objects in the environment that plays a part in adjustment of 
perception.  Cues are therefore the bits of information we perceive that help us adjust our 
perception towards a better understanding of reality.  They carry information that can be 
generally defined as neutral.  
3.4.5 Summary of approaches to search 
 
Figure 4 - Search classes 
Figure 4 shows the differences between the search processes of Simon and Gigerenzer.  The 
two approaches to search share a number of elements: firstly, there is a goal that provides the 
impetus behind the decision; secondly, there is the environmental structure that provides 
information about alternatives; thirdly there are the heuristics that function as specialised 
                                                
141 It must be noted that Brunswik and Kamiya were specifically defining cues as they relate to perception 
within an actual environment in: Brunswik, E. and Kamiya, J. 1953. “Ecological Cue-Validity of 'Proximity' and 
of Other Gestalt Factors” in: The American Journal of Psychology 66(1): 20  
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search, stop and decision rules in assessing the validity of cues or alternatives; and finally 
there are the cues themselves (which is implicit in Simon’s aspiration levels). 
The search function as it pertains to Simon’s version of bounded rationality assumes that, 
because the decision maker has limitations, all alternatives cannot be known.  Search 
becomes a process of identifying or generating alternatives that satisfy the aspiration levels of 
a goal.142  The search function as it pertains to F&FH assumes a specific environment for 
which a specific set of heuristics apply.  These heuristics are divided into three kinds of rule 
sets namely search rules, stop rules and decision rules.143  The process further assumes that 
the various alternatives are known and tries to describe how, within a specific domain with a 
known set of alternatives, cues are used to determine which alternative is sufficient to reach a 
goal.   
3.5 Information and truth in F&FH 
How do we know that a decision maker made a good decision?  What is important for this 
study is to understand whether mechanisms exist within the F&FH framework that enables a 
decision maker to ascertain the veracity of cues. Studies have been conducted on the validity 
of cues; however, these studies typically focus on whether cues carry useful information that 
will guide the decision maker towards a specific alternative.144  As such it is assumed in this 
study that cues are neutral in the sense that the decision maker perceives the cue without 
being required to judge its veracity because it assumed to be intrinsically true (its usefulness 
notwithstanding). 
In his critique of Kenneth Hammond’s take on the role of coherence and correspondence in 
JDM, Dunwoody states the following: “Hammond (1996; 2007) argued that there are two 
main camps of researchers in the field of judgment and decision making (JDM) who have 
each adopted different criteria for assessing the competence of human judgments and 
decisions.  According to Hammond (1996; 2007) researchers in the Brunswikian tradition 
                                                
142 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 321 
143 Gigerenzer, G. & Selten, R. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 8 
144For example categorisation tasks related to breast cancer Martignon, L. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The 
Adaptive Toolbox: 159 
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tend to emphasize the correspondence of judgment with ecological criteria….while 
researchers in the Heuristics &  Biases (H&B) program tend to assess coherence…”145 
F&FH are the tools in Gigerenzer’s Adaptive Toolbox that aim at explaining how people 
make good decisions in spite of their limitations.  Taking the information in Chapter 2 into 
account, it is striking how the empiricist tradition of knowledge acquisition through 
experience is reflected in the search process described in F&FH.  Searching for cues, as has 
been discussed, is equal to finding information from the environment that enables us to learn 
whether a specific option will provide a desired result.  Knowledge is clearly gained from the 
environment. If F&FH builds on the empiricist tradition, it follows that it must rely on the 
correspondence theory of truth.  This is confirmed when Gigerenzer & Todd states the 
following with regards to the focus of the ABC research programme: “…we study the 
correspondence-based performance of heuristics in real-world environments, situations where 
optimal coherent strategies are often not known or feasible.”146 
3.6 Criticisms of the F&FH Programme 
3.6.1 Issues noted by researchers within the programme 
The F&FH programme is comparatively young and is constantly undergoing changes.  Many 
researchers, including those who founded the programme, are relatively open about the 
shortcomings the programme suffers.  In the opening chapter of their book on bounded 
rationality, Gigerenzer & Selten clearly states that the book “cannot and will not provide a 
unified theory of bounded rationality.”147  The first shortcoming is that of a lack of a unified 
theory of bounded rationality.  Selten goes so far as to state that “bounded rationality cannot 
be precisely defined.”148  A possible reason for this problem lies in the criticism that 
Gigerenzer & Selten has of the divide between different academic disciplines when they state 
that “the lack of information flow between disciplines can hardly be underestimated.” They 
                                                
145 Dunwoody, P.T. 2009. “Theories of truth as assessment criteria in judgment and decision making” in 
Judgment and Decision Making, 4(2): 117 
146 Gigerenzer, G. & Todd, P.M. 1999. “Fast and Frugal Heuristics” in Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart: 
28  
147 Gigerenzer, G. & Selten, R. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 1 
148 Selten, R.  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 15 
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posit that different disciplines have found answers to the same problems, yet because the 
information is rarely shared, the proverbial wheel is constantly reinvented.149 
Selten highlights a second major problem: “The human motivational system determines he 
goal pursued by boundedly rational decision making.  Unfortunately we have no clear 
understanding of the interaction of different motivational forces.  This is a serious difficulty 
for the development of a comprehensive theory of bounded rationality.”150  This study goes 
into some detail on the motivations of advertisers and how it influences the way in which 
they use language with the aim of eliciting a reaction from consumers.  Motivations are a 
critical element in the study of decision making that may not yet be fully understood in the 
F&FH context. 
In the study of heuristics, Todd highlights a number of potential issues such as the best way 
to measure performance increases in comparing traditional optimisation models and F&FH.  
He also mentions the possible problem of unrealistic testing environments as there is no 
agreed upon format for what a realistic environment entails.  He also highlights the problem 
that in some tests participants apparently used different heuristics for the same environment 
which goes against the idea of a domain specific heuristic.  He finally reflects on the lack of 
multiple perspectives on tests performed to identify the use of heuristics and argues that more 
perspectives are required to confirm the validity of these early findings.151  What this 
highlights is that the F&FH programme is still young and lacks specific support in its 
approach and findings. 
In a group report on why and when simple heuristics work, Goldstein, et al concluded the 
chapter with a section called “What we do not yet understand”.  In this section they highlight 
some critical issues such as the fact that there isn’t an adequate description of the 
environmental structure, that there is a lack of precise models of heuristics and that there is a 
lack of understanding how the proverbial scissor blades fit together.152 
                                                
149 Gigerenzer, G. & Selten, R.  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 10 
150 Selten, R.  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 32 
151 Todd, P.M.  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 67 - 68 
152 Goldstein, D.G. et al  2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 15 
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In summary: the F&FH programme is young with a variety of areas that are unexplored, 
unexplained or even contradictory.  It has some prominent shortcomings of which the lack of 
a unified theory for bounded rationality and the missing link between the cognitive and 
environmental stands out. 
3.6.2 Criticisms from researchers outside of the F&FH programme 
Criticism of the F&FH programme is rarely fundamental or overarching.  Rather, researchers 
within the field of JDM tend to criticise F&FH from within the field which leads to criticisms 
that are typically related to specific methodologies or specific heuristics.  This section 
provides examples of criticisms of F&FH. 
Dougherty et al. attempted to develop an argument to prove that fast and frugal heuristics are 
psychologically implausible by criticising the underlying theory of probabilistic mental 
models.  In their study they developed four points namely 1) that the automatic frequency 
counter assumption is not well supported in literature, 2) that the definition of cue validity is 
flawed, 3) that, as a result of the previous points, validity-guided generation is unlikely and 
instead a memory retrieval processes likely supersede cue validity processes, and 4) that the 
recognition principle violates accepted memory principles and ignores assumptions of 
ecological rationality.153 Gigerenzer et al. responded by systematically refuting each of the 
points.154  However, in a counter-response in their postscript, Dougherty et al. made note that, 
in view of Gigerenzer et al.’s response, they found the description of processes related to cue 
inference and memory to be vague.  They also noted that there is lack of clarity as to the basis 
of the claimed rank ordering of cues in the Take The Best heuristic.  Finally they raised a 
question regarding the size to which the adaptive toolbox can grow.155  Gigerenzer et al. 
provided a second response that rejected any claims of vagueness and did not provide any 
clear response to the final question posed by Dougherty et al.156   
                                                
153 Dougherty, M.R. 2008. “Psychological Plausibility of the Theory of Probabilistic Mental Models and the 
Fast and Frugal Heuristics” in Psychological Review, 115(1): 199 
154 Gigerenzer, G. et al. 2008. “Fast and Frugal Heuristics Are Plausible Models of Cognition: Reply to 
Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008)” in: Psychological Review, 115(1): 230 – 239 
155 Dougherty, M.R. 2008. “Psychological Plausibility of the Theory of Probabilistic Mental Models and the 
Fast and Frugal Heuristics” in: Psychological Review, 115(1): 213 
156 Gigerenzer, G. et al. 2008. “Fast and Frugal Heuristics Are Plausible Models of Cognition: Reply to 
Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008)” in: Psychological Review, 115(1): 238 – 239 
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Michael Birnbaum made a successful attempt at criticising the priority heuristic as it relates 
to risky decisions.  He made the following conclusions: “First, their heuristic is not 
descriptive of certain data that they did not review. Second, their analysis relied on a global 
index of fit, percentage of correct predictions of the modal choice. Such analyses can lead to 
wrong conclusions when parameters are not properly estimated from the data. When 
parameters are estimated from the data, CPT and TAX fit the D. Kahneman and A. Tversky 
(1979) data perfectly. Reanalysis shows that TAX and CPT do as well as the priority heuristic 
for 2 of the data sets reviewed and outperform the priority heuristic for the other 3. Third, 
when 2 of these sets of data are reexamined, the priority heuristic is seen to make systematic 
violations. Fourth, new critical implications have been devised for testing the family of 
lexicographic semiorders including the priority heuristic; new results with these critical tests 
show systematic evidence against lexicographic semiorder models.”157  In short, Brandstätter 
et al. admitted that the heuristic would not necessarily work for all data sets, and argued that 
this fact supports the “adaptive toolbox” approach.   They also argued that they did not 
attempt to fit, but rather to predict, which they mean is a critical distinction when discussing 
the issue at hand.  They further argued that the contention made by Birnbaum that they were 
selective in their choice of data is unfair as their study tested a wide variety of models against 
an even wider variety of problems, which they regard as a unique in that manner.158 
Campitelli & Gobet raised the following issue: “Our own criticism to Gigerenzer’s approach 
is that, although he carried out research with experts (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996b; Hoffrage, 
Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000), he did not use the potential of Simon’s expertise 
approach. In the expertise approach, both the cognitive system and the environment are 
independent variables that adopt different levels. Gigerenzer used ecological environments 
(which is a positive aspect of his approach) but did not vary them. Consequently, the 
importance of fast and frugal heuristics might be an artefact of the range of tasks and 
individuals used in these experiments. In other words, decision making is likely to require 
more than fast and frugal heuristics, in particular when expertise increases… It is paradoxical 
that there are so few cross-citations between Klein and Gigerenzer, given that both 
                                                
157 Birnbaum, M.H. 2008. “Evaluation of the Priority Heuristic as a Descriptive Model of Risky Decision 
Making: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006)” in: Psychological Review, 115(1): 253  
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approaches stress the importance of studying ecologically valid phenomena. It could be 
argued that Gigerenzer provided the formal models and laboratory data and Klein the real-
world data.”159  In other words, not only can fast and frugal heuristics be seen as an artefact 
of the selective nature in which tasks were assigned to individuals, these writers contend that 
Gigerenzer is not testing the theory in real-world conditions. 
A final example of criticism comes from Max Albert regards ecological rationality as overly 
simple: “From this description, it remains unclear how much is assumed to be known by the 
decision maker. Anyway, the highest level of the adaptive toolbox is a process of 
reinforcement learning. While reinforcement learning may describe some aspects of actual 
human decision making, it is certainly not a candidate for the decision rule we are searching 
for. Even if one could argue that it is rational to learn in this way, reinforcement learning 
cannot recommend itself. As a conception of rationality, ecological rationality is too 
simple.”160 This criticism clearly links the F&FH programme to the behaviourist tradition in 
psychology through its reference to reinforcement learning. 
3.7 An example of how F&FH may function in a real world situation 
In the Section 3.4 it was shown that cues (as they relate to the F&FH perspective) are pieces 
of information that act in a descriptive fashion to qualify an alternative from a set of known 
alternatives within a specific environment. It is also assumed that cues are neutral in terms of 
its veracity – cues are perceived and judged as valid, but its truth is not necessarily 
questioned.  This creates a problem which is illustrated in the following speculative 
example161: A person enters a shop to buy a packet of sweets.  If we use the principles of 
F&FH their decision making process will involve the limitations of the environment and a set 
of heuristics that will allow the shopper to search for cues that will result in a choice.   
                                                
159 Campitelli, G. & Gobet, F. 2010. “Herbert Simon’s Decision-Making Approach: Investigation of Cognitive 
Processes in Experts” in Review of General Psychology, 14(4): 357  
160 Albert, M. 2009. “Why Bayesian Rationality Is Empty, Perfect Rationality Doesn’t Exist, Ecological 
Rationality Is Too Simple, and Critical Rationality Does the Job” in RMM, Perspectives in Moral Science, 0: 61 
161 The purpose of this example is to establish an argument around how fast and frugal heuristics could lead to 
less optimal decisions as a result of the manipulation of meaning and not to provide an empirically tested 
example of precisely how the Tallying heuristic works when selecting products in a shop, as such it acts as a 
thought experiment. 
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In our example the shop has only two kinds of sweets – musk and peppermint.  If the goal of 
the shopper is to mask bad breath, then their heuristics will stop their search when they find a 
cue that indicates which of the two options will satisfy their goal.  There is a generally 
accepted connotation of fresh breath with peppermint, so cues that indicate which packet of 
sweets are peppermint will point the shopper in the right direction. In our example the first 
cue found is that of a label that clearly differentiates the two packets as “Peppermint” and 
“Musk”.  But what if the packet was mislabelled?  The cue would then be valid, but not true, 
and lead the shopper to buy something that they didn’t want. 
We can change the example to include the concept of aspiration levels: The shopper has a 
particularly potent combination of onions and garlic for lunch and are on their way to a job 
interview.  They enter the shop with the same goal namely that they need fresh breath, 
however, in this scenario the options for sweets are as follows: 
• Packet 1 is musk flavoured and is labelled accordingly. 
• Packet 2 is a well-known brand of mint flavoured sweets and is labelled “Strong Mint 
Lozenges.” 
• Packet 3 is a new brand of mint flavoured sweets and is labelled “Super Mints” with a 
tagline that states “Fresh Breath for up to 8 hours!*” 
The shopper takes in the cues presented and eliminates Packet 1 as an option.  The shopper 
has had previous experience with Packet 2 and knows that it works, but the effects of a single 
lozenge only lasts for around an hour.  Based on the cues presented by Packet 3, namely that 
it lasts for up to eight hours, the shopper may be led to believe that this packet of sweets 
contains ingredients that are stronger than that of Strong Mints and chooses this packet 
instead.  Within the F&FH framework one of the major constraints is that of time162 – the 
shopper didn’t notice the asterisk which, in very small print, provides an internet address to a 
web page that explains how the claim is substantiated. If the shopper had the time and 
immediate access to the internet, he would have found laboratory tests proving that the 
effects of each sweet lasts up to 30 minutes, and that one needs 2 sweets per hour to maintain 
a fresh breath.  It is not incidental that the packet contains precisely 16 sweets, therefore 
                                                
162 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 292 
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allowing for “up to 8 hours of fresh breath”.  Here too the cue was valid and fulfilled the 
higher aspiration level to mask onion and garlic odour on the shopper’s breath.  The 
experience of using the product however proves that the aspiration level was not fully met 
and that “Super Mints” are in fact, about half as strong as “Strong Mints”.  What adds 
complexity to this example is the fact that the cue was not false – the claim that the mints will 
give you fresh breath for up to eight hours was completely true, yet it was presented in a way 
that implied greater efficacy than that of its rival product when in fact it was not the case. 
F&FH might explain the decision making process in the second example as a case of 
“Tallying”.  Gigerenzer describes tallying as a heuristic where cues are randomly searched 
and tallied to show which object has the greater positive cue value.  The object with the 
highest cue value is predicted to be the best option.163  The following figure clarifies how 
Tallying applies in our example: 
 
Figure 5 - The Tallying Heuristic 
In our example we had three objects that could potentially fulfil the goal of “fresh breath” 
with an aspiration level of “for as long as possible”.  Object 1 was the packet of musk 
flavoured sweets that presented a single cue, namely its label (“Musk”) that carries a 0 value 
for cue validity.  Object 2 was the first packet of mint flavoured sweets that presented a single 
cue, namely its label (“Strong Mints”) which carries a +1 value for cue validity.  Object 3 
was the second packet of mint flavoured sweets that presented two cues namely a) its label 
(“Super Mints”) which carries a +1 value for cue validity and b) its tagline (“Fresh breath or 
up to 8 hours!*”) which carries an additional +1 value for cue validity. 
By simply tallying the valid or positive cues, the shopper finds that Musk has no positive 
cues for satisfying the goal.  Strong Mints can potentially satisfy the goal at a known 
                                                
163 Gigerenzer, G. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 74 
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aspiration fulfilment of one hour (as previous experience taught) and presents one positive 
cue.  Super Mints can potentially satisfy the goal and presents a cue that claims aspiration 
fulfilment for up to 8 hours thereby presenting two positive cues (the label and the tagline).  
The tagline nullifies the known aspiration level of Strong Mints with its claim.  The shopper 
tallies the positive cues and chooses Super Mints as it both fulfils the goals and purportedly 
satisfies the aspiration level more than would Strong Mints.  As mentioned however, Strong 
mints are in reality the better option.  The way in which Super Mints presented the cue 
affected the shopper’s judgment and eventually provided an unsatisfying experience. 
From the example two key problems arise – firstly the cues on the Super Mints packaging 
was manipulated to elicit a response based on a comparison to the more established brand of 
Strong Mints.  The shopper did not find any cues indicating that the information was 
manipulated in this manner, and had no heuristics that would allow him to make such a 
judgment.  Secondly, the information, albeit it factually true, had implications that were not 
necessarily true.  The fact that the makers of Super Mints knew that their product would be 
placed in the vicinity of Strong Mints, gave them an opportunity to elicit an inference through 
comparison that implied a superior product, when in actual tests Strong Mints would still be a 
superior product.  The example therefore raises the following questions namely: 
1. How does the manipulation of meaning affect the perception of cues? 
2. Can the veracity of cues be determined using the F&FH framework? 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an overview of the F&FH programme of Gerd Gigerenzer in an 
attempt to raise specific questions regarding the ability of F&FH to uncover disinformation.  
Initially F&FH was juxtaposed against the H&B programme to show how the former was a 
response to the latter.  The two programmes differ primarily 1) in terms of the selection of 
norms and the way it they are used to define rationality, and 2) the role that heuristics play in 
the decision making process.  The two programmes share a common origin namely that of the 
behaviouristic approach in psychology. 
The F&FH programme was described in terms of the three areas of research defined by the 
founding researchers namely that of the adaptive toolbox, ecological rationality and practical 
application of the resultant theories.  It was shown that the adaptive toolbox consists of 
heuristics that adapt to the environment as required.  Ecological rationality was described as a 
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form of bounded rationality where the environmental structure acts as the bounds to the 
decision maker’s ability to make rational decisions.  It was shown that F&FH is regarded as a 
programme that can deliver normative insights, descriptive theories in terms of the adaptive 
toolbox and ecological rationality, and can be used in a prescriptive manner.   
The search function was introduced in a comparative analysis of the approaches by Herbert 
Simon and Gigerenzer where it was found that cues provide information to the decision 
maker about the structure of the environment that could be used to determine an alternative 
that would satisfy a goal.  It was proposed that cues are neutral in as much as they don’t carry 
explicit truth value, but rather provides information that still needs to be interpreted by the 
decision maker. Various criticisms were discussed, both from researchers within the 
programme and from researchers outside of the programme.  A speculative example was 
provided to show how cues can be valid, but not true.  A second speculative example was 
provided to show how cues are valid and true, but lead to suboptimal decisions through false 
inferences based on implied information.  Two key questions have been identified for further 
discussion in following chapters. 
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Chapter  4  
Disinformation:  A  language  use  
strategy  
4.1 Introduction 
People use language to achieve goals.  More importantly, in using language they may in fact 
be using disinformation to achieve their goals.  The focus of this chapter is to show, through a 
careful historical and conceptual overview, that enterprises with a profit motive may use 
implicature-type disinformation as a means to create a competitive position for their product 
or service.  The chapter will start off by discussing the use of language as an act; it will then 
be followed by a discussion on the use of language as a strategic joint activity that achieves 
goals.  The concept of implicature is introduced along with the Cooperative Principle 
developed by Grice after which motive is discussed in terms of its definition and 
characteristics.  A discussion around profit motive follows that leads into the forces 
experienced by enterprises that results in the use of advertising to gain a competitive position. 
The chapter then provides an overview of the historical development of advertising and 
propaganda as an extension of rhetoric and its persuasive mechanisms for the purpose of 
contextualising the concept of disinformation.  The argument is developed that current 
advertising strategies are heavily influenced by the development of rhetoric through the 
integration of the Jewish and Greco-Roman traditions, carried into the era of capitalism.  A 
short overview of the salient historical events related to advertising is provided along with a 
brief discussion of the major theories related to persuasion that has been developed over the 
last century. 
After the historical overview the chapter leads into a definition of disinformation followed by 
the differentiation of disinformation from misinformation, persuasion and deception. Finally 
a short discussion follows that indicates how implied information, or implicata, can be a form 
of disinformation. 
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4.2 Using language 
Language is “a finite system of elements and principles that make it possible for speakers to 
construct sentences to do particular communicative jobs.”164 This definition refers to the fact 
that language is something (a finite system of elements) that human beings use (to do 
particular communicative jobs).  Herbert C. Clark confirms this notion when he says: 
“Language is used for doing things.  People use it in everyday conversation for transacting 
business, planning meals and vacations, debating politics, gossiping…All these are instances 
of language use…”165 
In its most fundamental form, language is used to convey meaning.  Jeff Speaks discusses 
two theories of meaning namely theories that seek the semantic meaning of expressions (the 
meaning of specific symbols within the system of language) and foundational theories of 
meaning that pertains to how a social grouping gives meaning to the symbols they use in 
communication.  Speaks clarifies the difference between these two theories as follows: “To 
see the distinction between semantic theories and foundational theories of meaning, it may 
help to consider an analogous one. Imagine an anthropologist specializing in table manners 
sent out to observe a distant tribe. One task the anthropologist clearly might undertake is to 
simply describe the table manners of that tribe—to describe the different categories into 
which members of the tribe place actions at the table, and to say which sorts of actions fall 
into which categories. This would be analogous to the task of the philosopher of language 
interested in semantics; her job is to say what different sorts of meanings expressions of a 
given language have, and which expressions have which meanings. 
But our anthropologist might also become interested in the nature of manners; he might 
wonder how, in general, one set of rules of table manners comes to be the system of etiquette 
governing a particular group. Since presumably the fact that a group obeys one system of 
etiquette rather than another is traceable to something about that group, the anthropologist 
might put his new question by asking, ‘In virtue of what facts about a person or group does 
that person or group come to be governed by a particular system of etiquette, rather than 
                                                
164 Fasold, R. & Connor-Linton, J. 2006. “Introduction” in An Introduction to Language and Linguistics: 9 
165 Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 3 
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another?’ Our anthropologist would then have embarked upon the analogue of the 
construction of a foundational theory of meaning: he would then be interested, not in which 
etiquette-related properties particular action types have in a certain group, but rather the 
question of how action-types can, in any group, come to acquire properties of this sort.”166 
For the purpose of this study we will be more interested in the foundational approach to 
meaning, namely that we want to understand how communicators add meaning to, or 
generating meaning from, communicative acts. Meaning relates to our experience of the 
world, which includes people around us.  Prashant Parihk explains it as follows: “What seems 
to be common amongst most uses of language is intended information flow between agents, 
via language. It has three aspects: intention, information and flow. [Information] has to do 
with how language refers to or connects with the world.”167 
J.L. Austin distinguishes three language acts namely locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts.  Locutionary acts are performed when language is used to make a 
statement about something.  Austin explains how using language is to do something, in other 
words, using language is an act in itself: “…to say something is in the full and normal sense 
to do something – which includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain 
words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain ‘meaning’ in the 
favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain 
reference.  The act of ‘saying something’ in this full normal sense I call, i.e. dub, the 
performance of a locutionary act…”168 
An illocutionary act is performed along with a locutionary act and is the character of the 
locutionary act performed.  Where a locutionary act is to make a statement, the 
accompanying illocutionary act is how it is said.  Austin uses the example of the utterance: 
“Shut the door” - he means that at face value it isn’t clear whether this is a statement or a 
warning: “To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine in what 
way we are using the locution: 
asking or answering a question, 
                                                
166 Speaks, J. 2011. “Theories of Meaning” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition): 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/meaning/.  Accessed 25 October 2011 
167 Parihk, P. 2001. The use of language: 3 
168 Austin, J.L. 1955. How to do things with words: 94 
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giving some information or an assurance or a warning, 
announcing a verdict or an intention, 
pronouncing sentence, 
making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, 
making an identification or giving a description, 
And the numerous like.”169   
Austin proceeds to clarify the point further by defining an illocutionary act as follows: “I 
explained the performance of an act in the new and second sense as the performance of an 
‘illocutionary’ act, i.e. performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance 
of an act of saying something…”170 
Perlocution is the act of bringing about consequences with how we use language.  Austin 
develops an in-depth argument around the definition of perlocution and provides this short 
description: “Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or 
achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even say, 
surprising or misleading.”171 
Austin provides the following example as a means to differentiate between the three kinds of 
language acts: 
“Act (A) or Locution 
 He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ meaning by ‘shoot’ shoot and referring by ‘her’ to her. 
Act (B) or Illocution 
 He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her. 
Act (C. a) or Perlocution 
                                                
169 Austin, J.L. 1955. How to do things with words: 98. 
170 Austin, J.L. 1955. How to do things with words: 99. 
171 Austin, J.L. 1955. How to do things with words: 108 
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 He persuaded me to shoot her. 
Act (C. b) 
 He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her.”172 
Using language therefore means that we are performing acts that provide information 
(locution), in a given way (illocution) that has a specific consequence (perlocution).  This is 
all achieved by the use of a language system that consists of symbols, signs and sounds that 
carry some form of meaning about our experiences of the world. 
4.3 The strategic use of language 
The use of language is generally not something that happens in a vacuum or at random.  In 
reference to Austin’s description above, we use language in different contexts to convey 
information, in a specific manner, in order to achieve a result.  Clark expands on this idea 
when he says: “What people do in arenas of language use is take actions.  At a high level of 
abstraction, they negotiate deals, gossip, get to know each other.  At a lower level, they make 
assertions, requests, promises, apologies to each other.  In doing that they categorize things, 
refer to people and locate objects for each other. At yet a lower level, the produce utterances 
for each other to identify.  And at the lowest level, they produce sounds, gestures, writing for 
each other to attend to, hear, see.”173  Clark’s description of the levels of language use 
correlates with that of Austin (Figure 6): 
                                                
172 Austin, J.L. 1955. How to do things with words: 102 
173 Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 18 
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Figure 6 - Levels of Language Use and Language Acts 
4.3.1 Language as a joint action 
Both Clark and Austin’s perspectives have two major points in common namely the idea that 
language is used for a purpose, and that this purpose is generally to achieve a goal.174  Clark 
however, takes the idea further and provides a comprehensive study on the use of language as 
a joint action: “Language use is really a form of joint action.  A joint action is one that is 
carried out by an ensemble of people acting in coordination with each other….It is a joint 
action that emerges when speakers and listeners – or writers and readers – perform their 
individual actions in coordination, as ensembles.”175  When we use language, we use it 
together, not as random actors uttering random sentences, but within a given context in 
coordination with each other.  Clark states that joint activities and language use are in fact 
                                                
174 In line with the concept of perlocution. 
175 Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 3 
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inseparable: “Two or more people cannot carry out a joint activity without communicating, 
and that requires language use in its broadest sense.  Yet whenever people use language, they 
are taking joint actions.  Language use and joint activity are inseparable.”176  He further notes 
the following: “What makes an action a joint one, ultimately, is the coordination of individual 
actions by two or more people.  There is coordination of both content, what the participants 
intend to do, and processes, the physical and mental systems they recruit in carrying out those 
intentions.”177 
What we can derive from the views of Clark is that language use as a joint action involves 
role players that are coordinated in terms of content and process towards the fulfilment of a 
goal. 
4.3.2 Achieving goals 
We know from the above that joint actions are goal oriented.  Clark confirms the point and 
expands the idea further by identifying the different types of goals that exist in joint 
activities.178  He mentions  
1. the domain goal, which is the overall goal of the joint activity, such as transacting 
business, winning a chess game etc. 
2. procedural goals, such as finishing the joint activity efficiently. 
3. interpersonal goals such as being polite. 
4. possible private agendas such as deception. 
He then proceeds to divide these goals into public and private goals.  He defines public goals 
as “openly recognized by all the participants” and private goals as “hidden from view”.179 
4.3.3 Cooperation 
Paul Grice is credited with the discovery of the field of implicature.180  Wayne Davis 
provides the following definition: “He [Grice] introduced the verb implicate and the cognate 
                                                
176 Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 29 
177 Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 59 
178 Clark mentions that joint activities consist of joint actions in: Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 59 
179 Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 34 - 35 
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noun implicature as technical terms denoting ‘the act of meaning or implying something by 
saying something else.’”181  Consider the following example: 
Joe:  I am hungry 
Jack:  There’s a restaurant just down the street 
Jack may have implied that the restaurant has food for Joe, but the sentence does not carry 
that information directly.  Recognising the fact that language use is typically social and will 
involve other individuals, Grice developed the so-called Cooperative Principle that specifies 
four maxims 182 that will lead to effective communication. The four maxims are: 
1. Maxim of Quality: Make your contribution true. 
a. Do not say what you believe to be false . 
b. Do not say that for which you lack evidence. 
2. Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as necessary 
a. Make your contribution as informative as required. 
b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
3. Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. 
4. Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous. 
a. Avoid obscurity. 
b. Avoid ambiguity. 
c. Be brief. 
d. Be orderly.  
Grice goes on to expand these maxims beyond conversational exchanges: “I have stated my 
maxims as if this purpose [of talk and talk exchange] were a maximally effective exchange of 
information; this specification is, of course, too narrow, and the scheme needs to be 
                                                                                                                                                  
180 Davis, W.A. 1998. Implicature – Intention, Convention, and the Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory: 
1 
181 Davis, W.A. 1998. Implicature – Intention, Convention, and the Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory: 
5 
182Davis, W.A. 1998. Implicature – Intention, Convention, and the Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory:  
11 – 12 
Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the way of words: 26 – 28 
Clark, H.C. 1996. Using Language: 142 
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generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of 
others.”183 The Cooperative Principle provides a broadly accepted norm against which 
effective information exchanges can be measured.  On Grice’s suggestion, these maxims can 
also be applied to other forms of exchange such as mending a car.184 
Based on the information at hand we can define language use as: A series of joint actions 
coordinated in terms of content and process that make up a joint activity between two or 
more participants who want to achieve a variety of private and public goals. 
4.4 Motive 
Motive is defined as “a state of arousal that compels an organism to act”185; in relation to 
goals, it is also defined as “a highly aggregated class of goals, with variants of a basic theme 
being common to all of them.”186 Coon & Mitterer provides a more in-depth explanation: 
“Many motivated activities begin with a need, or internal deficiency… Needs cause a drive 
(an energized motivational state) to develop… Drives activate a response (an action or series 
of actions) designed to attain a goal (the ‘target’ of motivated behavior).”187 Earlier it was 
confirmed that language use is a series of coordinated joint actions that make up a joint 
activity between two or more participants who want to achieve a variety of private and public 
goals.  This section looks at the role of motive during language use as it relates to both the 
arousal to act and the aggregation of goals with a common theme. 
4.4.1 The intersection of information, goals and action 
The following figure provides a summary of what has been found in this study of language 
use so far: 
                                                
183 Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the way of words: 28 
184 Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the way of words: 28 - 29 
185 "Motives and Goals" in Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology: 
http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/estappliedpsyc/motives_and_goals. Accessed 22 August 
2011 
186 "Motives and Goals" in Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology: 
http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/estappliedpsyc/motives_and_goals. Accessed 22 August 
2011 
187 Coon, D. & Mitterer, J.O. 2010. Introduction to Psychology – Gateways to mind and behavior: 320 
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Figure 7 - Language Use in Summary 
When language is used, information is transferred between two or more participants in a joint 
activity.  This information can be explicit (locution), implicit (illocution and implicature) and 
is intended to result in a response, action or consequence (perlocution).  The goals of the 
participants can be public or private.  We can deduce from the definitions above that the 
goals of the participants are aggregated into motives, and that these motives spur them to 
action.  If goals are public and private, then motives, as an aggregated class of goals, should 
also be public or private. It follows that the result of the joint activity is determined by the 
information exchange, the motives, the specific goals and the actual joint actions performed 
during the exchange. 
4.4.2 Self-serving and selfless 
Thomas Hobbes held the belief that humans are inherently self-serving.  He developed an 
entire philosophy that defined humans as beings who, responding to their natural instincts, 
desire only to fulfil what he called appetites.188 His perspective on human beings is 
                                                
188 "Hobbes, Thomas." in The Essentials of Philosophy and Ethics: 
http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/hodderepe/hobbes_thomas. Available 23 August 2011 
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mechanistic and he compares people to automata189: “Nature (the art whereby God hath made 
and governes the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, 
that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining 
whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines 
that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For 
what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so 
many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer?” 190 
Gregory Kavka discusses the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and at one point discusses the 
validity that Hobbes was a psychological egoist 191: “According to traditional interpretations, 
Psychological Egoism is one of the central elements of Hobbes’s philosophy.  It is derived 
from his mechanistic thery of human action and serves as a vital premise in Hobbes’s famous 
arguments against anarchy, which ground his entire political theory.”192  He used this 
argument as a means to justify the creation of an authoritarian regime that has absolute 
control over people because “the Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no 
Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that 
forbids them; which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till 
they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.”193 In other words, our motives that 
drive our actions, at least from Hobbes’ point of view, must be governed by a law in order to 
establish some semblance of security from those very motives. 
In contrast to Hobbes, Joseph Butler takes the concept of natural desires and provides a more 
selfless perspective.194  He seems to agree that human nature contains “internal principles” 
that govern self-preservation, happiness and so forth.  Different to Hobbes he extends the 
                                                
189 Please note that the spelling was taken verbatim from the original document provided by The Gutenberg 
Project, referenced below 
190 Hobbes, T. 1651. “Introduction” in Leviathan: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm. 
Accessed 23 August 2011 
191 Psychological Egoism is defined by Kavka as follows: “…the doctrine that all hman action is selfishly 
motivated.” in: Kavka, G.S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory: 29 
192 Kavka, G.S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory: 44 
193 Hobbes, T. 1651. “The Incommodities Of Such A War” in Leviathan: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm. Accessed 23 August 2011. 
194 Great Thinkers A-Z. 2004. Joseph Butler: 
http://www.credoreference.com.ez.sun.ac.za/entry/contgt/joseph_butler. Accessed 23 August 2011 
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“parts of man” that is served by the internal principles beyond the individual by saying that, 
in the same way as man has parts that make up the body, individuals make up similar parts of 
society.  As a consequence, the individual desire to survive and live a happy life translates 
into selfless acts as the internal principles extend towards other members of society.  Butler 
says: “The relation which the several parts or members of the natural body have to each other 
and to the whole body is here compared to the relation which each particular person in 
society has to other particular persons and to the whole society; and the latter is intended to 
be illustrated by the former.  And if there be a likeness between these two relations, the 
consequence is obvious: that the latter shows us we were intended to do good to others, as the 
former shows us that the several members of the natural body were intended to be 
instruments of good to each other and to the whole body.”195 
In summary – motive may be seen as self-serving where individuals strive to fulfil only their 
personal goals, possibly at the detriment of those around them.  Alternatively, the notion of 
selfless motive reflects the idea that the same drivers that urge individuals to do things for 
themselves, extends automatically towards the rest of society e.g. the drive to survive as an 
individual extends towards society in the form of medical services, food markets or any other 
such activity. 
4.4.3 The profit motive 
Adam Smith provided perhaps some of the most influential ideas of classical economics 
when he proposed the theory of an invisible hand that guides a free and open economy.  In 
essence his position was that if all people were self-interested and motivated by profit, then 
the whole of society would prosper.196 His perspective on the consequences of the self-
serving nature of man reflects that of Butler – the good we afford ourselves naturally extends 
towards the rest of society. When one reads Smith’s words, one finds that he was referring 
specifically to the employment of capital in domestic industry as opposed to importing goods 
                                                
195 Butler, J. 1887. “Sermon I: Upon Human Nature” in Human Nature and Other Sermons:  
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3150/3150-h/3150-h.htm. Accessed 23 August 2011. 
196 Bloomsbury Guide to Human Thought. 1993. Invisible Hand: 
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from elsewhere.197  The benefits of the invisible hand seemed to have definite limits in terms 
of where it operated and who will benefit from the profit motive. 
Kenneth Lux launches a searing attack on the profit motive in his article named The failure of 
the profit motive where he juxtaposes the concept of infinite growth to limited resources.  In 
doing so he shows that, due to the fact that our natural resource system is closed, and the fact 
that economic growth equates to increases in material resource requirements, it is impossible 
to sustain infinite growth with in a finite system.  He explains that the profit motive is directly 
related to an increase in wealth, which is directly related to an increase in resource 
consumption.  Since the profit motive is central to the current economic culture, the 
implication is an unsustainable future.  His solution is that we move away from self-interest 
towards the common good in order to attain sustainability.198  Lux points out that the concept 
of self-interest found in Adam Smith’s work can be translated into the concept of profit 
motive: “If self-interest is to have any useful meaning at all we must see that in economic 
practice it means what everyone takes it to mean, the profit motive, which is the desire to 
increase one’s financial wealth.”199  Note that Lux does not define profit motive as the 
maximisation of financial wealth, but rather as increasing one’s financial wealth.  This 
distinction is important since it correlates with the concept of satisficing.  Simon levels 
various criticisms even against the idea that firms aim for the maximisation of profits200 and 
shows that firms often acted to increase profits only when difficulties arose or profits were 
falling below expectations.201 
It has already established that a motive is an aggregated class of goals.  Moreover, it was 
shown that there is credible criticism against the concept of maximisation of utility.  It is 
accepted in this study that many different types of organisations of which some do not exist 
for the sake of making profits.  The typical function of a business enterprise is to sell goods 
                                                
197 Smith, A. 1776. Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3300/3300-h/3300-h.htm. Accessed 23 August 2011 
198 Lux, K. 2002. “The Failure of the Profit Motive” in Ecological Economics 44: 1 - 9 
199 Lux, K. 2002. “The Failure of the Profit Motive” in Ecological Economics 44: 2 
200 He mentions that firms may seek to maximize some quantity other than profits, that executives may seek to 
maximize their own utility that may contradict that of the firm and that executives and other participants may 
identify with and attempt to maximize various sub-goals of a firm in: Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded 
Rationality (3): 282 – 284.  
201 Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality (3): 410 
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or services at a profit – Veblen states that “[t]he motive of business is pecuniary gain, the 
method is essentially purchase and sale.  The aim and usual outcome is an accumulation of 
wealth.”202  The way wealth accumulates is through profits, generated by selling goods or 
services at a higher price than the cost of producing such goods or services.203  In a business 
enterprise a profit motive exists, whether it is the maximisation or maintenance thereof is for 
the purpose of this study of no consequence other than the fact that in order to generate 
profits, sales must be made that would generate revenues in excess of costs.   
In summary, it was shown that the aim of an enterprise is to make profit, and that this can be 
seen as a motive that consists of various goals that would satisfy the motive.  There exists two 
perspectives on the profit motive that correlates with the views of Hobbes and Butler namely 
that of the self-interested economic agent to the detriment of society (Hobbes and Lux) and 
the economic agent concerned with the common good (Butler and Smith).  
4.4.4 Competition, profits and the strategic use of language 
If profits depend on the enterprise’s ability to sell goods to a sufficiently large market then, 
within the profit motive of a business, there exists the goal of sales with an aspiration level 
that correlates with the expectation that income made from sales should exceed costs.   
If sales were the only determinant of success, then business and economics as a subject would 
not have been the focus of hundreds of years’ worth of study.  Much rather the ability to sell 
goods and services is subject to various forces that pressure an enterprise to perform various 
activities that could counter the influence of these forces.  Michael Porter defines the success 
of a firm as follows: “…firm success is manifested in attaining a competitive position or 
series of competitive positions that lead to superior and sustainable financial performance.”  
204  It can be inferred that this competitive position is a) related to other competitors that b) 
sell equivalent goods in c) the same market space. 
Porter presents a model of five forces that erode long term profitability – Figure 8 refers: 
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203 The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia with Atlas and Weather Guide. 2010. Profit: 
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Figure 8 - Porter's Five Forces 
Based on the above model we see that there are numerous participants involved in the process 
of establishing a successful firm namely Competitors, Suppliers, Buyers and New Entrants.  
As enterprises conduct their business, they will engage in joint activities with the various 
participants, which, according to Clark, imply the use of language. It is assumed that the 
“conversations” or communication between the enterprise and a given participant will change 
according to the context, for example, an enterprise will negotiate costs when engaging 
suppliers or discuss value when engaging buyers. 
The conversation an enterprise engages the buyer on is one that constitutes the question of 
value. Peter Doyle explains the importance of customer value: “In a free-enterprise system 
individual consumers choose how to spend their money.  In turn firms compete with one 
another to attract the patronage of customers.  Firms making offers that do not appeal to 
customers go out of business because they do not generate cash flow to pay their suppliers of 
materials, labour and capital.” 205  Weinstein & Johnson defines customer value as consisting 
of three core aspects namely product quality, service quality and value-based prices.  They 
                                                
205 Doyle, P. 2008. Value Based Marketing: 74 
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refer to this as the customer value triad.206  An enterprise may be fully equipped to deliver 
customer value, but how do they communicate this value to the market?  More specifically, 
how do the forces discussed above influence the message of value delivered by an enterprise? 
What was shown in this section so far is that joint activities imply language use, that 
language use involves public and private goals and that these goals influence the information 
sent between the speaker and the listener. It was also shown that enterprises have a profit 
motive that implies the goal of making sales.  Furthermore it was shown that the key to 
continued business success is to provide value. With competitive forces at play however, with 
other organisations vying for the same money, an organisation is required to send a message 
that strategically enhances the possibility of generating sales and retaining customers.  This 
message normally comes in the form of advertising.   
4.4.5 The problem with advertising: an example of a baker 
The problem of information in advertising discussed in this study is perhaps better clarified 
with the following thought experiment:  Let us imagine a bakery where cakes are sold.  There 
is no sense for a baker to put out a sign saying “Cake” when he is competing with other 
bakers and grocers who all sell cakes within the same general vicinity of where his bakery is 
located.  As a first strategic response, according to Weinstein & Johnson, he should be 
creating customer value.  Presuming that his competitors are all roughly equal in the 
customer value triad of product quality, service quality and value-based pricing, how should 
he respond?  He needs to sell cakes to sustain his business and in order to do so he must 
create a reason for his customers to buy from him.  Should he use advertising as a means he 
may resort to various techniques of persuasion that could elicit a better response. The baker is 
an honest man, he won’t lie about the superiority of his cakes – he must however find a way 
to put his best foot forward and cast a good light on his cakes that would attract customers.  
Instead of his normal sign that simply states “Cake”, he orders an advertisement in the local 
paper with the heading (locution) “Great Cakes make for Happy Birthdays” which is 
presented alongside a picture of a small boy with a large grin and a big birthday cake 
(illocution).  The advertisement ends with a directive: “Call early to place your order” with a 
telephone number for the bakery (perlocution): 
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Figure 9 - Advertisement for cakes207 
The baker didn’t lie about the cakes, but he did create associations between successful 
birthday parties and the cakes he sells.  Of course, he cannot provide a guarantee that buying 
his cakes will in fact make for a successful birthday party – the implication can therefore be 
regarded as possibly misleading. Moreover, he created a sense of urgency with the closing 
line that provides the idea that he is busy – if you want a successful birthday party for your 
child you need to call as soon as possible to avoid disappointment. 
What the baker did was to create an imperative for action with a positive association that 
differentiates him from other bakers and grocers in the area even though all of his 
competitors in reality provide similar quality products, similar quality service and value for 
money.  In effect the baker provided cues that, even though not explicitly false, established 
connotations that cannot be confirmed.  By providing cues that are aligned with his market’s 
needs, he gained an edge. 
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4.5 Defining disinformation 
This section aims to provide an overview of the concept of disinformation in terms of its 
history, key characteristics and how it is differentiated from misinformation, persuasion and 
deception.  Finally implicatures and their relation to disinformation will be discussed. 
4.5.1 Historical overview 
The purpose of this historical overview is to provide context in terms of the origins of 
disinformation in Western society.  It is not intended to be an exhaustive or complete 
representation of the subject of rhetoric, nor does it provide critical information to the 
definition of disinformation.  Rather, it consists of a coherent story based on the perspectives 
of J.J. Murphy and a few other writers. 
4.5.1.1 From ancient rhetoric to a Cold War weapon of mass delusion 
The use of information to deceive or mislead is a practice that is possibly as old as the use of 
language.  Galasinski notes: “It seems that it would be wrong to speak of deception as some 
strange, unnatural or occasional behavior.  Deception is firmly situated in our everyday 
actions.  Although we know we should not deceive others, our cultural practices, our 
traditions, provide us with a multitude of situations not only in which one deceives the other 
but, indeed, in which such actions are decidedly positive or, at the least, are not considered 
negative.”208  In this section we will develop a historical perspective on the use of language 
as a tool for misleading people.  The history of disinformation will be reviewed mainly from 
the point of view of its development through Christianity via the perspectives of ancient 
rhetoric in the Catholic Church through to the migration of the Purists in the United States.  
This route is chosen in an attempt to show the link between the origins of the rhetorical 
methods employed by the modern day advertising and the culture of commercial 
consumerism that originated in the United States and consequently spread through the rest of 
the world. 
4.5.1.2 Ancient Greece and Rome 
Pratkanis & Aronson reveals that a primary purpose of propaganda is the aim to persuade: 
“The term propaganda did not see widespread use until the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when it was use to describe the persuasion tactics employed during World War I and 
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those later used by totalitarian regimes.  Propaganda was originally defined as the 
dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies and deception… The 
word propaganda has since evolved to mean mass ‘suggestion’ or influence through the 
manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual.  Propaganda is the 
communication of a point of view with the ultimate goal of having the recipient of the appeal 
come to ‘voluntarily’ accept this position as if it were his or her own.”209  Carl Hausman 
provides a more informal definition: “Propaganda has various definitions, but we usually 
think of it as a one-sided, deliberately misleading message, often designed to be hurtful to a 
person or group.”210 Finally the Greenwood Encyclopaedia of International Relations defines 
propaganda as: “The deliberate spread of ideas, images, and information which may (but 
need not) be untrue, to advance one’s cause and undermine the interests of opponents.”211 
From the above we know that propaganda has at its goal to persuade through the provision of 
information.  Persuasion as a formal method of communication has a history that can be 
traced back to the sophists of Ancient Greece.  Taylor & Mi-Kyoung provides us with some 
insight into that era: “… the period saw the flourishing of a challenging, rationalistic climate 
of thought on questions including those of morality, religion and political conduct, to which 
the sophists both responded and contributed. It is important to emphasize the individualistic 
character of the sophistic profession; its practitioners belonged to no organization, shared no 
common body of beliefs and founded no schools, either in the sense of academic institutions 
or in that of bodies of individuals committed to the promulgation of specific doctrines.”212  
The fact that they charged money for their knowledge, along with the fact that they generally 
held the belief that there is no objective truth, but only a good argument, led to Plato and 
Aristotle’s general disdain for their practices. Their skills were of particular value in Ancient 
Greece society: “The emergence of this new profession, which was an extension to new areas 
of the tradition of the itinerant rhapsode (reciter of poems, especially of Homer), was a 
response to various social, economic, political and cultural developments of the period. The 
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increasing wealth and intellectual sophistication of Greek cities, especially Athens, created a 
demand for higher education beyond the traditional basic grounding in literacy, arithmetic, 
music and physical training. To some extent this involved the popularization of Ionian 
speculation about the physical world… which was extended into areas such as history, 
geography and the origins of civilization. The increase in participatory democracy, especially 
in Athens, led to a demand for success in political and forensic oratory, and hence to the 
development of specialized techniques of persuasion and argument.”213 
Pratkanis & Aronson writes that “Aristotle reconciled the view of the Sophists and the 
position of his teacher, Plato, in Rhetoric – the first comprehensive theory of persuasion.”  
According to the writers, Aristotle believed that the purpose of persuasion was the 
communication of a point of view or position which, his position on discovering the truth 
through a rational process of reasoning notwithstanding, he believed was needed to 
“communicate the truth to them [men of lesser intellect] in such a manner that they might 
come to the right conclusion.”214  In this volume on rhetoric, Aristotle identified requirements 
for successful persuasion namely: the speaker or source (ethos), the emotions of the listener 
(pathos) and the message or logic (logos).215  For each requirement there is a method that 
adds to the potential success to persuade.  Rapp explains that, firstly, the credibility of the 
speaker comes into play – for Aristotle, credibility meant three particular characteristics that 
must all be present namely that of practical intelligence, a virtuous character and good will.  
Secondly Aristotle defines a number of specific emotions and ways in which they could be 
elicited.  Underlying to these methods for many of the emotions he defined there are three 
things to keep in mind namely the state of mind required for a given emotion, the target of the 
emotion and the reason for the emotion.  Thirdly persuasion happens through a logical 
argument in the form of induction (arguing from the particular towards the universal) or 
deduction (arguing that, given certain assumptions, a logical truth may be deduced from said 
                                                
213 Taylor, C.C.W. and Lee, M. “The Sophists” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 
Edition: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/sophists/. Accessed 25 October 2011 
214 Pratkanis, A. R. & Aronson, E. 1992. Age of propaganda: 11 
215 Pratkanis, A. R. & Aronson, E. 1992. Age of propaganda: 18 – 19 
Rapp, C. 2010. "Aristotle's Rhetoric" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition): 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/. Accessed 24 August 2011 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
81 
assumptions).216  Pratkanis & Aronson further notes that Aristotle identified one last factor 
influencing persuasion namely that of atechnoi (from atechnoi pisteis or “artless proofs”217) 
which refers to facts and events outside of the speaker’s control such as contracts and laws.218  
In essence it refers to the favourable elements in the context of the argument that acts as a 
platform from which a persuasive argument can be built.  The table below provides a 
summary of Aristotle’s persuasion techniques: 
Aspect Technique 
The Source (Ethos) All three must be present to prove credibility of the 
source (the speaker): 
1. Practical intelligence 
2. Virtuous character 
3. Good will 
The Emotion of the Audience (Pathos) The speaker can elicit specific emotions if he can 
effectively engage: 
1. The mindset of the emotion 
2. The target (e.g. anger at a specific person) 
of the emotion 
3. The reason for the emotion 
The Argument (Logos) Arguments can successfully be developed through 
1. Induction – arguing from the specific 
towards the universal 
2. Deduction – deducing truths that follow 
naturally from, or due to the truth of, 
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presuppositions 
The Contextual Elements (Atechnoi Pisteis) The speaker must take note of specific elements 
within the context of the argument that will provide 
a basis for a good argument e.g. the way in which a 
law or contract has been written. 
Table 1 - Aristotle's Techniques for Persuasion 
In line with Aristotle’s techniques for persuasion, the Roman lawyer and orator Cicero 
identified three duties of the orator namely to charm or give pleasure, to instruct or teach and 
to move the audience.219  Pratkanis & Aronson notes that Cicero (who was heavily influenced 
by Greek philosophy, especially on the matter of rhetoric) expanded on the concept of 
atechnoi by developing a theory called statis [sic]220 which concerns the status of the issue at 
hand. “The task of an orator or a lawyer is to provide a definition of the situation that is most 
advantageous for one’s point of view.”221  Following closely in Cicero’s footsteps was 
Quintillian who provided an educational programme aimed at the development of an ideal 
orator.  In this programme he establishes a strong connection between grammatica and 
rhetorica proposing that the literary arts should be the foundation of the development of 
oratory arts.222 
4.5.1.3 Medieval rhetoric 
Murphy notes that rhetoric too has suffered much criticism after its zenith during and 
following Cicero.  He specifically makes note of Titian: “Another fourth-century figure, 
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Titian, rails against literature in general and rhetoric in particular: ‘You have invented 
rhetoric for injustice and calumny…you have invented poetry to sing of battles, the love of 
gods, of everything that corrupts the spirit.’”223  However, St. Augustine’s De doctrina 
christiana is widely regarded as a return to rhetoric, specifically for the purpose of enhancing 
the preaching skills of the clergy.  De doctrina consisted of four volumes, the first three 
covering the subject of materia or the way in which the scripture is to be understood, and the 
last volume discusses amongst other things the benefits of using eloquentia as an oratory 
tool.224  Augustine motivates the point by saying that rhetoric can be used as effectively to 
spread the truth as it can be used to spread lies, why then should those who wish to speak the 
truth avoid rhetoric and be ineffectual speakers?225 He mostly followed the basic tenets of 
Cicero which he transformed into an acceptable doctrine for the Christian church of the 
time.226  
According to Murphy, from Augustine forwards writers in the middle ages mostly replicated 
his efforts with emphasis on different aspects of the learning process including Cassiodorus 
(480 – 575 who wrote Institutions divinarum et saecularium litterarum), Boethius (480 – 524 
who translated some works of Aristotle and added a commentary on the Topics known as 
Topica Boetii), Priscian (an Eastern European contemporary of Boethius who was famous for 
creating the Institutionum Grammaticae) and Bishop Isidore (570 – 636) who wrote Origines 
as a whole system of education).  Most of these works were intended as educational systems 
that, amongst other disciplines, focused on the use of language with increasingly less 
emphasis on the subject of rhetoric.227   
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The subject of rhetoric is brought back to the mainstream through the work of Alcuin (735 – 
804) who, at the request of Emperor Charlemagne, wrote Disputatio de rhetorica et de 
virtutibus.228  Based on Murhpy’s analysis, this work seems for the most part a rehash of 
Cicero’s work – he points out that, as such, it did not have notable direct influence on later 
works.  However, it did have influence on Alcuin’s pupil, Rabanus Maurus (776 – 856). “The 
work of Rabanus is a significant milestone in the history of preaching because he is the first 
of many medieval writers to make a pragmatic choice of only those ideas which are useful to 
him without swallowing the whole system which gave birth to the ideas… [according to 
Rabanus] Those who would take up holy orders must have ‘fullness of science, rectitude of 
life, and perfection of learning’”.229  In this statement of Rabanus we see similar requirements 
for being a good speaker than that of the rhetoric of Aristotle (and consequently the officia 
oratoris of Cicero) of knowledge, virtue and the ability to teach. 
It seems from Murphy’s exposition on the subject that the key point in the history of 
medieval rhetoric is the fact that the classical works of especially Cicero survived and found 
acceptance as the cardinal works that established the foundation of rhetoric in the times that 
followed. “In summary, then, the history of the arts of discourse in the middle ages is at least 
in part the history of th survival of classical works.  The most important ancient author in this 
connection is Cicero, the acknowledged magister eloquentiae.”230 
4.5.1.4 The Christian pedagogy 
It was shown that rhetoric in the middle ages was heavily reliant on the works of Cicero who 
in turn learned much of his knowledge from the Greeks.  Murphy explains that the Greek 
methodology of rhetoric was not based on any strong set of beliefs in a given truth, but rather 
aimed at plausibility: “It will be recalled that Greek and Roman rhetoric purported to deal 
with what Aristotle described as nonapodeictic proofs – that is, means by which an audience 
could be led to believe an assertion without formal logical demonstration…Cicero and other 
Romans sought to make a case ‘plausible’ (believable) mainly through probabilities.  No 
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ancient pagan rhetorician ever conceived of any single mode of proof as being conclusive or 
binding… Topics are indistinguishable only by their varied suitability for this or that 
audience.  But all share one major rhetorical fault: their maximum expectation is the creation 
of probability.”231 Any discussion that takes the Church (in direct reference to the Roman 
Catholic tradition) into account cannot ignore the influence of the teaching methods 
implemented by Jesus Christ. The Judaic method of discussion was already heavily 
entrenched by the time that Jesus was born.  The methods employed by the Jews inside and 
outside of the synagogue typically consisted of two parts namely that of “teaching (exposition 
of doctrine) and preaching (hortation to action).”232  Murphy explains that, since the Jews 
firmly believed in the truth of the Scriptures (and their task to safeguard it), their method of 
discussion was not to establish probability, but rather to discuss and seek meaning in the 
Scriptures themselves.  Christ, being the fulfilment of prophecy from the scriptures, therefore 
took the whole of the Testament as absolute proof of its truth.  He further notes that the fact 
that Christianity was founded outside of the synagogue where learned men spoke, but rather 
where laymen sought to live better lives, meant that Christ instituted the use of parables as a 
means to convey the meaning of the scriptures.233  There are a number of critical differences 
between the approach to rhetoric of Greek and Roman descent and the approach introduced 
by Christ that has relevance to our definition of disinformation: 
1. As stated, Greeks and Romans sought maximum probability to convince the audience 
through the development of a viable argument.  Christ’s point of departure was that an 
absolute truth has already been established and that meaning should be sought in the 
scriptures. 
2. Greeks and Romans applied rhetoric only amongst the higher strata of the community.  
Christ preached to the unlearned masses.234 
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3. Greeks and Romans expected a decision in favour of or against a proposed argument.  
Christ introduced a rhetorical element that was never seen before (in neither Jewish 
nor Greek/Roman culture) namely that of “a direct command to his followers to 
spread his ideas through speech.”235 
Murphy proceeds to show how the teachings of Christ, and more specifically the ways in 
which he taught, became intertwined with the dual Roman/Jewish education of Paul (3 – 68 
AD).  According to Murphy: “The metarhetoric of Saint Paul – that is, his foundation for a 
theory of preaching – thus includes several new elements not found in pagan rhetoric.  First 
his keen appreciation of the responsibility for persuasion which Christ’s mandate thrust upon 
the Church.  He is also acutely conscious of God’s possible intervention during the preaching 
event itself, in other words, of the possibility that the efficacy of a preaching discourse might 
depend not on the rhetorical skill of the speaker but on God’s gift of grace to speaker and 
hearer.  The possibility of grace also tends to derogate the human skill derived from rhetoric, 
since God’s message is so powerful that its mere utterance will be persuasive.  This is quite 
different from Plato’s idea of truth being persuasive in itself, or the Stoic-Senecan view that a 
speaker should speak with utter simplicity to let the message transmit itself.  It is also 
different from Aristotle’s dictum that the truth will prevail if opponents have equal skill.  
What Paul means is that the message itself has divine power.  One practical result of this 
principle was that for a dozen centuries the Church was almost exclusively concerned with 
what to preach – not how.”236  This is most evident in the fact that St. Augustine dedicated 
three quarters of the De doctrina on materia. 
4.5.1.5 The Renaissance 
This aspect of medieval rhetoric, namely that (at least in European circles) it was the domain 
of the Church and that the Church was generally more concerned with content rather than 
process, was changed when two documents were discovered in the 1400’s.  Murphy explains 
that the first was the discovery of a complete copy of the Institutio oratoria of Quintillian by 
Poggio Bracciolini in a dungeon in St. Gall.  The second was the discovery by Bishop 
Gerardo Landriani, in the city of Lodi, of a manuscript containing five Ciceronian rhetorical 
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works namely De inventione, Rhetorica ad Herennium, Brutus, Orator, and a complete text 
of Cicero’s De oratore. Intense interest sprung from these two discoveries and created a 
sudden influence on rhetoric throughout the Renaissance and beyond.237 
The discovery of the manuscripts came at the near conclusion of the Great Schism within the 
Catholic Church.  Even though the Schism was purely of a political nature, the increasing 
pressures that resulted in the birth of the Renaissance resulted in European society to 
fragment into different directions.238  Most notable was the development of humanism that 
can be directly related to the rediscovery of the classical works: “The Renaissance…was 
partly brought about by a renewed interest in classical thought.  The ideas and arguments of 
Ancient Greek and Roman thinkers were sought out, and gave enormous impetus to 
intellectual inquiry, which now broadened out far beyond the boundaries of Christian 
theology.”239 The renewed interest in the individual as a being unto himself firmly established 
the notion of individualism that was formalised in the philosophical musings of Immanuel 
Kant.240 
Humanism, as it developed during the Renaissance, was not specifically secular – rather it 
was a shift away from the authoritarian (and corrupt) nature of the then Catholic Church 
through the rediscovery of ancient philosophy.  Enno van Gelder notes: “The Humanist was 
religious in the broad sense of the word, in that he felt himself attached to powers and values 
outside his own ego.  He was…a convinced confessor of the Christian faith, except for a few 
who were either completely converted by what they found in the writings of the Greeks and 
Romans, or who evolved still further in the modern direction.”241  Through the original 
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criticisms of John Wycliffe (1330 – 1384) of the abuses by the church242 and later through 
those of Jan Hus (1369 – 1415) who wrote De Ecclesia that discussed the reformation of the 
Church)243 the increasing dismay with the state of the Church resulted in the initiation of the 
Protestant Reformation. Desiderius Erasmus (1496 – 1536) was heavily influenced by the 
undercurrents of humanism.  He was an educator who held true to his Catholic vows, yet 
became disenchanted with the scholastic method of education used by the Church as a 
method for education and later proposed a reform of theological studies that emphasised the 
humanist agenda in the form of a return to the classics (in the form of ancient Greek and 
Roman teachings).  He was regarded as a major influence on Martin Luther who is known as 
the founder of the Protestant movement.244  In this analysis of the foundations of 
disinformation, this is a critical point – historically it was the rediscovery of classical 
literature and motifs that not only inspired a final schism in the form of Catholicism versus 
Protestantism, but as one of the sparks that led to the Protestant movement, remained an 
integral part of the rhetorical nature of the way in which the church’s message was delivered. 
The term propaganda is first seen in the context of the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church 
to re-establish the religion through a form of education: “The first documented use of the 
term occurred in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV established the Sacra Congregatio de 
Propaganda Fide…the papal [established] propaganda as a means to of coordinating efforts to 
bring men and women to ‘voluntary’ acceptance of church doctrines.” Due to its origins 
however, the term garnered a negative connotation in Protestant circles, whereas in Catholic 
contexts it was seen in the same light as preaching.245 
Within the English Protestant movement, a growing questioning of the Church of England led 
to the development of the Puritan movement, which first started amongst others with a well-
supported group of highly educated members of the Church of England.  Crous explains that, 
as the movement developed, it was put under tremendous pressure by the exclusively 
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Catholic British monarchy, and specifically under the auspices of Archbishop William Laud, 
to the extent that it contributed heavily to what has been called the Great Migration from 
1630 to 1640.  An estimated 24 500 British colonists, of which an undetermined number were 
Puritans, settled in America where they became firmly established.246  One may speculate 
that, in this way, the rhetorical methodologies that accompanied the Protestant movement 
became entrenched in American society. 
The following figure provides a summary of the history of pre-modern rhetoric as the 
foundations of propaganda: 
 
Figure 10 - The development of rhetoric in pre-modernity 
4.5.1.6 Advertising and Propaganda in Modernity 
With the Puritans settled after the Great Migration and the intellectuals of Britain and 
elsewhere making increasingly spectacular advances in technology, it wasn’t long before the 
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advent of the Industrial Era created the fertile grounds in which advertising was to sprout and 
grow.  One cannot ignore the fact that there were limited forms of advertising in earlier times: 
“There is evidence that the criers and hawkers were shouting their wares as far back as the 
days of the early Greeks, Romans, and Phoenicians.  This primitive advertising, refined over 
the centuries, has carried down to the present day… Before long, competition and the need 
for identification necessitated signs.  Signs used for identifying shops, with such appropriate 
illustrations as a goat (for dairy) or a mule driving a mill (for a baker), were unearthed in the 
ruins of Pompeii.  There is also evidence of announcements painted on walls during this 
period.”247 It was however the Industrial Revolution and the social and technological 
advances that came with it, which prompted a need for advertising on a massive scale: “The 
Industrial Revolution was an economic force that yielded the need for advertising.  Beginning 
in about 1750 in England, the revolution spread to North America and progressed slowly 
until the early 1800’s, when the War of 1812 in the United States boosted domestic 
production…. The Industrial Revolution was a basic force behind rapid increase in mass-
production goods that required stimulation of demand, something that advertising can be very 
good at.”248  
In the late 1800’s and early 1900’s modern advertising emerged in what is known as the “P.T. 
Barnum Era”.  During this time Max Weber, in a response to Karl Marx, wrote his famous 
essay around the influence of the Protestant work ethic on the development of capitalism, 
which purportedly followed a successful visit to America.249  It is possibly not coincidental 
that the most well-known individuals in advertising at that time were all sons of church 
ministers.250  At the same time, as noted before, propaganda first appeared in World War I 
which was fully supported by the advertising industry.251  
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Since then advertising (specifically in America) went through various revolutions in a 
response to the changes in society252:  
• The “Roaring Twenties” known for its underlying theme of overindulgence. 
• The Great Depression in the 1930’s that created tremendous mistrust amongst 
consumers in big business and their advertising cohorts. 
• World War II that created an opportunity for redemption of the advertising industry. 
• The 1950’s that taught advertisers to focus on women as they are the major buying 
power whilst men are away at work. 
• The liberal revolution of the 1960’s. 
• The 1970’s with another wave of excess and the introduction of minorities into mass 
media as well as the introduction of new advertising regulations. 
• The great amounts of expendable income of consumers and increased use of the mass 
media for political efforts during the 1980’s. 
• The introduction of interactive media in the 1990’s that brought higher degrees of 
consumer awareness. 
• The increase in consumer empowerment in the last decade through new media and the 
closer integration of advertisement with entertainment and online social interaction. 
4.5.1.7 An overview of major theories of persuasion in recent history 
During the 20th century various theories were developed that attempted to explain the way in 
which people respond to media.  Most of these theories had an impact, not just on the way 
that advertisers communicated information to consumers, but also in the way that consumers 
saw the advertising industry.  Pratkanis & Aronson provides a short overview of the most 
notable theories: “Modern theories of persuasion rely extensively on principles developed 
within at least one of the three major schools of thought in psychology – psychoanalysis, 
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learning theory, and cognitive approaches.”253  In the psychoanalytic approach it is believed 
that objects all have hidden meanings and connotations that, in the right combination, can 
elicit a powerful response from the audience.  This view was popularised by Vance Packard 
in his bestselling book The Hidden Persuaders.  Pratkanis & Aronson notes that, even though 
advertisers during the 1950’s used the psychoanalytic approach, they discarded it by the mid-
1960’s because it didn’t deliver results.254  O’Guinn et al. confirms the point when they 
provide a footnote on Packard’s writings: “With respect to the effects of ‘subliminal 
advertising,’ researchers have shown that while subliminal communication is possible, 
subliminal persuasion, in the typical real-world environment, remains all but impossible.”255 
Learning Theory on the other hand is readily used by propagandists and advertisers to 
effectively persuade and elicit a desired response: “According to learning theory, a persuasive 
message is persuasive when it is learned and accepted by the recipient; propaganda must be 
seen, understood, learned, remembered, and acted upon.”256 According to Pratkanis & 
Aronson there are stages that facilitates learning namely 
1. Attracting the recipients’ attentions. 
2. Logical arguments that must be understood and comprehended. 
3. Acceptance of the message as true. 
4. Action that results from the message.257 
The writers proceed to define persuasion from the cognitive response perspective as follows: 
“The successful persuasion tactic is one that directs and channels thoughts so that the target 
thinks in a manner agreeable to the communicator’s point-of-view; the successful tactic 
disrupts any negative thoughts and promotes positive thoughts about the proposed course of 
action.” 258  When looking at this description, it is interesting to note the correlation with the 
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rhetorical methods we already found namely that there is a message that moves the target to 
an agreeable state of mind which will result in a favourable result.  
In The Persuasion Handbook edited by James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau a more 
comprehensive overview of current persuasion theories is provided.  The major theories are 
summarised here as presented by contributing authors: 
1. Cognitive Dissonance Theory: Developed in the late 1950’s the theory is still 
actively used and revised.  It was originally explained as follows: “…the presence of a 
cognitive inconsistency of sufficient magnitude will evoke an aversive motivational 
state – dissonance – that drives cognitive work aimed at reducing the cognitive 
inconsistency.”  In essence then, when we are given information that challenges our 
understanding of the world, we will actively rationalise the information at hand so as 
to explain it or fit it into our current world view.  The value of this theory, and more 
specifically studies that rely on this theory, is the way that it can assist in amongst 
others in understanding how attitudes change.259 
2. Language Expectancy Theory: This particular theory, developed in the 1970’s, 
focuses on the way in which variations within language affects the persuasiveness of a 
message.  The following definition is provided by Burgoon et al: “Language 
expectancy theory is an axiomatic theory that… expounds on the effects of linguistic 
variations on message persuasiveness.  It is a message-centered theory.”260 Its 
usefulness in understanding persuasion is obvious – if we know how different kinds 
of messages persuade people, then advertisers and propagandists alike can develop 
messages according to these theories. 
3. Functional theories of attitude: Simply put, this class of theories developed in the 
1950’s and 1960’s look into the role that attitude plays in the process of learning and 
decision making.  According to Shavitt & Nelson functional theories “were the first to 
recognize attitudes as instrumental constructs designed to serve individuals’ physical, 
social and emotional needs.” They also mention that this theory is useful as a 
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predictive tool of message effectiveness.261 A deeper understanding of attitudes 
provide persuaders a base to work from – if they know what the attitude of a given 
audience is towards a given subject, they may be able to construct a message that will 
leverage that attitude towards a given goal. 
4. The Elaboration Likelihood Model: This model developed during the 1980’s and 
1990’s attempts to integrate a diverse array of studies that primarily focus on the 
processes involved during communication for each variable in the standard 
communications model (source à message à receiver).  Booth-Butterfield & 
Welbourne provides this insight: “The ELM assumes that people are bombarded with 
so many different persuasive communications that it is nonadaptive, if not impossible, 
to carefully evaluate the merits of each and every one of these attempts at 
persuasion.” ELM shows that there is a correlation between the motive/ability of an 
individual to elaborate on the merits of a message and the likelihood that they will be 
engaged by said message.  Similar to the Heuristic-Systematic Model below, instead 
of assessing all the information, ELM shows that people will use “peripheral route 
processes” to process messages.262 
5. The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM): This model developed concurrently to 
ELM (and often referencing it) posits that people process messages through scrutiny 
as well as through the use of heuristics: “The critical assumption of the HSM is that 
people can engage in systematic or heuristic processing.  People can scrutinize cues 
peripheral to the message content, or the can process the message content 
heuristically.” They further show that these two modes of information processing can 
occur simultaneously.263  Applied to persuasion this theory can be useful in 
developing messages that are congruent on both levels which the recipient of the 
message will engage on. 
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6. The Theory of Psychological Reactance:  Burgoon et al defines this theory, 
developed in the 1960’s, as follows: “It is a theory of social influence that focuses on 
how individuals act when their realm of free behavior is limited.  A form of 
psychological arousal, reactance is considered a motivational state directed towards 
the reestablishment of free behaviors that have been eliminated or threatened by 
elimination.”  The authors also state that the underlying premise is the assumption that 
humans need to fulfil basic needs and will react when their freedom to do so is 
restricted.264  Both advertising and propaganda makes use of the basic motivational 
factors of human needs and fears in order to elicit a response – in this way reactance 
theory provides deeper insight into how restriction of freedom affects the persuasive 
message. 
7. Inoculation Theory: The theory developed by McGuire in the 1960’s holds that 
people could be “inoculated” to promote resistance against persuasive messages: “The 
guiding idea of inoculation theory is taken from the health practice of administering a 
weakened form of a virus to activate the body’s immune system against the virus.  
Based on this analogy, McGuire (1964) reasoned that people can be stimulated to 
build up resistance to attacks on attitudes by being exposed to weakened attitude-
threatening messages.”265  Understanding how resistance builds up against persuasion 
provides a means to develop message strategies that will not be resisted over time.  
8. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA):  “The aim of the TRA is to explain 
volitional behaviors… It posits that the best predictor of volitional behavior is one’s 
behavioral intention.”  This behavioural intention flows from an individual influence 
and a normative influence.  The theory excludes behaviours that can be classified as 
habit or impulse and purely focuses on those actions that involve conscious 
decisions.266  Understanding the elements that influence conscious decisions allow 
persuaders to speak to those elements through their message. 
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From this overview we can see that the most prominent element not yet fully identified in the 
previous sections of this study, is that of attitude and its role in the way a receiver will 
process and react to a message.  That said, when we refer to the original Rhetoric of Aristotle 
(pathos) and Cicero’s officia oratoris (to move the audience), that attitude plays a major role 
in the likelihood of persuasion. 
4.5.2 Key characteristics of disinformation 
In this section we will summarise the key characteristics of disinformation at the hand of the 
previous sections as well as by introducing a number of authors on the subject.  This will be 
done in an effort to provide a more fundamental definition of the concept and move it away 
from its Cold War connotations. 
Disinformation can be defined as follows: “Disinformation means false, incomplete, or 
misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or 
country. Disinformation is not merely misinformation that is erroneous. Disinformation is 
comprised of news stories deliberately designed to weaken opponents, which are often 
planted in newspapers by secret agents of a foreign country masquerading as journalists. The 
intention is to obscure the identity of the originator of the message in order to foster a high 
degree of credibility for both the message that is being planted and the apparent source that is 
giving it credence.” The term is derived from the Russian word dezinformatsia which 
originated as a part of Cold War methods to discredit the United States.267  Disinformation is 
regarded as a covert form of propaganda or “black propaganda”.268  A critical characteristic 
of disinformation is that of intent.  James H. Fetzer brings in this element of intent when he 
says that disinformation “entails the distribution, assertion, or dissemination of false, 
mistaken, or misleading information in an intentional, deliberate, or purposeful effort to 
mislead, deceive or confuse…”269  In another article Fetzer affirms his perspective when he 
defines disinformation as “[involving] the dissemination of incomplete, inaccurate, or 
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otherwise misleading information with the objective, goal or aim of deliberately deceiving 
others about the truth.”270 
In this chapter it was shown that language use is a social activity – this implies that there are 
at least two people and a backgound of social context involved when language is being used, 
and also that there is a series of actions taking place when language is being used.  A further 
implication is that decisions precede actions – in essence therefore language use may be 
regarded, at least in part, as a social activity that reflects a series of decisions made by the 
participants in the activity. 
When any of the actors taking part in the social activity of language use has one or more 
goals, then language use becomes strategic.  Strategic language use implies that a) there is 
one or more preconceived goals present in the minds of the participants and b) that the given 
participant or participants are consciously selecting appropriate actions of responses to 
achieve the goals.  It was also shown that goals can be public or private, where private goals 
may indicate the possible intent to deceive. 
Goals aggregate into motives, and motives compel action. It was shown that motives can be 
selfless (serving others in spite of self) or self-serving (serving self, often in spite of others).  
When applied to the profit motive of business enterprises the same may be true – some 
enterprises operate from a selfless position and others from a self-serving position.  An 
argument was developed to show that the forces of competition place pressure on enterprises 
to use strategic language as a means to communicate value through marketing and 
advertising.  In mature industries there is little or no distinction between different enterprises 
in terms of real value delivered in which case the language strategy may involve the use of 
disinformation to create the impression of greater value where none may exist. 
Don Fallis provides an in-depth conceptual analysis of disinformation by stipulating the 
activity of disinforming others.  His analysis results in the following definition of the activity 
of disinforming: 
“(D7) You disinform X if and only if: 
1. You disseminate information i. 
2. You believe p to be false. 
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3. You foresee that X is likely to infer from the content of information i that p. 
4. p is false. 
5. It is reasonable for X to infer from the content of information i that p.” 271 
In other words, the originator of the message is disinforming their target if they a) are 
disseminating information that b) they believe is false, c) they foresee the target will infer as 
true, d) that is actually false and that e) it is reasonably expected that the target will infer that 
the information is true. 
With this in hand Fallis defines disinformation as “the information (i.e. the stuff with 
representational content) disseminated by someone who is disinforming.” He adds a critical 
perspective to this definition when he says: “In order for something to count as 
disinformation, it clearly does not have to be the immediate source of the information who 
believes that the information is misleading.”272  In this way he removes the requirement that 
only the originator can disinform – when the same information is passed along by somebody 
who also knows of the untruthful nature of the information, then it still remains 
disinformation.  For Fallis disinformation is the information provided in the act of 
disinforming.   
Using the points above it becomes clear that disinformation can be seen as the content of a 
language act that has been strategically constructed to serve the private goals of the source 
and/or disseminator with the specific intent to mislead the recipient in order to achieve these 
private goals.  For the purpose of this study, the definition provided by Fallis will be used as 
it represents the most fundamental found in the sources consulted. 
4.5.3 Differentiating disinformation 
In this section disinformation will be compared to misinformation, persuasion and deception 
as a means to clearly delineate the extent of the concept.  This section ensures that 
disinformation is understood within the context of its relationship to other forms of false 
information. 
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4.5.3.1 Misinformation 
Fetzer defines misinformation as “false, mistaken, or misleading information.”273 Fallis 
informally notes that misinformation is “inaccurate and misleading information… [where] the 
source made an honest mistake.”274 Taking Fallis’ definition of disinformation into account 
one finds that the key difference between these two concepts lies in that misinformation 
clearly lacks intent. 
4.5.3.2 Persuasion 
The difference between disinformation and persuasion is somewhat more complex.  One 
possible definition of persuasion is provided by Gerald R. Miller: “…the phrase ‘being 
persuaded’ applies to situations where behavior has been modified by symbolic transactions 
(messages) that are sometimes, but not always, linked with coercive force (indirectly 
coercive) and that appeal to the reason and emotions of the person(s) being persuaded.”275 
He admits that this definition does not provide an all-encompassing solution to the debate 
around the question of what constitutes persuasion, however for the purpose of this study it 
would suffice. 
There are two key differences that can be identified between the concepts: in persuasion we 
see that there is information that is used to change the behaviour of the audience.  This differs 
with disinformation that as its primary outcome does not require a change in behaviour, but 
more a change in belief or sentiment.  It can be argued that a change in beliefs will ultimately 
result in a change in behaviour, but that is rather a consequence of disinformation and not its 
primary goal.  Secondly, the messages used in persuasion may be either true or false – as 
such it seems that disinformation may to some degree be a subset of persuasion in that 
persuasive techniques may utilise disinformation. 
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4.5.3.3 Deception 
An even more complex question is how disinformation differs from deception for the simple 
reason that consensus amongst academics as to what the definition of deception is differs so 
widely.276 Robinson provides a cautious definition of deception as follows: “Here, the 
definition of deception will follow Mitchell (1986): 
1. An organism R registers (or believes) something Y from some organism S, where S 
can be described as benefiting when (or desiring that). 
2. R acts appropriately toward Y, because 
a. Y means X; and 
3. it is untrue that X is the case.”277 
This definition is very broad as it includes the actions of non-human organisms for the 
purpose of survival.  In essence however the definition states that a sender (S) of information 
(Y) deceives the receiver (R) of the information when the information sent is untrue and 
elicits a response from the receiver that somehow benefits the sender.  By this definition any 
action that transmits falsity for the purpose of gaining a benefit from another participant will 
therefore be deception. 
Fallis comments that “disinformation does not include all deceptive behaviour.  For example, 
it excludes certain parts of the disinformation campaign used by the Allies during World War 
Two.  In addition to sending fake radio transmissions, the Allies built fake tanks and 
airplanes out of rubber and canvas to give the false impression that a huge force was 
preparing to attack Calais.  In this case the Allies were not disinforming because they were 
not disseminating information.”278 Taking his original definition of disinformation into 
account, disinformation is by all means a subset of deception, but not the other way around. 
Figure 11 summarises the differentiation of disinformation: 
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Figure 11 – Differentiation of disinformation 
4.5.4 Implicata as disinformation 
Grice introduces three terms in his lecture on implied meaning namely “the verb implicate, 
and the related nouns implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf. what is implied).” In this 
section the plural of implicatum will be called implicata. Grice proposed that implied 
information, or implicata, can lead to misunderstanding on the one hand or deception on the 
other hand – for this purpose the Cooperative Principle and its maxims can be used as a 
means to discover whether there is a potential quality issue with an information exchange.  
Grice says: “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfil a maxim in various ways, 
which include the following: 
1. He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be 
liable to mislead. 
2. He may opt out from the operation both of the maxim and of the Cooperative 
Principle; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to 
cooperate in the way the maxim requires.  He may say, for example, I cannot say 
more; my lips are sealed. 
3. He may be faced by a clash: He may be unable, for example, to fulfil the first maxim 
of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of 
Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say). 
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4. He may flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfil it. On the assumption that 
the speaker is able to fulfil the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim 
(because of a clash) is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his 
performance, trying to mislead, the hearer is faced with a minor problem: How can his 
saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the 
overall Cooperative Principle?  This situation is one that is characteristically gives rise 
to a conversational implicature; and when a conversational implicature is generated in 
this way, I shall say that a maxim is being exploited.”279 
Grice admits that in violating one or more of the maxims a speaker may mislead the listener. 
The conversational act is by its very nature one that includes the dissemination of information 
and, by Grice’s explanation, will include implicature as part of the information that is 
disseminated.  Presuming the intent to mislead, the belief that the implicatum is false, the fact 
that the implicatum is false and the expectation that the listener will in fact believe the 
implicatum, it follows that implicata may indeed be a form of disinformation. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Language is used for doing things.  Language is the systematic communication by vocal 
symbols meaning that people us it to transfer knowledge between each other.  J.L. Austin 
identified three language acts namely locution (providing information), illocution (in a 
specific way) and perlocution (that has a related consequence). 
Language is a joint activity performed by the coordination of language content and process 
with the purpose of achieving public and private goals.  Language is used with motive which 
is defined as a highly aggregated class of goals with a common theme.  As with goals, motive 
can be public and private.  Motive can also be viewed as intrinsically self-serving or 
intrinsically selfless. 
Grice introduces the concept of implicature which refers to implied meaning during 
conversation.  He proposes the Cooperative Principle with a set of maxims as a norm against 
which effective communication can be measured. 
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Business enterprise has a profit motive.  The profit motive can also be seen as self-serving or 
selfless. The profit motive is not equated with the maximisation of profits necessarily, but 
rather with the increase of wealth. Enterprises are subject to various forces which leads to two 
major goals namely a) to generate sales and b) to achieve a competitive position by doing so.  
In highly mature markets where all competitors have roughly the same value offering at 
roughly the same price, the pressure generated by the profit motive requires an enterprise to 
differentiate itself from the competition.  One avenue of doing so is through the use of 
advertising.  It is shown that advertising is used as a means to persuade customers to buy a 
product or service.  The highly mature market forces differentiation through implication 
where, even though the information in the advertisement is true, the implicature may be false. 
Disinformation has a long history dating back to the sophists of Ancient Greece that 
formalised the art of rhetoric.  This history was provided to contextualise the possible origins 
of disinformation as a consequence of rhetoric.  Aristotle consolidated the views of Plato and 
the sophists with the writing of his Rhetoric that distinguishes the requirements for 
persuasion.  Cicero the Roman lawyer learns these principles from the Greeks and develops 
the officia oratoris (duties of the orator) that closely resembles Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  
Quintillian formalises Cicero’s work into an educational programme that links the role of 
language in the development of rhetoric. 
Jesus Christ enhances the Jewish rhetorical tradition of “teach and preach” by adding the 
command to spread His message.  His disciple Paul combines Roman rhetorical tradition with 
Christ’s methodology.  The Roman Catholic Church retains Paul’s teachings that focused on 
content rather than delivery and initially rejects the pagan traditions of rhetoric.  St. 
Augustine attempts to reincorporate the rhetorical tradition in his De doctrina but later 
medieval scholars seems to retain merely the educational aspect of Augustine’s writings 
letting the classical tradition slowly fall by the wayside. 
The Renaissance is ushered in with the rediscovery of classical rhetorical works.  The 
growing discontent with the Catholic Church, along with new insights from the classical 
teachings of Cicero and Quintillian motivates writers such as Wycliffe, Hus and Erasmus.  
With the humanist influence changing perspectives on the character of the church, Luther 
establishes the Protestant movement that eventually results in the Great Migration of British 
Puritans to America. 
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With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the art of advertising gains fertile grounds and 
becomes a most fashionable occupation.  Advertising becomes increasingly politicised and is 
eventually used in World War I in the form of propaganda.  Advertising goes through many 
revolutions, and propaganda turns into a form of covert operation known during the Cold 
War as disinformation.  There are a number of theories that underlie the concept of 
persuasion that influences the way in which propaganda and advertising is developed. 
Don Fallis provides an insightful analysis of the concept of disinformation and provides a 
clear definition that includes the following requirements: 
1. Information is disseminated. 
2. The sender of information believes it to be false. 
3. The sender foresees that the target will infer that the information is true. 
4. The information is actually false. 
5. There is a reasonable expectation that the target will infer that the information is true. 
Disinformation can be seen as the content of a language act that has been strategically 
constructed to serve the private goals of the source and/or disseminator with the specific 
intent to mislead the recipient in order to achieve these private goals. 
Disinformation differs from misinformation (providing false or misleading information with 
the intent to deceive), from persuasion (which may or may not use false information to 
achieve a result, and also may be focused on consequences other than generating a belief), 
and from deception (which includes non-verbal acts that deceive). 
Implicata (the plural of implicatum, which is the implied information generated by an 
implicature) is information that, should the Cooperative Principle not be fulfilled, may be 
misleading.  If the intent of the speaker is to mislead and the information and expectations 
correlate with those of disinformation, then the implicata may be disinformation. 
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a sound argument for the role of implicata as 
disinformation.  This provides the foundations for the development of the argument of 
implicata in advertising that may disinform consumers and the question whether F&FH has a 
mechanism to process this kind of information. 
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Chapter  5  
Disinformation  and  Fast  &  Frugal  
Heuristics  
5.1 Introduction 
Advertising uses numerous techniques to elicit a desired response from the consumer, namely 
that the consumer will be enticed to buy a specific product or service brand.  This chapter 
focuses on two issues, namely the use of implicature-type disinformation in advertising as 
well as how the F&FH framework processes such information.  The chapter initially 
discusses the truth condition for F&FH after which the manipulation of meaning is discussed 
within the context of advertising.  Various deceptive techniques are identified, specifically 
with reference to pictorial metaphor, with examples provided.  In the form of a thought 
experiment, two of the examples discussed throughout the study are then used for the purpose 
of analysing the way in which F&FH may be applied to the problems found within the 
examples.  Through these analyses a number of conclusions are reached regarding the ability 
of the F&FH framework to uncover disinformation.  Various shortcomings in the theory are 
discussed and a final conclusion reached. 
5.2 The truth condition for F&FH 
As a means to juxtapose the F&FH programme from other perspectives on decision making, 
Gigerenzer introduces the topic in this manner:  “I will introduce you to the study of 
cognitive heuristics: how people actually make judgments and decisions in everyday life, 
generally without calculating probabilities and utilities.”280 Selten makes the following claim: 
“Modern mainstream economic theory is largely based on an unrealistic picture of human 
decision making.  Economic agents are portrayed as fully rational Bayesian maximizers of 
subjective utility.  This view of economics is not based on empirical evidence, but rather on 
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the simultaneous axiomization of utility and subjective probability… However, it is wrong to 
assume that human beings conform to this ideal.”281  Gigerenzer expands on this perspective 
when he says: “Humans and animals make inferences about unknown features of their world 
under constraints of limited time, limited knowledge, and limited computational capacities.  
Models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other 
fields, in contrast, tend to ignore these constraints and treat the mind as a Laplacean 
superintelligence equipped with unlimited resources of time, information, and computational 
might.”282  The emphasis of the F&FH programme is clearly that of constraints and how 
decision makers deal with them. 
F&FH postulate a form of ecological rationality that relies on the search for cues in order to 
identify an alternative that would satisfy the aspiration levels of a given goal.  It was shown 
in Chapters 2 and 3 that F&FH corresponds with the philosophical theory of Empiricism and 
consequently that the underlying truth theory is that of correspondence. However, it assumed 
that cues act as neutral pieces of information, and that they are processed through a set of 
heuristics that are contextual and adaptive with the implication that truth is seemingly 
irrelevant as a characteristic of cues.  Based on this analysis the following questions were 
raised: 
1. How does the manipulation of meaning affect the perception of cues? 
2. Can the veracity of cues be determined using the F&FH Framework? 
These question support the research question of this paper by investigating the effects of 
information manipulation on the decision maker after which an argumentative test is 
performed to investigate to what extent the veracity of truth can be determined within the 
F&FH framework.  The purpose of this is to determine whether F&FH is truly capable of 
effective normative and prescriptive insights as claimed by Gigerenzer. 
In preparation to answer the questions above, a study on the nature and definition of 
disinformation was conducted.  In the following sections the questions will be answered in 
terms of the findings in Chapters 3 and 4 and as directly related to the interaction between 
advertisements and consumers. 
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5.3 The manipulation of meaning 
5.3.1 Advertising 
Percy & Elliot provide the following definition of advertising: “In a very real sense, 
advertising is meant to turn us towards a product or service by providing information or 
creating a positive feeling – something that goes well beyond simply calling our attention to 
it.”283  In this definition we find locution (providing information), illocution (creating a 
positive feeling) and perlocution (turning us toward a product or service).  All the language 
acts are completely represented in advertising with the implication that it is somehow a joint 
activity with the public goal by the sender (the enterprise) to get and keep your attention on 
the product or service they offer to which the customer responds with a “yes I will buy this 
product”, “no I won’t buy this product”, “I will keep it in mind for the future” or complete 
disinterest. 
With so much at stake (including the possible demise of the business enterprise) and with so 
much pressure from the various participants in the overarching activity of doing business, it is 
small wonder that advertising has become an art of persuasion.  Jules Henry attributes much 
of the problems in the American consumerist culture to advertising when he names two 
“commandments” of the “new era” (the new era is in reference to what is known today as 
consumerism which he describes in more detail).  The first commandment is that of “create 
more desire” and the second is that of “thou shalt consume”.  He posits that advertising 
entices people to buy things they don’t need and drives them to ever higher levels of 
consumption.284  Percy & Elliot provide more insight into Henry’s arguments and provide 
additional criticisms of advertising.  Their four criticisms include 1) the creation of 
unnecessary desires, 2) the misleading nature of advertising, 3) that advertising insults the 
consumer’s intelligence and finally 4) that advertising has a negative effect on the economy 
(e.g. driving up the costs of products).285  What is interesting about these particular criticisms 
of advertising is that they all focus on parties external to the enterprise, and more specifically 
from a consumer/customer perspective.  Using Percy & Elliot’s main points as a guide we 
can deduce the following:  
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1. Where unnecessary desires are created, they are created within the market. 
2. Where advertising is misleading, it misleads the market. 
3. Where advertising insults intelligence, it does so in the market. 
4. Where advertising has a negative effect on the economy, the effect is directly 
experienced by the market. 
O’Guinn et al.286 provides a more balanced perspective on the pros and cons of advertising.  
Their conclusions have been summarised in the following table with the headings provided 
by the authors: 
Claim Pros Cons 
Advertising educates 
consumers 
Advertising informs: 
“Supporters of advertising 
argue that advertising educates 
consumers, equipping them 
with the information they need 
to make informed purchase 
decisions.” 
Advertising is superficial and 
intrusive: “Critics argue that 
advertising does not provide 
good product information at all 
and that it is so pervasive and 
intrusive to daily life that it is 
impossible to escape.” 
Advertising improves the 
standard of living 
Advertising lowers the cost of 
products: Advertising 
contributes to economies of 
scale; consumers have greater 
choice; due to competitive 
pressure firms are motivated to 
create better products and; 
advertising aids in the diffusion 
of innovation. 
Advertising wastes resources 
and raises the standard of 
living for only some: “One of 
the traditional criticisms of 
advertising is that it represents 
an inefficient, wasteful process 
that channels monetary and 
human resources in a society to 
the ‘shuffling of existing total 
demand,’ rather than to the 
expansion of total demand.” 
Advertising affects happiness 
and general well-being 
Advertising addresses a wide 
variety of basic human needs: 
Most, if not all products, can be 
Advertising creates needs: “A 
common cry among critics is 
that advertising creates need 
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related to Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs. 
and makes people buy things 
they don’t really need or even 
want.” 
 Advertising only reflects 
society’s priorities: “While we 
clearly live in the age of 
consumption, goods and 
possessions have been used by 
all cultures throughout history 
to mark special events, to play 
significant roles in rituals, and 
to serve as vessels of special 
meaning…” 
Advertising promotes 
materialism: “The long-
standing argument is that in 
societies characterized by heavy 
advertising, there is a tendency 
for conformity and status-
seeking behavior, both of which 
are considered materialistic and 
superficial.” 
Advertising: demeaning and 
deceitful, or liberating and 
artful? 
Advertisers are showing much 
more sensitivity: “Advertisers 
are realising that a diverse 
world requires diversity in the 
social reality that ads represent 
and help construct.” 
Advertising perpetuates 
stereotypes: “Advertisers often 
portray people in 
advertisements that look like 
members of their target 
audience…Critics charge 
that…it perpetuates 
stereotypes.” 
 Advertising is a source of 
fulfilment and liberation: 
“…some argue that the 
consumption that advertising 
glorifies is actually quite good 
for society…Observers argue 
that there is a liberating quality 
to advertising and consumption 
that should be appreciated and 
encouraged.” 
Advertising is often offensive: 
“A long-standing criticism of 
advertising is that it is often 
offensive and the appeals are in 
poor taste. Moreover, some 
would say that the trend in 
American advertising is to be 
rude, crude, and sometimes 
lewd…” 
 Advertising is a democratic 
art: “Some argue that one of the 
best aspects of advertising is its 
Advertisers deceive via 
subliminal stimulation: The 
authors refute this by stating: 
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artistic nature…Some of this art 
critiqued consumer culture and 
simultaneously celebrated it.” 
“…let us clarify: No one ever 
sold anything by putting images 
of breasts in ice cubes or the 
word sex in the background of 
an ad.” 
Advertising has a powerful 
effect on the mass media 
Advertising fosters a diverse 
and affordable mass media: 
“Advertising fans argue that 
advertising is the best thing that 
can happened [sic] to an 
informed democracy.  
Magazines, newspapers, 
television and radio stations, 
and web sites are supported by 
advertising.” 
Advertising affects 
programming: “Critics argue 
that advertisers who place ads 
in the media have an unhealthy 
effect on shaping the content of 
information contained in the 
media.” 
Table 2 - Pros and cons of advertising 
Pros and cons taken into account, the ultimate purpose of advertising is to entice consumers 
to buy products or services.  This becomes an especially difficult task in a market space 
where competing firms are on par with regards to the value triad.  Burke et al. used ibuprofen 
based products as a class of consumer product to test deceptive advertising precisely because 
of this reason – in terms of ingredients and effectiveness, there is little difference between 
various products on the market, forcing manufacturers to revert to deceptive advertising 
techniques: “In the case of products such as analgesics, where a set of competing brands has 
similar or identical chemical compositions, advertisers often rely on exaggerated and 
ambiguous advertising claims to differentiate brands in the minds of consumers…”287 
5.3.2 Manipulation and consumer behaviour 
The concept of ecological rationality in F&FH determines that heuristics adapt to the 
structure of the task environment in order to provide the decision maker with information 
(cues) when selecting an alternative.  It was also noted that emotions are regarded as a subset 
of the heuristics used in the decision making process.  Although not the focus of this study it 
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is important to note that manipulation of the environment, as well as emotions, have an affect 
on the way that consumers act.  Ronald Milliman created a study that measured the effect of 
music on supermarket shoppers.  His findings were that slow music results is slower pace of 
in-store traffic, and results in higher sales volumes.  Conversely, fast paced music resulted in 
a higher pace of in-store traffic and lower sales volumes.288  Manipulating the auditory 
aspects of the environment directly affected shopping behaviour.  In another study on 
ambient scent it was found that pleasant scents increased attention and memory, and 
improved evaluations for unfamiliar brands.289  The consequence is that, when launching a 
new brand, shoppers’ attitudes may be affected by its smell. 
The manipulation of emotions is also well studied.  As an example, Yoo & MacInnis found 
that, whether an advertisement is emotional or informational, the credibility of these 
advertisements are subject to the feelings of the audience, resulting in the conclusion that 
people cannot be seen as mere information processing mechanisms.290  In another example, 
Lin et al manipulated the emotions of their audience between “good” and “bad” in an effort to 
gauge its role in the endowment effect.  The endowment effect is “the tendency for minimum 
selling price to exceed maximum buying price for a particular object”.291  The researchers 
found that the endowment effect occurs when good emotions are induced, whereas it is 
absent when bad emotions are induced.292  In essence then, making people feel good allows 
the seller to gain profits because people who feel good are more willing to pay higher prices. 
5.3.3 The manipulation of meaning in advertising 
Paul Ricoeur developed an in-depth philosophy concerning the creation of meaning through 
the use of metaphor.  He explains: “The maker of metaphors is this craftsman with verbal 
skill who, from an inconsistent utterance for a literal interpretation, draws a significant 
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utterance for a new interpretation which deserves to be called metaphorical because it 
generates the metaphor not only as deviant but as acceptable. In other words, metaphorical 
meaning does not merely consist of a semantic clash but of the new predicative meaning 
which emerges from the collapse of the literal meaning, that is, from the collapse of the 
meaning which obtains if we rely only on the common or usual lexical values of our 
words.”293  Metaphor happens when something is said in such a way that the literal meaning 
gives way to a newly created meaning. 
In a recent study McQuarrie & Phillips combines the concept of implicature with metaphor 
and studies what one may call the perlocutionary effect thereof in advertising: “We shall 
argue that indirect claims, such as those using metaphor, may be advantageous because they 
render the consumer more receptive to multiple, distinct, positive inferences about the 
advertised brand.” They extend metaphor to the use of images when they say: “In addition, an 
indirect metaphorical claim presented in a picture enjoys a further advantage because such 
inferences are more likely to be generated spontaneously at the time of ad exposure.”294  They 
state that “[m]etaphors represent a type of indirect claim because they make claims in  a 
figurative way rather than a literal way – the advertising message is not stated outright but 
only implied…”295  Their study proceeds to test the hypothesis that indirect claims through 
visual metaphor provides a specific advantage to the advertiser.  This advantage lies in the 
way that the consumer processes the indirect claims.  In essence, the use of visual metaphor 
elicits the generation of strong and weak implicatures: “According to linguists Sperber and 
Wilson (1986), there are two basic kinds of inferences that can be drawn in response to a 
message: (1) strong implicatures, and (2) weak implicatures.”296 A strong implicature is the 
single most obvious inference that one is likely to make when faced with a visual metaphor, 
whilst weak implicatures are inferences that are peripheral to the strong implicature. 
McQuarrie & Phillips state that weak implicatures “are best thought of as inferences 
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generated as part of an attempt to comprehend advertiser intent.”297  From their study the 
following to conclusions are relevant namely: a) “...the findings show that the use of 
metaphorical claims in ads appears to make consumers receptive to multiple, distinct, positive 
inferences about the advertised brand (i.e. weak implicatures), while still conveying the main 
message of the ad (i.e. strong implicature).  Furthermore, metaphors presented in pictorial 
form are able to elicit these multiple inferences spontaneously at the time of ad exposure.” 
and; b) “A further implication of this study is that verbal rhetorical figures in ads may be less 
effective that visual figures.”298  
From the above it follows that implied information through the use of visual metaphors 
generates a positive experience for consumers through the spontaneous generation of weak 
implicatures.  The question however remains whether or not these implicatures are truthful. 
5.3.4 Problem of measuring disinformation in implicatures 
Dariusz Galasinki distinguishes two types of deception – the first, omission, is the act of 
withholding information that will induce a false belief: “Withholding information, controlling 
it, is the essence of deception in general – if the target had access to all information relevant 
in a given communicative situation, deception would be impossible. A passive deceiver, 
however, offers nothing to distort or falsify reality; the passive deceiver is silent and merely 
conceals a piece of information…”299  On the other hand Galasinki shows that deception can 
be an act of commission: “An active deceiver, one who engages in an act of deception by 
commission, causally contributes to the target’s acquiring or continuing a belief that suits the 
purposes of the deceiver.  This can be done in two ways: by information explicitly conveyed 
in the utterance or by information that is implicit.”300  Implicatures are then by default acts of 
commission. 
Earlier in the study it was shown that, when the maxims of the Cooperative Principle are 
violated, a speaker is liable to mislead.  Galasinski notes the following: “Having established 
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the Gricean conceptual framework, McCornack (1992) shows messages that violate the four 
conversational maxims.  Thus, omissions as well as messages involving varying degrees of 
informativeness violate the maxim of quantity; quality violations, being the prototypical 
‘deceptive messages’, involve ‘distorted’ versions of the sensitive information or the 
presentation of completely fabricate information; speakers who violate the maxim of relation 
attempt to divert the course of conversation from potential disclosure of ‘dangerous’ 
information; finally, manner violations involve ambiguity.”301   
Using the Gricean framework as a tool to identify disinformation may not be effective.  
Disinformation is defined as the information that is disseminated during the process of 
disinforming.  The process of disinforming has the following characteristics: 
1. The act of information dissemination. 
2. The belief by the source that the information is false. 
3. The source foresees that the target will believe the information. 
4. The information is in fact false. 
5. It is reasonably expected that the target will believe the information. 
When the Gricean framework is applied to visual metaphor it is problematic in the following 
ways: 
1. It cannot measure the motive to mislead (foreseeing that the target will believe the 
information and the reasonable expectation that the target will believe the 
information). 
2.  It cannot measure the belief by the source that the information is misleading or 
deceptive. 
The second of these shortcomings is further complicated by the fact that advertising is in 
general heavily regulated in order to curb deception.  For example, advertising in the United 
States is regulated by the FTC – they provide the following general guidelines for advertisers: 
“Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: 
• Advertising must be truthful and non-deceptive; 
• Advertisers must have evidence to back up their claims; and 
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• Advertisements cannot be unfair.”302 
 
The FTC also provides a definition for when an advertisement is regarded as deceptive: 
“According to the FTC's Deception Policy Statement, an ad is deceptive if it contains a 
statement - or omits information - that: 
• Is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances; and 
• Is ‘material’ - that is, important to a consumer's decision to buy or use the product.”303 
Advertisers have learned that, in order to remain legally clear in their advertising, they should 
avoid making false statements.  What is interesting about this definition for deceptive 
advertising is that it refers to a false statement; however, there seems to be very little in the 
way of regulating implied information.  One possible reason for this is that the implicatures 
are generated by the audience – this has two possible implications, firstly, when something is 
unstated an advertiser could easily maintain that the interpretation was simply a by-product of 
the imagination of the complainant and secondly, deception can only be measured after the 
fact.  McQuarrie & Phillips took up the issue of regulation: “If it is true that consumers are 
peculiarly vulnerable to pictorial metaphors, then legal protections may need to evolve 
beyond a focus on whether a claim made in words is true or false towards an emphasis on 
whether a population of typical consumers does or does not spontaneously draw certain 
inferences from the ad in its entirety, including its pictorial components… Whether the legal 
system can evolve to address the possibility of misleading pictorial claims remains to be seen.  
At the least, this study argues for efforts to educate consumers to attend more closely to 
pictorial claims and to scrutinize them more critically…”304  Reece & Ducoffe echoes a 
similar sentiment in their study of implied meaning in brand names: “If standardization of 
meaning is not possible, then one public policy alternative is simply to encourage 
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manufacturers to be explicit in their advertisements and on their packages as to the claims 
and benefits inherent in the brand names. If guidelines are instituted for other terms used in 
brand names, a consumer education program should be built into the new regulations. Such a 
program might be federally funded or might be a joint effort of manufacturers and grocery 
store chains. Any activity undertaken should have as its goal improving consumer 
understanding for better decision making.”305 
5.3.5 A solution for consumers: ask the right questions 
What follows from the above is that, due to the fact that the implicatures are generated by the 
audience, it seems that it is difficult to determine whether or not implied information can be 
defined as disinformation before the fact or at the time of ad exposure.  Disinformation, 
however, can be easily determined after the fact as shown in the studies of McQuarrie & 
Phillips as well as Reece & Ducoffe.  Lord & Kim conducted a study on the effects of the 
executional style of advertisements on consumers, and suggested that, contrary to the findings 
above, there may be a way to inoculate consumers against deception through a method of 
framing.  In essence they studied two framing styles of advertisements (attribute vs. 
emotional) and found that, when an advertisement aligns with the framing preference of the 
subject they will be more susceptible to deception.  They conclude the following: “Since 
framing-style consistency leaves consumers disproportionately susceptible to deception, 
consumers may benefit from an educational program which alerts them to the danger of 
confusing expectancy confirmation with credibility in the evaluation of advertising 
claims.”306  In other words, if the consumer understands that the credibility of an ad is not 
dependent on whether it provides information in the way that consumer prefers, one might be 
less susceptible to deception.  In the manner of Austin – illocution consistent with the 
expectations of the consumer is not equal to truth in the stated or implied claims of the 
advertisement. 
Lord & Kim provide us with the three additional examples of deceptive advertising that is 
difficult to regulate and often appears in advertisements namely 1) puffery, 2) incomplete 
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comparisons and 3) implied-superiority claims.307 Kamins & Marks define puffery as 
follows: “As noted by Preston (20), puffery is legally defined as ‘advertising or other sales 
representations which praise the item to be sold with subjective opinions, superlatives, or 
exaggerations, vaguely and generally, stating no specific facts.’ Examples of puffery include 
some slogans which are extremely familiar to the consumer, such as ‘Nestles [sic] makes the 
very best chocolate,’ ‘You can’t beat the experience…Pan Am’ and ‘Count on the leader, 
Bank of America.’”308  The authors studied the effects of puffery, specifically what they call 
two-sided claims, on product evaluations by consumers: “A two-sided appeal typically 
presents the product in a positive fashion on attributes which are salient or important to brand 
choice, but disclaims or limits product or brand performance claims on some attributes which 
are of relatively minor significance to the consumer.  The intent is to establish credibility 
without deterring purchase… Two-sided appeal can be either refutational or non-refutational.  
In a refutational form, the product’s weaknesses or its limitations are refuted in the context of 
the communication, whereas in a non-refutational form, the weakness is presented without 
any attempt at refutation.”309 In essence their study found that extreme puffery is ineffective, 
however moderate one-sided puffery influences consumer ratings of products and that two-
sided refutational puffery has the greatest influence.310 
Shimp defines incomplete comparisons as follows: “Incomplete comparative advertising is 
illustrated by such unqualified advertising claims as ‘Brand X is better’ and ‘Brand Y will get 
your dishes cleaner.’ The receiver of such claims must infer what brands X and Y are better 
than and with regard to what… such claims are misleading by virtue of being inherently 
susceptible to multiple interpretations, some of which may be false.”311 He goes on to prove 
in his study that subjects made inferences, not just that of completing the statement, but even 
                                                
307 Lord, K.R. & Kim, C.K. 1995. “Inoculating Consumers Against Deception: The Influence of Framing and 
Executional Style” in Journal of Consumer Policy, 18: 171 
308 Kamins, M.A. & Marks, L.J. 1987. “Advertising Puffery: The Impact of Using Two-Sided Claims on 
Product Attitude and Purchase Intention” in Journal of Advertising, 16(4): 6 
309 Kamins, M.A. & Marks, L.J. 1987. “Advertising Puffery: The Impact of Using Two-Sided Claims on 
Product Attitude and Purchase Intention” in Journal of Advertising, 16(4): 7 
310 Kamins, M.A. & Marks, L.J. 1987. “Advertising Puffery: The Impact of Using Two-Sided Claims on 
Product Attitude and Purchase Intention” in Journal of Advertising, 16(4): 13 
311 Shimp, T.A. 1978. “Do Incomplete Comparisons Mislead?” in Journal of Advertising Research, 18 (6): 21 
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beyond that.312  His study reflects the findings of McQuarrie & Phillips who found evidence 
for strong and weak implicatures.  As an introduction to the title of his study, Shimp suggests 
that, when commercials fail to complete the comparison, the question that needs to be asked 
is “Better than what?”313 
The third type of deceptive technique identified by Lord & Kim is implied-superiority claims. 
Rita Snyder defines implied-superiority claims as follows: “An implied superiority claim, 
such as ‘No leading brand gets rid of dandruff better than Selsun Blue,’ presents a statement 
of parity that may be understood as suggesting superiority.”314 Snyder found that implied-
superiority claims may be misleading to a degree: “…between 28 and 75 percent of the 
subjects in any experimental condition interpreted implied-superiority claims to mean that the 
advertised brand was the best or better than others.”315 
From the four points presented, it follows that consumers can to some degree be educated on 
how to interpret advertising in order to avoid being deceived.  Firstly the consumer can 
become more aware of their illocutionary preference and become more sensitive to their 
response to advertisements that play to this preference.  Secondly, the consumer can learn to 
recognise two-sided refutational appeals and choose to remain as objective in their buying 
choices as possible.  Thirdly, consumers can learn to recognise incomplete comparisons and 
ask the question “Better than what?”  Finally consumers can learn to recognise implied-
superiority claims and seek out information that can help them make factual comparisons 
between brands. 
The same deceptive techniques can be applied to pictorial advertisements.  The following 
examples have been created specifically for this study: 
                                                
312 Shimp, T.A. 1978. “Do Incomplete Comparisons Mislead?” in Journal of Advertising Research, 18 (6): 27 
313 Shimp, T.A. 1978. “Do Incomplete Comparisons Mislead?” in Journal of Advertising Research, 18 (6): 21 
314 Snyder, R. 1989. “Misleading Characteristics of Implied-Superiority Claims” in Journal of Advertising, 
18(4): 54 
315 Snyder, R. 1989. “Misleading Characteristics of Implied-Superiority Claims” in Journal of Advertising, 
18(4): 60 
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Figure 12 - Example of an emotional frame 
Earlier in the study we used the baker’s advertisement as way to state the problem of how 
implied information can be generated without direct or stated falsity.  The way in which it has 
been designed is also a very good example of an emotional frame.  Rather than provide 
attributes of the cakes he sells, Ben Baker makes an emotional case – one that exudes the 
happiness of a birthday boy, and the urgency to place the order. 
 
Figure 13 - Example of a two-sided refutational appeal 
In Figure 13 we see a good example of a two-sided refutational appeal.  The advertisement 
clearly highlights the underpowered engine, but appeals to the style conscious market on a 
budget.  In contrasting the ugly military style vehicle with the more stylish LX1300, the 
advertiser emphasis style over power.  Moreover, with the statement that “Style is better” 
there is another incomplete comparison.  
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Figure 14 - Example of an incomplete comparison 
Figure 14 shows an example of an incomplete comparison – in a sea of brown beer bottles; 
the green bottle used by Brewers Premium Beer stands out in comparison.  But it leaves the 
question open – in comparison to what?  In this way the consumer is allowed to infer the 
comparison which may lead to deception – the bottle, after all, is not what makes the beer.  
 
 
Figure 15 - Example of an implied superiority claim 
In Figure 15 we meet Darren Beuer a fictional five-
time gold medallist in men’s swimming (in an 
unknown tournament).  He uses Arum cologne and 
since Darren is a superior swimmer, this must mean 
that he makes superior choices with regards to the 
scent he wears.  The implied claim that Arum is 
somehow superior to other colognes by virtue of its 
association with a sport star makes no sense in an 
empirical manner, yet it remains an effective 
advertising technique. 
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5.4. Disinformation in the Adaptive Toolbox 
5.4.1. Analysing disinformation using the F&FH frame 
Implicatures can be misleading.  If metaphors have been created specifically for the purpose 
of generating misleading weak implicatures, then said implicatures can be defined as 
disinformation.  It has been shown that brands are often forced to resort to such tactics of 
persuasion as they may not have a unique competitive position in the market for a given 
product, because all of the competing brands provide similar quality and composition of the 
given product. 
When faced with such an advertisement, can one use the principles of F&FH to identify 
disinformation?  Stated differently – it is possible to determine cue veracity using the 
principles of F&FH?  There are two ways of approaching this question – the first is to define 
“truth” and argue according that definition, alternatively one could use the definition of 
disinformation and test the principles of F&FH accordingly.  It was shown in this study that 
the concept of truth is not only difficult to define, but has been a key question in philosophy 
for millennia.  This study will therefore not attempt a definition beyond correspondence and 
coherence.  However, disinformation has been well defined – this definition will be used to 
test the principles of F&FH through using examples provided throughout the study. 
5.4.2.1 The mints problem 
As a thought experiment, earlier in the study an example was provided of a shopper wanting 
to buy mints.  It was shown that, using the heuristic of Tallying, the shopper would select a 
product he deems as satisfying to his goal of “fresh breath” for “as long as possible”.  In the 
particular instance it was speculated that the heuristic of Tallying might have been used to 
deduce which packet of sweets to buy.  For the purpose of description the example may as 
well have used the heuristic of Take The Best (where cues are sequentially analysed to 
determine which alternative is the best)316, Imitation (where the shopper would have imitated 
another person in his selection)317 or even Take The First (where he did not spend much time 
analysing the environment and simply took the first option that, from experience, would 
                                                
316Todd, P.M. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 59  
317 Goldstein, D.G. et al. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 174 
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satisfy his aspiration)318.  Even though some questions were derived from this example, it was 
shown that F&FH could be used to describe how the shopper came to make his choice.  The 
purpose of this, and the next, example is to investigate to which extent the F&FH framework 
can support better decisions when a person is faced with implicature-type disinformation. 
In the example in Chapter 3 the shopper decided to buy Super Mints, the new product, that 
was selected based on tallying the cues that related to the shopper’s requirement for fresh 
breath.  It was shown however that the shopper selected an inferior product and therefore, 
even though the tallied cues in the environment led him to Super Mints, he made a wrong 
choice. 
If the shopper was to use the Take The Best Heuristic he would have processed cues 
sequentially until one cue directed him to one or the other product.  In this case, if he 
approached the sweets from one end of the aisle he might have encountered the sweets in the 
following sequence: Musk, Strong Mints, Super Mints.  In this case he would possibly have 
stopped his search at Strong Mints as it contained the first cue that indicated a possible 
alternative to satisfy his aspiration level.  If he approached the sweets from the other end of 
the aisle he would have encountered Super Mints first and selected that. 
If he relied on his previous experience of Strong Mints the Recognition Heuristic might have 
been induced – in this case he would have walked to the sweets aisle and selected Strong 
Mints as the only option, and only have considered Super Mints if Strong Mints were out of 
stock.  The Recognition Heuristic exploits the lack of knowledge319 – the shopper did not 
know anything about the new brand of breath mints and, presuming the Recognition Heuristic 
was induced, would select the mints he recognizes from previous experience. 
In yet another scenario the Imitation Heuristic might have been induced where he might have 
imitated his favourite movie star, his girlfriend or his best friend in their choice of breath 
mints – if the movie star preferred Super Mints, then the shopper might have imitated him 
and selected the same product. The “imitate if better” rule might apply since it assumes that 
people will follow the decisions by those they regard more successful than themselves.320 
                                                
318 Goldstein, D.G. et al. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 177 
319 Goldstein, D.G. et al. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 187 
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As much as it is speculative, the argument shows that the programme of F&FH at the very 
least shows some potential in its descriptive attempts of how decisions are made using these 
mental shortcuts, presuming that one accepts the concept of heuristics in the first place.  The 
heuristic that will normally be induced would depend on the environment (which sweets are 
available, how they are displayed etc.) and the limitations of the shopper’s knowledge of 
different mint brands and the time he has to gather information about his selection. 
Prescriptive models in JDM prescribe methods for decision making improves the chances of 
a better decision.321  From this perspective it must first be clear what the decision making 
problem is – it was stated in the example that the shopper had a goal of “fresh breath” with an 
aspiration level of “for as long as possible” and that two products competed for his attention.  
The first, Strong Mints, lasts an hour per lozenge and the second, Super Mints, lasts for 30 
minutes.  Based on this information, the best decision would have been to take Strong Mints 
because that would in reality have been the best option.  The problem is that Super Mints 
presented information is such a way as to elicit implicature-type disinformation that will 
mislead the shopper in terms of the actual strength of the product.  Could the study of 
ecological rationality prescribe a better heuristic to help the shopper identify implicature-type 
disinformation and the lead him to a better decision?  As has been discussed in the study, 
proponents of the F&FH programme claim that the environment must be studied in order to 
match it with the best heuristic.  
Two questions arise: firstly, if implicature-type disinformation is generated by the perceiver 
of a metaphor or text, does this newly generated piece of information exist in the ecology of 
the decision maker?  Gigerenzer may argue that the information exists in the memory of the 
decision maker and therefore could act as a cue.322 If this is the case, then any heuristic that 
relies on this cue will be bound to lead to an inferior decision as the cue provides misleading 
information.  Secondly, if one were to prescribe analysis of a cue, would the prescribed 
process still be fast and frugal? Heuristics are fast because they act as shortcuts and as such 
they preclude any extended analysis of cues. They are frugal because they do not use a lot of 
resources (processing power and knowledge).  If cues are to be analysed then the rational 
                                                
321 As discussed in Chapter 2 
322 For a discussion on memory within the F&FH context see: Hoffrage U. & Hertwig, R. 1999. “Hindsight Bias 
– A Price Worth Paying for Fast and Frugal Memory” in Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart: 195 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
124 
process involved will take more time and processing power.  Applied to the mints problem, 
the shopper would have to take the time to visit the web site on the Super Mints package to 
ascertain whether or not it is truly a superior product.  This would be an approach that is 
neither fast nor frugal. 
If the F&FH provides normative insights in terms of the rationality of choices made with 
heuristics that are well matched to environments, then the mints problem highlights a key 
issue – it may happen that, using only heuristics to make decisions, people select alternatives 
that do not satisfy an aspiration level of a specific goal.  It was noted earlier in the study that 
neither Gigerenzer, nor other researchers in the programme, claim that heuristics are always 
effective or accurate, only that they may be as accurate as the norms suggested by the H&B 
programme in certain situations.  As a norm, the match between heuristics and an 
environmental structure will obviously not fare well where implicature-type disinformation is 
present due to an exclusive reliance on cues of which the veracity is not tested.  Even if the 
heuristic is well matched to the environment (e.g. the mints problem) it may result in the 
decision maker selecting an alternative that may not satisfy his aspiration level – the decision 
maker would have acted rationally and still have made a bad decision.  The question that 
arises from this analysis is then as follows: what value does ecological rationality provide in 
the normative sense other than being descriptive of what a rational (yet potentially fallible) 
choice consists of?  
5.4.2.2 The baker problem 
In another thought experiment, Ben Baker was introduced with a specific problem.  The 
problem was that he faced competition from other bakeries and grocery stores with cake sales 
and needed a way to gain a competitive advantage.  In terms of service quality, product 
quality and value-based pricing Ben is on par with the competitors and has very little that 
differentiates him from the competition.  Ben decides to take out an advertisement in the local 
paper to boost sales (Figure x) that depicts a small boy that is celebrating his first birthday.  
The advertisement states in its heading “Great cakes make for happy birthdays” and has a 
subheading that states “Call early to place your order.”  None of these sentences provide false 
information, however it doesn’t provide any factual information about Ben’s bakery either.  
As such it is an emotionally framed advertisement that is aimed to elicit a response from 
mothers who have small children.  Ben knows from experience that mothers become very 
stressed when putting together a children’s party and created this advertisement to speak to 
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this need for having a successful party.  The subheading is a directive that makes it clear that 
Ben Baker has a full schedule and requires mothers to order early. 
 
Figure 16 - Ben Baker's Advertisement 
The baker problem is different to the mints problem in one critical aspect, namely that the 
advertisement is not necessarily read at the time when the decision to buy a specific cake is 
made.  Rather, the advertisement acts as a piece of information that aims to create a positive 
attitude towards Ben Baker with potential customers.  This advertisement will form part of 
the internal framework of decision makers when their child’s birthday comes around.  The 
strong implicature in this advertisement is “Ben Baker sells cakes” with potential weak 
implicatures that can range from “the cakes will help me host a good children’s party” to “my 
child will be happy with this cake.” 
This kind of advertisement highlights perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the F&FH 
programme namely its inability to properly account for internalised cues.  Some researchers 
do make note of memory as a point of retrieval323 however the lack of a unified theory on 
bounded rationality and ecological rationality (specifically with regards to the description of 
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the environmental structure324) makes it difficult to pinpoint the role of memory and internal 
cues to the decision making process.  Following the concept of ecological rationality, there is 
little clarity how internalised information (knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and so forth) is 
accounted for during the decision making process. 
Not only does Ben Baker succeed in creating a competitive position through an emotional 
frame, he succeeds in creating an internal point of reference – a good memory that was 
developed through the manipulation of emotions – that becomes part of the information that 
the decision maker will use when they need to buy a birthday cake for a toddler.  Ben cannot 
guarantee the success of a party, but through association he created the impression that his 
cakes will contribute to “happy birthdays”.  He didn’t lie, but the inference following from 
this, as well as the emotional attachment, creates a differentiation that does not necessarily 
reflect a good decision.  For example, it might be that for a specific customer, Ben’s bakery is 
quite far away when a grocery store selling a similar product may be just around the corner.  
As such the cake from Ben’s bakery would potentially satisfy the goal, but it may not be the 
best alternative because of opportunity costs. 
As mentioned before, Gigerenzer is quite clear that the use of fast and frugal heuristics does 
not necessarily lead to better decisions: “The moral is not that people would never err, but 
that in order to understand good and bad judgments, one needs to analyze the structure of the 
problem or of the natural environment.”325 Gigerenzer might argue that one could understand 
why the decision to buy from Ben’s Bakery is a less optimal one as the heuristics employed 
did not cater for additional variables such as travelling distance.  In this manner it would 
perform a descriptive function.  That said, even if the F&FH programme helped explain why 
the decision was less optimal it may not be able to provide a better way of making decisions 
in the context of daily tasks or decisions that are somewhat less critical than heart patients. 326 
Taking the prescriptive issue a step further one might ask: what prescriptive solution would 
the F&FH programme recommend for better decision making in this scenario?  There are a 
                                                
324 As noted by Goldstein et al. in the discussion on the shortcomings of F&FH in: Goldstein, D.G. et al. 2002. 
Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 188 
325 Gigerenzer, G. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 66  
326 In reference to an example of a fast and frugal tree designed for coronary care unit decisions in: Gigerenzer, 
G. 2007. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment & Decision Making: 81 
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few references to examples of the prescriptive application of fast and frugal decision trees in 
medical contexts as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, but can one develop a fast and 
frugal tree for buying cakes?  What about buying bread, milk, cereal, dishwashing liquid, 
toilet paper, cars or any other product which is heavily marketed through the use of pictorial 
metaphor?  Gigerenzer & Todd answers the question in this way: “…specificity can also be a 
danger: If a different heuristic were required for every lightly different decision-making 
environment, we would need an unworkable multitude of heuristics to reason with, and we 
would not be able to generalize to previously unencountered environments.  Fast and frugal 
heuristics avoid this trap by their very simplicity, which allows them to be robust in the face 
of environmental change and enables them to generalize well to new situations.”327  
As with the mints problem, the cues in the environmental structure of the mom who wants to 
buy a birthday cake may include pieces of implicature-type disinformation.  Heuristics, from 
the F&FH perspective, rely on cues and will lead to suboptimal decisions in the context of 
consumer choice.  The same prescriptive issue therefore arises from the baker problem 
namely that no heuristic that fully relies on cues from the environmental structure 
differentiates the veracity of the cues – verifying cues will inherently require time and 
processing power as well as a conscious effort to find “true” cues.  Once this conscious effort 
takes place it is no longer a heuristic that allows the decision maker to be rational.  In 
addition, the baker problem highlights another issue, namely that the definition of heuristics 
seem self-contradictory.  They are described as domain specific, yet they are also described 
as robust.  It may be argued that a heuristic will apply to the domain of “shopping” and be 
robust in the sense that, for example Take The Best, would apply in most shopping situations. 
This leads to a further question however namely: how big can a domain be before a heuristic 
becomes domain general?  For example, one may argue that shopping for a car is not the 
same as shopping for bread – how will the F&FH programme distinguish the boundaries of a 
domain to which a heuristic is matched? 
5.5 Shortcomings in the Fast & Frugal Heuristics Programme 
This study posed a question on the way in which the F&FH programme is useful in 
uncovering disinformation.   From the two main examples it was firstly found that F&FH 
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may not be able to effectively differentiate implicatures as part of the set of cues that assists 
decision makers in the process of selecting an alternative. Even though F&FH refers to 
emotions as powerful building blocks of heuristics328, the implicatures are not necessarily 
emotional, and because they are not part of an experience based on the environment, it is 
difficult to say whether it is part of the memory or not.  In the mints problem the shopper did 
not make an emotional choice over which packet of mints he wanted, he merely responded to 
the cues and generated implicatures that confirmed his choice in an informational manner.  
Secondly there seems to be no way to establish cue veracity – instead many studies in F&FH 
focus on cue validity which makes no statement about how a decision maker can differentiate 
between truth and deception.  Thirdly it was found that the F&FH framework does not 
adequately describe the role of internalised information (in the form of knowledge, attitudes 
or beliefs amongst others) in the decision making process.  Finally, in reference to social 
rationality, the F&FH framework may attempt to include cues that are socially generated 
however it remains focused on the individual agent as an independent entity rather than a 
relational being that is constantly influenced by other agents.  It simply does not take the 
notion of language use as a joint activity fully into account. 
The study of the two examples aimed to determine whether the F&FH framework carries the 
descriptive, prescriptive and normative power claimed by Gigerenzer when cues carry 
implicature-type disinformation.  The examples given showed that heuristics have the ability 
to potentially describe how decisions are made but, due to emphasis on the environment, is 
unable to explain how the veracity of cues is determined.  People have been deceiving each 
other for longer than history is recorded – if Galasinski is to be believed, deception is 
embedded in our societies and cultures.  If heuristics are truly as adaptive and effective as 
Gigerenzer claimed, why is it that, after millennia of deception, people still believe lies?  
Why haven’t we developed heuristics that can assist us in finding and processing 
disinformation?  The conclusion is clear – the F&FH programme currently lacks the depth 
and coherence required to process some of the most basic information manipulation 
techniques used in everyday language.  Any prescriptive force it may carry loses impotence 
in the face of inconsistencies in theories and related findings.  Furthermore, due to the fact 
that the veracity of cues cannot be determined without higher computational costs and time, 
any prescriptive rule using fast and frugal heuristics will inevitably rely on false information 
                                                
328 Gigerenzer, G. 2002. Bounded Rationality – The Adaptive Toolbox: 45 - 45 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
129 
that will lead to potentially bad decisions.  Finally, it was found that the F&FH programme, 
as a response to the H&B programme, is to some degree a repetition of an age old 
philosophical debate between rationalism and empiricism – it does not bode well for a theory 
that repeats the mistakes of the past, especially when its founding researcher is a proponent of 
interdisciplinary information exchange.  The empirical approach effectively precludes a 
researcher in the F&FH programme to determine how things like meaning or attitude 
influences decisions as it is explicitly ignored.329 
5.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 started off with an investigation into the truth condition of the F&FH programme – 
early in the study it was confirmed that ecological rationality relates to the truth theory of 
correspondence, however it was also assumed that cues are “truth neutral” and that F&FH 
uses the concept of cue validity to indicate how decisions are made.  The two key questions 
regarding the manipulation of meaning and cue veracity was reiterated as a starting point for 
the analyses that followed. 
It was shown that advertising turns people towards a product or service – it is a complete 
language act that constitutes of locution, illocution and perlocution that attempts to persuade 
consumers through the establishment of beliefs through different frames.  Various pros and 
cons of advertising were discussed.  It was shown that manipulation of the environment has a 
measurable effect on consumers.  It was further shown that manipulation of meaning through 
the creation of pictorial metaphors in advertising carry the most influence on consumers.  
Several pictorial examples were provided. 
A thought experiment using two examples of advertisements was discussed in an attempt to 
apply the F&FH framework to implicature-type disinformation.  The first example provided 
implicature-type disinformation at the point of decision, whereas the second example 
provided implicature-type disinformation that would influence future decisions.  It was found 
that many of the cues in the first example cannot be fully defined as disinformation using the 
definition provided by Fallis as they are inferred rather than disseminated.  Moreover, 
recollection of memories (cues from memory) is neither inferred nor disseminated which may 
                                                
329 “The ABC program dispenses with the focus on coherence criteria (e.g., the laws of probability) as the 
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indicate a different class of information altogether.  It was shown that, even though the F&FH 
framework succeeds in giving a plausible description of decision making processes, it poses 
its prescriptive and normative force in the light of implicature-type disinformation.  In the 
second example it was shown that implied information may affect future decisions, but once 
again, due to a lack of integration between cues from memory and internalised information 
(such as attitudes, beliefs etc.), F&FH fails to fully describe how such decisions are made.  
More importantly, any prescriptive decision trees that rely strictly on cues from the 
environment will inevitably lead to suboptimal decision outcomes as the cues may contain 
disinformation.  Finally it was shown that the insistence upon a fully independent rational 
agent inhibits a full exploration of the relational aspects of decision making. 
The final conclusion reached is that the F&FH programme does not provide adequate and 
useful norms or prescriptions for decision making when a decision maker is faced with 
implicature-type disinformation.  At the very best, presuming that one accepts heuristics as 
the decision making tools Gigerenzer proposes, F&FH can provide adequate descriptions of 
how decisions are made. 
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Chapter  6  
Conclusion  
6.1 Summary of findings 
Does the programme of F&FH provide adequate and useful norms, descriptions and 
prescriptions for decision making when the decision maker is faced with implicature-type 
disinformation? 
Chapter 2 poses a seemingly simple question namely: “What are the underpinnings of 
Judgement and Decision Making?”  The chapter takes a two-pronged approach to the 
question: firstly the philosophical history of the discipline is investigated in the form of 
rationalism and empiricism with their related theories of truth.  Secondly the chapter 
identifies and examines the three underlying assumptions of JDM namely, that man is 
rational, decisions follow norms and that decisions have a utility fulfilment function.  The 
duality of the underlying philosophies is kept by elucidating the differences between the two 
forms of rationality most often discussed in JDM namely unbounded (or pure) and bounded 
rationality.  Various related terms (e.g. satisficing and search) are introduced.  The chapter 
finds that JDM at the very least shows a clear rift between proponents of unbounded 
rationality and those of bounded rationality, and that this rift reflects similar arguments 
between that of rationalism and empiricism.  As such is it concluded that the current debate 
between the two perspectives on rationality is a continuation of the original philosophical 
differences between Plato and Aristotle. 
Chapter 3 posed the question: "What is the Fast & Frugal Heuristics programme?" The 
chapter introduces the H&B programme and proposes that the F&FH programme was 
developed as a response.  The key differences between the two programmes are discussed to 
highlight why F&FH places emphasis on particular issues such as bounded rationality.  
F&FH is then discussed in terms of the three underlying questions posed by the founding 
researchers that relates to the nature of the adaptive toolbox, the character and function of 
ecological rationality and practical applications of the theory.  The chapter finally 
investigates information and the truth condition of F&FH and relates an example of a 
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problematic decision making process that relies on deceptive implied information.  This 
chapter finds that the F&FH programme is seen by its founding researcher as capable of 
delivering normative, descriptive and prescriptive insights. 
Chapter 4 poses the question: "What is disinformation" and answer it by contextualising the 
use of language as a joint activity.  The chapter shows through a careful historical and 
conceptual overview how disinformation developed from rhetoric through advertising, and 
that it is used strategically by enterprises with a profit motive in order to establish a 
competitive advantage.  The concept of disinformation is defined using the framework of 
disinforming provided by Fallis and is then applied to the notion of implicata to show that 
implied information may also be recognised as disinformation. 
Chapter 5 poses the final question of the thesis namely: "Does Fast & Frugal Heuristics 
uncover disinformation?"  The nature of advertising is discussed in more depth to establish an 
objective perspective on the benefits and drawbacks of the practice.  Deceptive techniques in 
advertising and sales are highlighted with special reference to those techniques in advertising 
that relies on generating weak implicatures.  The effect of weak implicatures is examined 
through the use of two examples in a thought experiment - one of a shopper faced with an 
immediate decision, and one of an advertisement that informs a future decision.  The F&FH 
framework is applied to the examples to investigate to which extent F&FH provides 
normative, descriptive and prescriptive mechanisms to process disinformation.  The chapter 
finds that F&FH can effectively describe how certain kinds of decisions are made, but with 
regards to the examples provided, fail in accommodating disinformation, and (due to a heavy 
reliance on environmental cues) struggles to deal with cues generated as inferences from 
implicatures.  Various shortcomings in the theory of F&FH is discussed with the final 
conclusion made that F&FH in its current format cannot provide effective normative and 
prescriptive outcomes when implicature-type disinformation forms part of the environment, 
even when it can provide adequate descriptions of how decisions are made. 
6.2 Conclusions reached 
In terms of the key research question, it is concluded that the programme of F&FH lacks the 
necessary definition and depth to provide normative and prescriptive outputs that are useful 
under conditions of disinformation and specifically implicature-type disinformation.  A 
number of remarks can be made with respect to this conclusion: 
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Firstly, proponents of the F&FH programme are very positive about the work that has already 
been done with regards to a more realistic understanding of human decision making and 
resulting normative and prescriptive insights.  At the same time most researchers will fully 
admit to numerous shortcomings in the theoretical foundations of the programme, in the 
approaches to testing theories as well as the results of currently available tests themselves.  
Secondly, even though there is a general admission of the importance of social and cultural 
elements in decision making, F&FH still remains intrinsically individualist and does not take 
issues such as motive, attitude and intent fully into account.  As such it will always fail to 
recognise deception and disinformation as those form part of a language act that is 
specifically designed around hidden motives and specialised persuasion techniques.  As much 
as proponents of this programme claim it to reflect a more realistic perspective on human 
decision making, it still very much suffers from an attempt to establish a model that is 
somehow removed from the human experience. 
Thirdly, F&FH will not be able to break free from the underlying issues it faces without 
breaking free from its philosophical underpinnings. F&FH still remains primarily empiricist 
through its behaviourist/positivist characteristics in its underlying assumptions and 
application and as such fails to recognise the validity of concepts such as meaning, belief and 
attitude.  If George Ladd’s observation in Chapter 2 is to be taken seriously, the kind of 
empiricism presented by F&FH that explicitly ignores the mentalistic issues that coherent, 
rational inquiry brings, is empty of scientific value. True advances in JDM will be had once 
the age old questions of rationalism versus empiricism are laid to rest and fresh perspectives 
on the concept of reality and truth surface. 
Throughout the study a number of other questions and criticisms arise: 
1. How would Gigerenzer defend the claim that F&FH represents real-world decision 
making when, due to his heavy reliance on laboratory tests and Peter Todd’s 
admission that it is difficult to effectively reflect real-world conditions in a 
laboratory, his findings reflect laboratory results and not results from real-world 
environments? 
 
In the material presented Gigerenzer indicates that F&FH represents real-world 
decision making which, based on the evidence presented, is an indefensible position. 
It is clearly one thing to construct carefully planned laboratory situations that could 
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potentially reflect real-world decision making whereas it is quite another to test 
decision making in actual day-to-day conditions.  It is the conviction of the 
researcher that Gigerenzer overstates the descriptive power of the F&FH 
programme. 
2. How is Gigerenzer’s claim that heuristics allow people to make decisions under 
constraints of limited time and knowledge any more positive than the statement 
made by Kahneman, Tversky and Slovic to the same effect when Gigerenzer admits 
that heuristics are indeed fallible? 
Based on the findings in this study, it seems as if the major difference between 
F&FH and its predecessor, H&B, is a matter of emphasis in this regard.  Kahneman, 
Tversky & Slovic are by no means completely only negative about the role of 
heuristics as a mechanism of decision making.  F&FH is also not completely positive 
about precisely how effective heuristics are in decision making, openly admitting to 
its fallibility.  The negative light shed on H&B by proponents of F&FH seems unfair 
to the contribution it made to research in the field of JDM. 
3. How does the F&FH approach explain the role of active manipulation of the 
environment by people with intent when the underlying theory implies that the 
decision maker merely responds to environmental cues? 
With the capacity to manipulate environments, and consequently the actions of 
others, people cannot be described as merely reactive agents.  The simple fact that 
advertisements exist points to the proactive abilities of companies to ensure that they 
achieve sales.  Even though this study found that Gigerenzer makes no claim to 
defining the concept of bound rationality, evidence was found to indicate that 
proponents of F&FH regards the theory as effectively descriptive of real-word 
decision making. A theory that portrays humans as reactive agents lack the 
robustness to effectively describe decision making – this seems to be the case with 
F&FH.   
4. How does the F&FH programme explain why people haven’t evolved beyond 
disinformation when a) the adaptive toolbox is an evolutionary concept and b) 
people have been faced with all sorts of deception throughout the history of 
mankind? 
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The issue of deception in decision making does not feature prominently in research 
conducted within the F&FH programme.  No evidence was found that indicates how 
the adaptive toolbox as a concept withstands circumstances where evolutionary 
mechanisms are exploited at the cost of the decision maker.  This study explored 
how advertising developed over centuries and have evolved to the fine art of 
eliciting desired consumer behaviour.  Presuming that the adaptive toolbox functions 
as described, different forms of deception in advertising (content notwithstanding) 
should theoretically become less and less effective. 
6.3 Contribution to the field of decision making 
Any study in the ways of decision making has as an output some contribution to better 
decision making by normal people.  F&FH is quite clear about its attempt to describe the way 
in which normal people make decisions and to provide prescriptive tools for better decision 
making and normative inputs through empirical findings. 
This study highlighted a number of critical, fundamental flaws in the F&FH programme.  It is 
hoped that the information in this study provides an impetus for the development of a more 
coherent ecological model that also integrates better with the non-empirical aspects of 
decision making. 
6.4 Opportunities for future research 
This study approached the question of disinformation in context of the F&FH programme 
through an in-depth investigation of the philosophical origins of JDM and the F&FH 
programme, as well as the historical development of disinformation.  The two most 
prominent questions that follow from this study are: 
1. Is there a way in which a coherent model for rationality can be developed that reflects 
both empirical and non-empirical aspects of decision making within a relational 
framework? 
2. What is the nature of implicature-type disinformation, how is it used and how can 
people inoculate themselves against such methods of deception through the use of 
better decision making techniques? 
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